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ARTICLE I.—ARCHETYPES.

WE assume in this paper that there are certain archetypes, according to which all created things are constructed. In saying this, we do not pretend to affirm that these archetypes have an independent, absolute existence, apart from their copies—a question which might provoke us to renew the battles of Scholastic Realism, a kind of warfaring to which we decline to be enticed. In treating the subject, we propose, first, to state the doctrine with illustrations; secondly, to trace its history; and, thirdly, to point out some of its uses and abuses.

And first, by archetype, we mean God's idea of a class of things before He made a single thing of that class. Thus, He had in his mind the model of the *Vertebrates*, animals with a back-bone, as the lion, the eagle, the lizard, the salmon; of the *Articulates*, animals whose bodies are jointed together, or ringed, as the spider, the lobster, the worm; of the *Mollusks*, soft animals, with no internal skeletons, as the cuttle-fish, the nautilus, the snail; of the *Radiates*, animals that radiate out from a centre, as the star-fish, the sea-urchin, the coral. The model of a given class of animals preceded in the Divine Mind any one animal of that class. The plan common to the class preceded any individual of the class. Now these plans, models, original patterns, existing in God's mind before He

made a single plant or a single animal, are what we mean by *Archetypes*. An archetype, therefore, is not a real, actual, objective thing, existing independent of the copy, or of God. It is only a plan, a model, an original pattern in God's mind—an idea, or thought of God. Because Brunel had in his mind the model of a gigantic steamship before he built, or even sketched on paper, the Great Eastern, it does not follow that that model was a real thing. And because God had in his mind certain models or archetypes of all things, it does not follow that these models or archetypes are real things (at least in the ordinary sense of the word real). Archetypes are God's *thoughts* before they are actualized into, or represented in, *things*. They are the typal font of God's ideas impressed on the broad page of the visible creation. And the real end of science is to discover, if possible, these moulding, typal thoughts—these archetypes of God.

The archetypal theory, then, is simply this: all created things are copies, more or less close, of original models.

Having thus defined what we mean by archetypes, let us, in the second place, trace the historic steps by which men have been led to this doctrine—one of the grandest generalizations of the human intellect. We can do this with only the utmost rapidity and meagreness.

Omitting for the present certain remarkable expressions of Moses and David, which we may classify with the "curiosities of literature," we mention, first, the famous arithmetical philosophy of Pythagoras. According to this sage, numbers are the *principia* of the universe, and existing things are a copy of numbers (*μίμησιν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα τῶν ἀριθμῶν*). Hence, also, his poetic conception of the music of the spheres. *Number, the essence of all things*, is the characteristic motto of the Pythagorean school. Numbers are the original (*παρδείγματα*) of all things. Undoubtedly there was much that was very fanciful in this theory; nevertheless, it was based on a permanent and grand element of truth. The sides and angles of crystals, the different parts of plants, the radii of radiates, the whorls of the shells of mollusks, the vertebræ of vertebrates, the chemical equivalents of Dalton, two of the three

laws of Kepler, the law of gravitation itself—all these are laws of numbers. Sir John Herschel, speaking of chemistry, remarks: "It is a character of the deeper laws of nature to assume the form of a precise quantitative statement." Pythagoras, with all his fancies, was right when he discoursed of pattern numbers.

What Pythagoras had done for the doctrine of archetypal numbers, Plato, more than a hundred years later, did for the doctrine of archetypal forms, or rather for the doctrine of archetypes in its most general sense. God is the maker of types ($\tau\omega\nu\ \tau\upsilon\pi\omega\nu$), is his language. We need not dwell on Plato's famous doctrine of the forms ($\epsilonἶδη$), for our readers are fresh from a luminous and eloquent exposition of the doctrine in the pages of this *Review*, by one of our most accomplished scholars. We simply wish to enunciate Plato's doctrine. According to his sublime philosophy, all sensible objects are fashioned after certain objective, immutable patterns or archetypes, existing in or before the Divine Mind from all eternity. He conceived of "an archetypal world which contains intelligibly all that is contained sensibly in our world." We cannot stay to point out what of truth and what of error is involved in Plato's doctrine of archetypes. We allude to it in tracing the history of typology, as the keenest intuition and grandest generalization, in this direction, of antiquity.

A few years later, Aristotle, while correcting some of the extravagances of his great master, as, for example, concerning the objective, independent reality of archetypes, "clung resolutely to the grand central truth that forms were as necessary as matter to the construction of the universe." In fact, the leading principle of his famous classification in zoölogy, the earliest classification extant, was conformity of structure, and community of structure implies a common archetype. But Aristotle was too much of a logician and metaphysician to be a truly philosophic generalizer from observed facts.

Passing by Augustine, one of the loftiest kings in the history of intellectual royalty, who virtually held that the first man was such an archetype that the whole human order formed with him an organism, so that when he fell all fell

with and in him, we come to the Mediaeval Realists, who maintained that classes are universal, had an independent, substantial, absolute existence, apart from the individuals of the class, as the specials of the universal. We allude to Realism merely to show that the very idea of a genus or a species presupposed the idea of a something — an archetype, if you will allow it — common to the genus or the species, and which made the classification possible; and this altogether independently of the question whether it existed, as with the Realists, an actuality, *ante rem*; or with the Nominalists, a pure *ens rationis post rem*; or with the compromise Conceptualists, a semi-real, semi-imaginary something *in re*. Whichever side of the triangular fight you espouse, the *casus belli* is the idea of an archetype, however dimly conceived.

But we must accelerate our pace. We tread now on more solid ground. The spirit of speculation is not allayed, but it is chastened by the spirit of observation. Theory and Fact are now wedded, and the daughter is Science. The historic progress of our theory gathers momentum, too, as the observed facts multiply. We can no longer trace the history of the theory in all the breadth of its widening march. We must content ourselves with surveying its progress in two directions, and those which concern us most nearly as belonging with us to organic life, viz., vegetable and animal archetypes.

In the middle of the eighteenth century, Buffon seems to have seized on the idea of archetypes of organic structures. *Interior moulds of form* is a favorite expression of his. In his theory of the earth, he makes the following statement: "That which is the most constant and unalterable in nature, is the type or form of each species; that which is the most variable and corruptible, is the matter or substance which clothes the form." We are not sure that we precisely understand what the brilliant naturalist means; but we interpret his statement thus, What is constant in nature is the invisible archetype, "the interior mould of form;" what is variable, is the visible form constructed with more or less of modification from the archetype. Buffon's statement is a remarkable one.

Let us now trace rapidly the progress of our doctrine in the direction of vegetable morphology.

In the year 1759 Caspar Frederick Wolff enounced, and in the year 1764 elaborated his doctrine of the identity of all the various organs of a plant. His language is: "In the whole plant we see nothing but leaves and stalk." His idea was that the different parts of a flower are nothing but green leaves in a state of arrested development. Here is a glimpse of our theory as applied to the vegetable kingdom, that all the parts of a plant are modifications of an archetypal leaf.

In his *Prolepsis Plantarum*, published somewhere between 1760 and 1770, the great Swedish botanist, Linnæus, uses this singular phrase: "The principle of flowers and leaves is the same" (*principium florum et foliorum idem est*). He considered the calyx, corolla, stamens, pistil, each as evolved in succession from the leaf, and this evolution he particularly styled *prolepsis*, or *anticipation*. His idea was this: when a plant produces a flower, nature anticipates the regular practice of several years; that is to say, the plant, instead of bearing regular green leaves several years in succession, suddenly brings them all out *simultaneously*, so that the leaves, instead of being usually-shaped and green, become the different parts of the flower. In other words, the flower-leaves are stem-leaves anticipated. Here we have an awkward, bungling, violent attempt by the great botanist to account for what he felt to be, and what has since been shown to be, true, viz., the community of structure throughout all the parts of a plant.

We have now reached what, in view of the point under immediate consideration, we may be pardoned for calling the flowering period in the historic growth of vegetable archetypes. The first distinct enunciation and elaborate unfolding of the grand principle which is now recognized in the councils of science as being the fundamental law of vegetable morphology, was made, not by a distinguished botanist, not by an eminent physicist, but by a man of singularly brilliant and creative fancy, the weird genius to whose name Faust has given immortality. But let no slothful young man, spending his days in dreams, and waiting for the breath of inspiration, or for great achievements to come to him, infer from this

statement that we are indebted for the discovery of a great scientific principle merely to the fancy of a genius, or to the imaginary forms of a poet. "For a half century," says Goethe in the history of his botanical studies, "I have been known as a poet in my own country and abroad. No one thinks of denying me that talent. But it is not generally known that I have also occupied myself seriously through many years with the physical phenomena of nature, observing them with the perseverance which passion alone can give. Thus, when my essay on the *Development of Plants*, published nearly forty years ago, riveted the attention of botanists in Switzerland and France, there seemed no expression for the astonishment at the fact of a poet thus going out of his route to make a scientific discovery so important. It is to combat this false notion that I have written the history of my studies, to show that a great part of my life has been devoted to natural history, for which I had a passion. It is by no sudden, unexpected inspiration of genius, but through long protracted studies, that I arrived at my results."

In 1790, Goethe gave to the world his famous *Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflantzen zu erklären*. His idea was this: All parts of a plant are metamorphoses of its original principle. "Possessed with the idea of a poetic synthesis in Nature," and impelled by the overmastering idea of unity in the vegetable world, he conceived that every part of a plant, leaf, calyx, corolla, stamen, pistil, fruit, are successive metamorphoses of the original cotyledon. Goethe was right in reducing every part of a plant to a community of form, structural (for *form*, in the technical language of morphologists, includes not only figure, but structure, which is the relation or connection of forms), and in establishing the community of form throughout the plant, he laid the foundation of Vegetable Morphology. But Goethe was wrong in representing the floral leaves as metamorphosed stem leaves. In fact, they never have been leaves at all. The true theory, as we believe, is this: not only the floral organs, but every part of the plant, are modifications for special ends, of what we call an archetypal leaf; that is to say, every part of the plant is

constructed on the model of an archetypal leaf. Wolff in 1759, Linnæus between 1760 and 1770, Goethe in 1790, De Candolle in 1827, and Schleiden in 1836, alike asserted the community of form in the folial and the floral leaves. Wolff explained it on the theory of arrested development; *i. e.*, as the sap ran higher it was less pure, and hence the flower was an evidence of imperfection. Linnæus explained it on the theory of anticipation. Goethe explained it on the theory of metamorphosis or development by elaborated sap; *i. e.*, as the sap ran higher, it became more refined, and so, in opposition to Wolff, the flower was an evidence of perfection. De Candolle and Schleiden explained it on the theory of a modified archetypal leaf. This latter theory may now be considered as firmly established. It is grounded on "the abnormal transformations which the parts of flowers undergo by accidents of nutriment and exposure." We cannot doubt the reality of these changes, for they are very frequent, as every observant horticulturist knows. We often find, *e. g.*, branches growing out of the centres of flowers, leaves becoming sepals, sepals becoming petals, petals becoming stamens, and *vice versa*. For example, in some double roses, the stamen often passes from its normal condition into a petal, and this again into a sepal. We all know that the single wild rose, by being cultured, transforms many of its numerous stamens into petals, and thus becomes the deeply folded blossom of the double garden rose. The green rose is a very beautiful instance of the apparent passage of a stem-leaf into a flower.

In fact, the whole art of introducing fresh varieties of a given plant practically rests on the truth of this theory. "Such changes, considered as monstrosities when they are very remarkable, show the tendencies and possibilities belonging to the organization in which they occur." And such exceptions, we may remark in passing, are legitimate instances of the often misapplied truth, that exceptions suggest, illustrate, and prove the rule. We have taken the pains to take the practical testimony of some of the most successful horticulturists of America. One firm, who enjoy an eminent reputation throughout Christendom, have kindly furnished us

with the following cases of transformation, which have come under their own observation. They have noticed "stamens of roses of various classes formed into leaves, wood and flower; also stamens of Opium Poppy, Pæonies, Chinese Primroses, Azaleas, Sun-flowers, converted into petals. They specially observed during the past year the following transformations: *wood-buds*, not leaf- or flower-buds, of pear trees, have made a growth of from twelve to eighteen inches, flowered, and produced fruit." Now, it will not do for us to deny what our eyes actually see, otherwise we may avow ourselves at once as Idealists. These transitional processes have been actually observed. And they must be explained on some theory or another.

Now, in accordance with the archetypal theory (a theory based on the actual and numerous phenomena presented by accidents of nutriment, of exposure, of culture, of retarded or of accelerated developments, and of monstrosities), Schleiden, who has done most to establish this theory, has constructed what he conceives to be an archetypal plant.

Let us not be misapprehended. We do not assert that this archetypal plant, as Schleiden has constructed it, is a real existence. We do not assert that this is a copy of the archetypal plant as it existed in the mind of God, before He constructed the first vegetable. This plant of Schleiden is only a scientific artifice, constructed to meet the conception of botanists as to the structure of the archetypal plant in the mind of God. Our very ideas of God as a perfect Being, compel us to believe that He must have had general plans before He constructed individual specimens of the plans. But since science must necessarily always be more or less imperfect, in consequence of the constitutional limitations of our faculties, we can discover these divine plans as archetypes only imperfectly or approximatively. It becomes us, then, when searching for these archetypal thoughts of God, to proceed with extreme diffidence and caution. This, as we have already stated, is the real end of science, viz.: to discover, if possible, these moulding, typical thoughts of God. And each science is false, or at least fails of its proper end, in pro-

portion as it leads us away from these primal modelling thoughts of God. And each science is true, in proportion as it helps us discover, and worshipfully live over again the moulding, archetypal thoughts of God, anterior to his creative fiat.

It is possible that some of our readers, who may not be very recent from the study of Vegetable Morphology, would be interested in a more specific statement of the archetypal doctrine. The statement then, is this: The green leaves on the stem, and the bright parts of the flower, are modifications of what we call an archetypal leaf.

Look first at the leaves of the *stem*. Now, it has been mathematically shown that the *law of the spiral* regulates the position of the leaves on the stem. The stem-leaves may come out in one of these three ways: First, they may come out *singly*, one by one; and when they do, they come out successively, one above another, on different sides of the stem, and hence are called *alternate* leaves. Now when the leaves are alternate, "a line commencing at any one leaf, passing round the stem, and touching the point of attachment of each succeeding leaf, forms a spiral, the cycle of which ends with the leaf placed *directly above* the one from which the line commences." Or, secondly, the leaves may come out in *pairs*; and when they do, the leaves of a given pair come out on opposite sides of the stem, and hence are called *opposite* leaves. In this case, the pairs of leaves are placed at right angles to each other, alternately, on the stem. Here also, as in the case of alternate leaves, the law of the spiral holds. Or, thirdly, three or more leaves may come out at the same point on the stem, and hence are called *whorled* leaves, or leaves in a whorl. In this case, the stem, an axis common to the whorl, is shortened throughout an entire cycle, and hence the spiral is apparently reduced to a circle.

Look now at the organs of the *flower*. It has been mathematically shown, that this same curious law of the spiral also regulates the position of the various parts of the flower, though by the shortening of their common axis they often seem to be placed in nearly the same plane. A complete flower consists of four series of organs, succeeding each other from

below upwards. Take an apple-blossom. The first outside part is the flower-cup, called calyx. The second part from without inwards, called corolla, is generally the brilliant part of the flower. The third part from without inwards consists of the fertilizing organs, called stamens. The fourth part from without inwards, as the central part, consists of the seed-bearing organs of the flower, called pistil. That is to say, an apple-blossom, consists of a series of parts arranged in whorls, placed within and slightly above one another on a common axis. The lowest and outermost whorl is the *calyx*, with its five sepal leaves. The second whorl is the *corolla*, with its five petal leaves. The third whorl is a multitude of stamens divided into separate whorls, each whorl consisting of five, or multiples of five, stamens. The fourth whorl is composed of the *ovaries*.

Now the archetypal view is this: The members of each of these whorls in the flower are in their structure identical, the same in fact as the stem leaves; but instead of being distributed spirally on the stem, they are brought together into the same plane by the shortening of their common axis, and are modified in form and color for special purposes of protection, of propagation, and of beauty. Now we would not say with Goethe, that in such changes there is an actual metamorphosis, as, when he asserts, that "whether the plant leaves, flowers or fructifies, it is the *same* organ which expands to make the stem leaf, contracts to make the sepal of the calyx, expands again to make the petal of the corolla, contracts once more to make the sexual organs of stamen and pistil, and expands for the last time to make the fruit." But our theory is, that every part of the plant, cotyledon, cuticle, stem, bud, leaf, stipule, pitcher, phyllodium, down, spine, tendril, bract, sepal, petal, stamen, pistil, fruit, each has a community of form, in the larger morphological sense of the word, and each is a modification, for a special purpose, of an archetypal leaf.

Let us now glance very rapidly at the other great department of archetypes in the organic world, viz.: Animal Morphology.

If, as we have seen, the grand conception of unity in nature led an illustrious poet to the theory of vegetable metamorphosis, in order to account for the similarity of structure in plants, we need not be surprised that the same conception should have led the same poet to the theory of osseous metamorphosis, in order to account for the similarity of form and structure in certain animals. Professional anatomists, indeed, sneered at the illustrious poet, as a "dabbler in comparative anatomy, who mistook his vocation when he left Parnassus for cabbages and bones." But Goethe, though no mathematician or natural philosopher, as the signal failure of his doctrine of colors in opposition to Newton shows, though no metaphysician, was truly poet and philosopher. And the line which separates the great poet from the great philosopher, is the narrowest possible, and is, we are almost ready to affirm, a line contingent rather than a line absolute. A great philosopher is a great poet with his wings undeveloped. A great poet is a great philosopher with his wings clipped. There is but an infant's tiny step between the *Novum Organon* and the *Paradise Lost*. Bacon and Milton need to have changed scarcely more than circumstances to have changed natures. It is not strange, then, that a great poet, a true, real poet, should have discovered among cabbages and bones sublimest truths, of which even professional and scientific botanists and anatomists had never dreamed. Now to Goethe belongs the credit of being the founder of the grand doctrine of Typal Organic Morphology — *i e.*, of the doctrine that animals, as well as plants, are constructed with more or less of modifications, after certain archetypes.

From the time of Galen "the structure of man had always been separated from that of even the highest animals, by the assumed fact that man had no intermaxillary bone." But Goethe discovered in 1784 this identical bone in man. Impelled and guided by the grand conception of unity in nature, he reasoned in this way: All animals having incisor teeth have also an intermaxillary bone. Man has incisor teeth; therefore man has an intermaxillary bone. From the time of Galen this had been denied. But Goethe intuitively felt that

this must be so. "Anatomists, lost in details, and wanting that fundamental conception which now underlies all philosophical anatomy, saw no abstract necessity for such identity of composition—the more so as *evidence* seemed wholly against it. But Goethe was not only guided by the true philosophic conception: he was also instinctively led to the true method of demonstration, viz.: the comparison of the various modifications which this bone underwent in the animal series. This method has now become *the* method, and we need to throw ourselves into the historic position to appreciate its novelty, at the time Goethe employed it. He found on comparison that the bone varied with the nutrition of the animal, and the size of its teeth. He found, moreover, that in some animals the bone was not separated from the jaw; and in children the sutures were traceable. Examination of the foetal skull since Goethe's day has set his discovery, which at the time was denied, beyond dispute."*

Now this discovery in 1784, on what we may call an *a priori* method, of the intermaxillary bone, was the prelude to Goethe's essay in 1790, on the *Metamorphosis of Plants*, and also to his *Sketch* in 1795 of the *Universal Introduction to Comparative Anatomy, beginning with Osteology*. Here, we have the first distinct recognition of an osteological archetype. Carus, in the historical sketch prefixed to his *Transcendental Anatomy*, uses the following language: "If we go back as far as possible into the history of the labors undertaken with a view to arrive at the philosophic conception of the skeleton, we find that the first idea of a metamorphosis of the osseous forms, *i. e.*, that all forms are but modifications more or less traceable of one and the same type—this idea belongs to Goethe." To say nothing of the testimony of St. Hilaire and the continuer of Cuvier, we content ourselves with the testimony of Richard Owen, the most authoritative

* Lewes' Life of Goethe, Vol. II, p. 140. This entertaining, as well as learned biographer of the great poet, asserts: "I have seen a skull where the bone was distinctly separated; and I possess the skull of a female, the ossification of which is far advanced at the parietal sutures, yet internally the traces of the intermaxillary are visible."

expounder of archetypes, who says : "Goethe had taken the lead in inquiries of this nature, by his determination in 1787 of the homology of that part of the human upper maxillary bone, which is separated by a more or less extensive suture from the rest of the bone in the fœtus ; and the philosophical principles propounded in the great philosopher's anatomical essays, called forth the valuable labors of the kindred spirits, Oken, Bajonus, Meckel, Carus, and other eminent cultivators of anatomical philosophy."*

Before dismissing Goethe, it may be interesting to allude very briefly to a curious charge of plagiarism alleged against the illustrious poet. It is the fashion to ascribe the vertebral theory of the skull to Lorenz Oken. The current story is, that while rambling in the Hartz mountains, Oken picked up the bleached skull of a roebuck, and after contemplating the partially separated bones, exclaimed : "It is a vertebral column !" Now here is another curious story : During one of his rambles in the Jewish cemetery near Venice, Goethe picked up the skull of a ram which had been cut longitudinally, and on examining it, the idea occurred to him that the face was composed of three vertebræ. Goethe declares that he made his discovery in 1790. Oken declares that he made his discovery in 1806. Here is a difference of sixteen years between the two alleged discoveries. Now, if there be any plagiarism in the affair, who is the plagiarist ? We do not pretend to decide. Oken, who long survived Goethe, defends his own claim with the ardor of personal and piqued pride. Lewes defends Goethe's claim with the ardor of an admiring biographer. A comparison, such as Lewes himself suggests, we think gives a fair solution. "Goethe had an *aperçu* which he did not develop. Oken had an *aperçu* which he demonstrated in detail. In Goethe's mind it was one of the many applications of a fundamental conception of organic creations—a conception which had before led him to his discovery of the intermaxillary bone. In Oken's mind, it was a special problem which a young anatomist set himself to

* Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton, p. 3.

solve."* Goethe conceived the idea; Oken demonstrated the fact. If Lewes in some of his insinuations has done injustice to Oken, he has not failed of doing full justice to Goethe. It is not true, as many writers, including such men as Owen, and M'Cosh, and Whewell, assert, that Oken originated the vertebral theory of the skull. Prof. Owen's great work was issued in 1848, M'Cosh's *Typical Forms* and Whewell's *History of the Inductive Series* in 1855, the same year with Lewes' *Biography of Goethe*.

We resume the thread of the history. In 1795 Goethe published his *Animal Morphology*. In 1807 Oken published his *The Signification of the Bones of the Skull*, in which he maintains that these bones are equal to four vertebræ. In 1815, Spix, in his *Cephalogenesis*, reduced the cranial vertebræ to three, and, moreover, extended the application of the vertebral theory to the heads of all classes of animals, specially of fishes. In 1824, St. Hilaire "presented a lithographic plate to the French Academy, entitled *Composition de la Tête osseuse chez l'Homme et les Animaux*." In 1830 Laurencet and Myraux presented to the Academy of Sciences a Monogram in which they sought to establish a community of type between vertebrates and molluscates. In 1834, Carus maintained the idea that the *entire* skeleton is nothing but a vertebra repeated. In 1837 Schleiden, and in 1838 Schwam, sought to demonstrate the community of type in the cells of the plant and the animal. In 1848, Owen published his *Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton*, in which he has done immense service, by giving to the archetypal doctrine a scientific form, and by inventing an admirably expressive terminology. In 1856 M'Cosh published his *Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation*, in which he seeks as his main object, to show, and as we think triumphantly, that modifications of, or departures from the archetype, are teleological.

It may not be inappropriate, though scarcely belonging to the history we are tracing, to give some slight illustrations of

* Lewes' *Life of Goethe*, Vol. II, p. 161.

the archetypal doctrine, as applied to Animal Morphology. We select, as perhaps the best and most interesting, since certainly it concerns us the most, the archetypal vertebra.

Every one knows that the great Cuvier, who spent seventeen years in perfecting his celebrated system of comparative anatomy, divided the whole animal kingdom into four great departments, viz.: the Vertebrata, the Mollusca, the Articulata, and the Radiata. We confine ourselves to one department — the Vertebrata. Since *vertebra* means a joint of the spine or back-bone (the spine in fact being a series of vertebræ), all animals having a back-bone, such as men, quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, fishes, are called vertebrates. Every zoölogist admits this statement. Now our proposition is this: the skeleton of every vertebrate animal seems to be constructed with more or less of modification, after what we call an archetypal vertebra — the departures from the model vertebra occurring for special ends, as, *e. g.*, the peculiar habits and necessities of the individual animals. And just as Schleiden has constructed what he conceives to be an archetypal plant, so Prof. Richard Owen of London, has constructed what he conceives to be an archetypal vertebra, or an archetypal skeleton built on the basis of such a vertebra.

Now the archetypal conception is this: first, every *vertebra* of every vertebrate animal, whether mammal, bird, reptile, or fish, is constructed with more or less of modification, after this archetypal vertebra; and, secondly, every *bone* of every vertebrate animal is copied, with more or less closeness, from some part of the archetypal vertebra. In other words, the whole skeleton, whether of mammal, bird, reptile, or fish, and each bone in the skeleton, seems to be constructed, with variations, on the plan or model of an archetypal vertebra; *e. g.*, Owen resolves the bones of the human head into four modified vertebræ, which he terms the Nasal, the Frontal, the Parietal, and the Occipital Vertebra, respectively. And so every bone of every vertebrate animal is a modified form of some part of the archetypal vertebra.

Let us now illustrate these statements by admitted facts. For example: The very fact that certain classes of animals,

though apparently differing in form from each other as much, for instance, as do the pickerel, and the tortoise, and the woodpecker, and the whale, and the mouse, and man, have yet been reduced by Cuvier to one and the same vertebrate department or type, which classification is universally admitted by comparative anatomists; this very fact, we say, shows that there is a community of structure in all these animals, and community of structure implies a primary, common model, an archetype. It does not need the practical eye of one initiated into the mysteries of comparative anatomy, to detect a general resemblance between the skeletons of these various animals. What deceives us is that which is put on the framework of the animal, such as muscle, skin, feathers, shells, scales, etc., etc. Remove all the soft parts, leaving nothing but the skeleton itself, from the bodies of a man, a horse, a bird, a frog, a fish, and you will be very much struck with the general similarity between the skeletons of these animals. The infant creeping on its hands and limbs reminds us of the quadruped. The dog, or squirrel, or bear, or monkey, sitting on its haunches, reminds us of the outlines of the human form, and it would do this emphatically, if only the skeletons were witnessed. The penguin is a *bird*, and yet its short legs and narrow wings, when extended, remind us of the *quadruped*, and its fin-shaped wings remind us of the *fish*, and its erect posture on land reminds us of the *human* figure. There is an evident conformity of structure, as even Aristotle noticed three hundred and fifty years before Christ, "running through the fins of the fish, the wings of the bird, the forepart of the reptile and of the mammal, and the arms of a man." The chief part of the wing of a bat is a highly developed hand, with its five fingers. "Every segment and almost every bone present in the hand and arm of man are also present in the fin of the whale. We can point out the finger in the hand of man which answers to the fore-foot of the horse, and the toe in the foot of man which answers to the hind-foot of the horse. Nay, we can point out the very nail in man's hand or foot which, by excess of development, becomes the hoof of the horse." It is the third digit or middle

finger. Indeed, comparative anatomists now admit, by common consent, that *ninety per cent.* of the bones in the human skeleton have their namesakes, or corresponding bones, in the skeletons of all vertebrate animals. And it has always been so. This archetypal skeleton, built upon the basis of an archetypal vertebra, can be traced in every vertebrate animal from the oldest fossil throughout widely separated geological eras. What stronger proof than this is conceivable, that God had originally in his mind the general plan or model of a vertebrate animal, from the very beginning of things, before the first animal existed?

But we must here guard against a loose use of language. It is common for those who defend the vertebrate theory of the skull, to speak of the cranial bones as a "congeries of modified vertebræ," as though an actual vertebra could be modified by development or "natural selection," as Darwin would say, into another vertebra, and thus the atheistic, or at least the sceptical theory, of the transmutation of the species be possible. This is true only when we mean by a vertebra the archetypal vertebra, and distinguish crural vertebræ from cervical vertebræ, from dorsal vertebræ, from lumbar vertebræ, from caudal vertebræ. "The skull is not, as Oken maintains, a modified spinal column. To maintain this, is to say that the spinal vertebra is the typical form from which the cranial vertebræ are developed; whereas, in truth, both are but variations of one and the same archetypal form, and the idea of Kilmeyer that the spinal column is a *skull*, is quite as accurate as the idea of Oken, that the skull is a spinal column." * We are surprised to observe that Dr. Draper, the learned professor of chemistry and physiology in the University of New York, speaks in his elaborate work on *Human Physiology*, of the bones of the skull as "*metamorphosed vertebræ*." There is no metamorphosis here. There is no development of any such kind in the history of an actual vertebra. There is no vertebral metamorphosis by which, as the transmutationists would hold,

* Lewes' Life of Goethe, Vol. II, pp. 157, 158.

a trout can become a turtle, or a turtle a bobolink, or a bobolink Adam. The true statement is simple enough: *every special, actual vertebra is the individual, very frequently modified, form of a general, archetypal vertebra.* The same Almighty Being who in the beginning devised the general plan of the vertebra, according to which all animals of the countless vertebrate type should be constructed, also at the same time devised the various modifications of the general archetypal plan, which should be suited to the habits and wants of each particular class, and order, and species, and individual, of the vertebrate type of animals. And this survey of the vertebrate kingdom of animals introduces us to two grand principles at work in the creation of the world: first, the principle of general ORDER; and, secondly, the principle of SPECIAL ADAPTATION. The general archetype necessarily involves the exercise of divine forethought; the special modification of the archetype necessarily involves the exercise of divine benevolence.

We cannot but allude to an attempt at a much vaster generalization than any which we have indicated. Cuvier resolved all animals under four types. The question has been raised, whether or not it is possible to reduce *all* animals to a community of archetype? Is it possible that Mollusca, Articulata, and Radiata, not less than Vertebrata, are modified forms of the archetypal vertebra? This is the startling question which is now exciting and guiding the researches of morphologists, specially with reference to mollusks and articulates. The bilateral symmetry of the form of vertebrates and articulates is obvious. The segments of the articulates seem to be strictly homologues of the vertebræ of the higher animals. The attempt has been made to reduce even mollusks, *e. g.*, the cuttle-fish, to the type of a vertebrate, "by considering the back-bone of the latter bent double backwards, so as to bring the root of the tail to the nape of the neck, thus placing the viscera of the mollusk in the same connexion as the viscera of the vertebrate."* We must confess, however,

* Whewell's Hist. of Ind. Scis., Vo. II, p. 485.

that we are somewhat staggered by this last phase of the archetypal theory. We know of but one thing more fanciful than the human imagination, it is the human will pledged to a theory.

Though we are presuming so much on the patience of our readers, there is another application of the archetypal doctrine, immeasurably wider, and better established than that just mentioned—an application for which we are specially indebted to the microscopic investigations of Scheiden and Schwam, in 1837 and 1838. It is now, we believe, quite generally admitted that all organic *structure, so far as it comes within the present range of our optical powers*, commences in, or rather from, minute microscopic *cells*. However great the difference between the full-grown plant and the full-grown animal, when surveyed by the unassisted eye, plant and animal seem gradually to approach each other as we analyze their component parts, and finally meet in an *apparently* common kind of structure—the individual, single, elementary cell. In this primordial state, no one can say, *so far as our optical power at present extends*, to which of the two great kingdoms of organic life the individual cell belongs. It is only when it begins to develop, that we can tell whether the cell is that of a vegetable or of an animal. The destiny is apparent only when vital movement begins. There is an archetypal cell, of which every cell in every cellular tissue is a modification for a special purpose. Take the case of *plants*. For example, the nut, as in the acorn or filbert, consists of cells, the *periplant* or outer wall of which is extraordinarily thickened. Ligneous fibre, or what we call wood, when we buy it by the cord, consists of cells elongated. Ligneous ducts, through which the sap rises, consist of an immense number of cells arranged in linear series, the partitions between which have been obliterated, so as to make a long, continuous channel. So it may be shown that every part of the plant is a modification, for a special end, of the archetypal vegetable cell. Take the case of *animals, e. g.*, the yellow fibrous, or elastic tissue; the white fibrous, or inelastic tissue, as in tendons or ligaments; the osseous and dental tis-

sues ; the areolar or connecting tissue ; the adipose tissue ; the cartilaginous tissue, as at the joints ; the muscular tissue ; the vascular tissue ; the nervous tissue ; the epithelial tissue, as in membrane, skin, nails, hoofs, horns, scales, shells, hair, bristles, wool, feathers, etc. ; all these consist of modifications for special purposes of the archetypal animal cell. The elementary "cells bear the same relation to the entire organism that the component materials of a building bear to the entire fabric." It is to the wonderful properties of the microscope that we owe the discovery of this grand fact of unity of plan, or community of archetype, in elemental structure throughout the whole organic world—one of the most significant and startling discoveries of this or of any age.

We have thus traced with mortifying meagreness the history of our theory, as applied to vegetable and animal morphology. We have said nothing of astronomy or chemistry, though astronomical collocations and movements, and chemical activities, follow certain archetypes, as is evident from the fact that astronomical and chemical phenomena can be expressed in certain unchangeable formulas. The same thing may be said of mechanics, as is evident from the fact that all mechanical powers can be reduced to six archetypal principles—the lever, the wheel and axle, the pulley, the inclined plane, the wedge, and the screw. The same thing may be said of crystallography, as is evident from the fact that all crystals, however differing from one another in substance or complexity of shape, can be reduced to six primitive or archetypal chrySTALLINE forms—the monometric, the dimetric, the trimetric, the monoclinic, the triclinic, and the hexagonal. In fact, crystallization presents some of the finest instances of archetypal morphology, the typical forms after maintaining their ground, even though the substance itself undergoes violent chemical changes, as is evident from the curious phenomena of isomorphism. As to the imponderables, we timidly hazard the suggestion that, if the undulating theory be true, it may perhaps yet be shown that not only the colors of light, but the degrees of heat and movements of electricity, are modifications for special ends of an archetypal wave. Neither

have we alluded to the typical system which runs confessedly throughout and eminently characterizes the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.

In fine, before God made the world, we conceive that He had in his mind certain original, normal patterns or archetypes, of which all forms and movements of matter are copies more or less perfect. The brilliant Agassiz is right, when, in his late Introduction to *Natural History*, he verifies with a confidence so calmly scientific, the great principle, *Premeditation prior to creation*.

The last division, the uses and abuses of the archetypal theory, though of more practical importance than the other two, we must dispose of very summarily. We shall mention but one use, and one abuse.

We consider first the *abuse*. It is the tendency of some of the defenders of our theory to view the doctrine of archetypes as the antithesis to the doctrine of final causes. Perverting Bacon's famous comparison of final causes to vestal virgins devoted to God, and, therefore, sterile, they have sought to array morphology, or rather homology, in antagonism to teleology. Lamarkism has plumed itself on the fancied alliance of typology. Geoffrey St. Hilaire, the chief champion of this school, with a scepticism the more atrocious because so sanctimonious, remarks: "I take care not to ascribe to God any intention, for I mistrust the feeble powers of my reason. I know nothing of animals which *have to play a part* in nature (*doivent jouer un rôle dans la nature*). I observe facts merely, and go no further. I only pretend to the character of the historian of what is." It was because of the tendency of the defenders of our doctrine to scepticism, that the illustrious Cuvier, whose brilliant achievements in zoölogy, notwithstanding the great Bacon's simile, had been made in the light of teleology, so ardently resisted the doctrine of archetypal forms. Geoffrey St. Hilaire and George Cuvier, once warm friends and co-laborers, became rivals, and then antagonists, and the whole scientific world watched with intense interest the progress of the battle. The news of this open collision in the French Academy, and the Revolution of July,

1830, reached Weimar, in Germany, the same day. The anecdote which M. Soret tells of the poet-philosopher is very characteristic :

"MONDAY, AUG. 1, 1830.—The news of the Revolution of July reached Weimar to-day, and set every one in commotion. I went in the course of the afternoon to Goethe. 'Now,' exclaimed he as I entered, 'what do you think of this great event? The volcano has come to an eruption, and everything is in flames.' A frightful story, I answered; but what could be expected otherwise under such notoriously bad circumstances, and with such a ministry, than that the whole would end in the expulsion of the Royal Family? 'We do not appear to understand each other, my good friend,' said Goethe. 'I am not speaking of those French people, but of something quite different. I am speaking of the great contest, so important for science, between Cuvier and Geoffrey St. Hilaire, which has come to an open rupture in the Academy.'"

The explosion was indeed a greater event in the history of human progress than the abdication of Charles X, though not for the reason which Goethe assigned. It were comparatively little that we know with Geoffrey what is, if we do not at the same time know with Cuvier what the is is FOR. And just here the work of Dr. McCosh is specially valuable. With St. Hilaire, he holds to the doctrine of typical forms, or homology. With Cuvier, he holds to the doctrine of final causes, or teleology. And he brings the two combatants to peace, by showing that, while there *are archetypes*, every departure from the archetype is *teleological*, *i. e.*, for a special purpose in securing the well-being of the individual animal. And both alike demand a Deity Past and a Deity Present; archetypology demands an original Planner, and teleology demands a present Adjuster to conditions. There is no transmutation of the species. Departures from archetypes have a final cause in the will of God. The general plan is not complete without the special adaptation. For, while archetypes prove that God has had from the beginning a general plan, modifications of archetypes prove that God has special purposes, adjusting the general plan to individual ends.

We consider very briefly the *use* of our doctrine. We have already more than once hinted it. The important fact that natural, strictly scientific classification is possible, grows out of the fact that there are archetypal forms. For example,

Cuvier, though disposed to deny in theory the doctrine of archetypes, nevertheless practically acted on it when he subdivided the animal kingdom into four great departments. The fact that there is a general model common to mammal, bird, reptile, and fish, is the fact that led Cuvier to reduce mammal, bird, reptile, and fish to one great class, the vertebrate type. The *practical* recognition of archetypes is no new thing under the sun ; it is only the scientific, philosophic recognition of it that is new. Type and characteristic are synonyms, both meaning impress, mark (τύπος, χαρακτήρ). The archetypal form, from which a certain number of objects, however differing in particulars, is constructed, is the distinguishing characteristic of these objects ; and the discernment of this characteristic form is the basis of a true, real classification. And one great end of science, we repeat, is to discover, if possible, these archetypes, so that men might know how to classify properly, and know generals without being burdened with too many heterogeneous particulars. Had there been no archetypal forms, men of minute observation and powerful memory might indeed have been able to know *many* things, but they never could have known *much*. But since there are archetypal forms, even feeble men, though they know but few things, yet may know much ; they may know only a few individuals, yet they may know classes, comprising countless individuals. The final cause, then, of archetypal forms, so far as man is concerned, seems to be to make possible for him classification, generalization, induction, science, a general knowledge ever growing more and more comprehensive. Archetypes themselves are teleological. They are for God's glory, and man's help.

We have been pointing out some illustrations of the theory, that all things are copies, more or less perfect, of archetypes. In the light of the theory, how curious become some of the utterances of antiquity ! Of the Realists of the middle ages, when they said : Classes exist before the individual ; of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, when he says : "Through faith, we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear ;" of Aristotle, when he says : "Forms are

as necessary to the universe as matter ;” of Plato, when he says : “ God is the maker of forms ;” of David, when he says : “ My substance was not hid from Thee when I was made in secret, curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth ; thine eyes did see my substance yet being unperfect, and in thy book all my members were written, when as yet there was none of them ;” of Moses, when he says : “ These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth when they were created, in the day that Jehovah God made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field not yet in the earth, and every herb of the field not yet sprung up.”*

Finally, Jesus the Christ, the Son of man and the Son of God — with profoundest reverence we utter it — is the grand Archetype of humanity. We would not dare to speak confidently of a theme so transcendent, touching, as it does, the primal, pre-creative purposes of Deity, and the very nature of Godhead. But when we read that the Creator, who, as the New Testament informs us, was none other than the Son of God, when about to create man, said, “ *Let us make man in our image, after our likeness,*” we cannot resist the impression that something more is meant in these words than mere conformity in moral character. The conviction is forced upon us, that the image in which man was made, the likeness after which he was created, is the image and the likeness of Him who, in his eternal forethought and purpose, was already, even before the world itself was created, the Incarnate Word. It is only on some such conception as this, that we can explain that sublime eighth chapter of the Proverbs, when the Son of God apparently speaks of Himself as the Pre-Adamite Word, or Wisdom. In his eternal forethought, “ reaching across the tottering mountains and boiling seas of the geologic eras,” linking together in the same instant of time his creative fiat and his incarnation at Bethlehem, did the Incarnate Word cry, “ Let us make man in our image, after our likeness !” Thus was He Himself the archetypal model after which humanity was to be constructed. Foreseeing from the begin-

* See an ingenious and entertaining exegesis of the passages from Hebrews and Genesis in Prof. Tayler Lewis's *Six Days of Creation*, chap. xviii.

ning the form he would assume in his incarnation, he made man in the image, after the likeness, of that form. True, there has been a terrible departure from that perfect archetype, involving in its train a tainted, wasted moral nature, misshapen forms, woes, diseases, death. It is a remarkable fact, written in the stone epic of earth's strata, that just before the advent of man upon the globe, and as if in anticipative sympathy with his awful fall, the process of animal degradation suddenly began, and misshapen monsters of all species fearfully multiplied. But though human nature is an appalling departure in the direction of degradation, yet, in all its debasement, it still bears some resemblance to its archetypal model — the grandeur of the likeness after which it was made being proved by the magnificent terribleness of its very ruin.

But this shall not always be so. Restoration is possible, for the Son of Man has come to seek and to save that which was lost. A new man is possible, the new man *renewed after the image of Him who created him*. But the image in which man was created, and which he has so fearfully lost, and in which he is to be renewed, is the image of Him who in his eternal purpose was already the Word Incarnate before the creation, the Lamb slain from before the foundation of the world. The image preceded the copy; the archetype preceded the race. We believe, most reverently be it written, that the Son of God, instead of taking human nature upon Himself, in the sense of conforming Himself to it, really modelled human nature after Himself; in very truth, moulding it in his own image, after his own likeness.

And this constitutes the true dignity of *human nature* — grand in its origin, grand in its destiny; grand in its origin, because modelled after Christ's own image; still grander in its destiny, because appointed to share in the ineffable glory awarded to Jesus as a human sufferer and victor. The Son of God made man after the model, not of an angel, but of HIMSELF. The saint, therefore, renewed in the image of Him who created him, shall yet be exalted above angel and archangel, cherub and seraph.

KNOW YE NOT THAT WE SHALL JUDGE ANGELS?

ARTICLE II.—THE GREEK CHURCH.

THE separation of the Greek from the Roman Church was the result of a protracted struggle, extending through several centuries. The church which centered its power at Rome, began early to develop a tendency to absolute authority in ecclesiastical and even in state affairs. And while it desired universality, it judged it better to mature this early tendency in the West, and to relinquish all in the East, than to acquire an influence less absolute throughout the Christian world.

There was no cordiality in the union of the Eastern and Western portions of the church during the later portion of the fifth century, or at any subsequent period, though the rupture was not regarded as irreparable till perhaps the middle of the eleventh century. The Eastern branch of the church from that period has been that of an independent organization, and, to a considerable extent, an unfriendly one to the Western or Roman branch.

The Western Church has been much more intimately connected with human progress for the last thousand years than the Greek Church. Besides, our relations with the west of Europe have been so much more intimate than they have with the East, that we have necessarily been better informed in regard to the Roman than the Greek Church.

The Greek Church has not, however, in its separation, been a totally inert body. It has not been destitute of men of capacity and learning. Its position has not been altogether obscure, nor its influence inconsiderable. Great encroachments have been made upon it in Asia by the Mohammedan power, but in Europe it has exerted an aggressive power, so as to extend itself and its doctrines over full half of the territory of Europe.

We do not conceal from our minds that this church is, as a body, ignorant; that its religious life is low, and that it has embraced serious errors. Yet there is, in its present condition and prospects, much that is encouraging.

The Greek Church at the present time numbers probably about 70,000,000. They have the Scriptures in a fair degree of purity. Though the clergy are not diligent in teaching them, they do not prohibit nor discourage their use. They do not insist upon the use of the Scriptures in any particular language, but permit it in a somewhat antiquated vernacular of the several nations in which the Greek Church is established. Their doctrines are Trinitarian, and, to a considerable extent, orthodox.

The Greek Church has by no means lost its cultivation and its literature. Some profound scholars of modern times have been Greeks. The Greek University at Athens is represented to be in a most flourishing condition, reaching by its influence very many of the youthful Greeks, and conferring upon them a thorough and finished education. The education of the clergy of Russia is one of the great measures of the present government. Thus, a power irresistible is going forth from this almost forgotten organization of the Greek Church, which is reaching and renovating the entire mass of 70,000,000 of the human family.

It does not follow from our hopeful view of the condition of the Greek Church, that it is, in the higher sense of the term, a Christian church; nor could we apply the name to any church which is essentially national, and embracing, except by special exception, the entire population of a nation. It has not the intelligence and acquaintance with religious things that the Established Church of England or of Prussia has. But there has been a time in the history of the established religions of Western Europe, when the clergy and the mass of the people were in a no more hopeful condition than the clergy and mass of the people of the Greek Church now are.

We cannot suppress the belief that this church has an important mission yet to accomplish. It is often said that to

revive an effete church, and bring it to a condition of vigor and effectiveness, is more difficult than the building up of a new organization. But the correctness of this assertion cannot always be maintained. We are not prepared to admit it in the case of the Greek Church. When Christianity is introduced into a nation by missionary efforts, the obscure portions of the population are quite as likely to become the subjects of religious convictions as those of greater prominence. Its influence works up through the lower to the higher grades of society. But when Christianity has been long established among a people as a national institution, it does not ordinarily rise to higher influence by exerting its power first among the obscure and uninformed. A national church will partake of the national character. And if a nation is for a century undergoing a gradual change of character — if, for instance, it is becoming more educated and cultivated — the church of that nation will take on the same gradual change. Local church organizations may become more or less efficient, and the fluctuations become apparent, in a few years. But disregarding transient and local variations, a national church, that organization which embodies the religious culture and moral type of a people, will be modified mainly by those secular changes in a nation which characterize its formative period or its decline.

If the countries in which the Greek Church prevails are to become leading countries in the world's progress, then that church will become an instrument of great moral and religious power in human history.

The Greek Church occupies a vastly greater area of Russian than of all other territory. Our hopes of this Church are mainly in connexion with the prospective advancement of that empire. Russia seems to possess that improvable stamina which in the middle ages characterized the migratory nations that came into possession of Western Europe. As they received the Christian religion, and by so doing became for ages the power of the world, so Russia, with Christianity of a type not inferior to that which prevailed among the intruding nations in the west of Europe, may rise to embody an equal greatness in the east of Europe.

Russia has a vast territory and a vast population, and to bring them out of barbarism, and confer on them a high form of civilization is a vast work. But such a work is going steadily forward in that empire. The great scheme of the Czars to extinguish serfdom, is now well nigh a fact accomplished. The great mass of the population is increasing in intelligence. They are understanding the necessity and the power of industry, and acquiring ideas of accumulation. A school system, as well as means of higher education, is springing up among them. Thus it would seem that progress is actually taking place throughout the empire as rapidly as progress can be made; that is, as rapidly as the spirit of progress can percolate through the general mind, or infuse itself into the several forms of social and operative life.

The government avails itself of the best skill wherever it is to be had. If it can get the best ships at the least price from our ship-yards, we are employed. If American contractors can most advantageously build their railroads, they are selected. If the French are most thoroughly versed in the science of military defence, French science finds its reward in Russia. Thus the highest skill of the world is used, and railroads are built, fortifications are constructed, a navy is created and sustained. Thus science and skill are more rapidly acquired and made permanent in that country than they could be by any amount of encouragement to home labor and skill, and by the exclusion of that which comes from abroad.

With these facilities and improvements, there must be large intercourse with foreign nations. Their commerce and their navy not only need, but soon must have harbors not closed half the year with ice. In other words, they must have seaboard advantages by way of the Black and the Mediterranean seas. Neither diplomacy nor war can long retard their advance into these waters. Constantinople is a necessity, and the possession of it the destiny of Russia.

And why should it not be so. If Russia needs these advantages for commercial purposes, it is because she has the results of industry which other nations want, and because she needs the results of the industry of other nations. Why should

there be petty restrictions on such commercial schemes. If Russia needs these advantages to build up a navy for her own protection, objection comes with a bad grace from any nation that is doing its utmost in the accomplishment of the same object for itself. No one nation is more bound than another to use for harmless purposes, a power which may be used to injure. If Russia is building up a commercial marine, her success is as much a pledge of peaceful intention on her part, as the commercial pursuits of other nations pledge these nations to peace. But, however viewed, facts are rapidly taking the place of conjecture. Russia and England are each jealous of the other's power on the eastern borders of the Mediterranean. But it is scarcely possible, with the increasing power of France on the central borders, that Russia and England should not make common cause of their position and power at the extremes. And whatever adjustments may be made to quiet the present unsettled condition of Europe, the great preponderating fact will be a harmonizing of the interests; that is, a satisfying of the industrial and commercial wants of the three European Nations in which the essential life of Europe resides. Such an adjustment involves then the free access of Russia to the Mediterranean waters. This point gained, and Russian development will be greatly accelerated.

We can scarcely compass the idea of such a nation moving forward with an unfaltering tread from barbarism to civilization, from a condition of obscurity to one of controlling influence in the affairs of Europe and the world. To this last condition Russia has already attained. And when the disadvantages of pent up condition shall be removed, and the largest facilities for commercial intercourse are opened, we can fix no limit to the greatness and progress and power which a nation embracing so vast a territory, such numerical strength, and such capacities of improvement, may attain.

We have confidence in the Greek Church, regarded as the cherished religion of such a nation. A national religion in a powerful nation must have power. It need not constitute the sum total of national existence, as the Mohammedan religion

did in the days of its power. But it will, to some extent, direct the pursuits of a people. It will, in a great measure, shape the general cast of character and the legislation. It will furnish the moral restraints and biases, and control the educational institutions and literature.

We do not insist that it will become a great power in the Christian world merely because the nation in which it principally exists is a nation of great power, and will exert itself to support and defend the church; but because it will sanctify this power, and because such a nation will furnish the most favorable opportunity that we can conceive, for it to exert that inherent power always possessed, but so long kept down by adverse surroundings. Its essentially evangelical character will more distinctly manifest itself. Its unrestricted use of the Scriptures in the language of the people will undermine both its errors of doctrine and its degeneracy in practical life. It must establish a correct public opinion in moral and religious matters. The schools and the church will combine to bring on discussion in regard to the usages and the creed of their body. Treatises will be written, opinions canvassed, and errors combated. Hostilities, divisions, parties will arise. Information will be gathered up and dug up. The lore of fifteen hundred years will be worked over. A vast amount of information, useful not to the Greek Church alone, but to Christendom, will be evolved. Earlier copies of the Scriptures than we yet know may be brought to light. Who shall say that the original copies of the Epistles and the Gospels may not yet come forth from the nooks of some eastern monastery. If a manuscript can be preserved a thousand years, we do not see why it may not be capable of preservation two thousand years. The very places which ought to contain the veritable manuscripts of Apostolic times, will, by the resuscitation of the Greek Church, become accessible, and there will be motive enough to make public whatever of value may be discovered.

Moreover, the traditions, the histories, the treasured memories of a past greatness, all the motives that are drawn from antiquity, all that is inspiring in the idea that their ancestors were the converts of the inspired men of the first century,

and that they are the continuous repository of a religion thus established, all these and a multitude of similar associations, will give power to the Greek Church exactly as the people become elevated and the mind becomes instructed and sufficiently capacious for such ideas.

In important particulars this church must have characteristic distinctions. It originated in a feud with the Western Church. Though the effective difference between them was concerning the "chief seat," yet there were doctrinal differences by no means unimportant, which have ever been insisted on. And their development through a thousand years in a fundamentally different type of character from that of the western nations, must constitute marked peculiarities in the Greek Church. And if this church rises to prominence, these peculiarities must impress themselves upon a coming age, and must oppose themselves to other peculiarities developed under different conditions.

All human progress is in a great measure corrective. It is not merely the introduction of that which is new and valuable, but it is the elimination of the cumbrous or the hurtful. The ship may be nearing its point of destination, though none of its movements are in precisely the right direction. The history of the world is a history of collisions. The veering from the right course at one period, is made necessary by the antagonism into which we must come with the errors which have been inaugurated in a former period. Newton conceived that the entire earth, deprived absolutely of porosity, might not exceed the dimensions of a cubic inch. We have sometimes thought that the sum of human opinions, condensed by expressing all the bloat of error, would exhibit a somewhat analogous shrinkage. Contest with error must then ever be a function of all Christian organizations.

The resuscitation of the Greek Church may be of untold advantage to the individuals who may be embraced within it. If it conveys the errand of divine mercy, and its instructions find acceptance in the great heart of the Slavonic race, no higher mission could be desired. And all this may be reasonably anticipated. But it may also have another and a wider, if

not a more important mission. It is the peculiar antagonism which it will of necessity furnish to the wide-spread and crystalized errors of other organizations in the Christian world.

The Protestant world regard the Church of Rome as embodying and sustaining a series of errors, some of which are of vital importance. Of this kind we must regard the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, by which the terrors of the world to come, which are calculated to exert a most important influence on human conduct, are essentially taken away; the forgiveness of sins by the payment of money, and the intercession of a mercenary priest, thus removing God from his moral government, and in fact excluding all moral ideas from it; and the interdiction of the Scriptures, by which a human guidance is substituted for the divine. As parts of the same system, though less obviously and glaringly corrupt, we may mention the celibacy of the clergy, the refusal of the cup to the laity, the use of images in worship, the intervention of saints, the restraints upon private opinion, and denying that there can be salvation beyond the pale of their own communion.

While we recognize many a noble work of piety and learning as of Papal origin, and admit that the Papacy, with its inflexible and authoritative tyranny, was an organization singularly adapted to the unsettled and stormy condition of mediæval times, we are nevertheless profoundly impressed with the numberless bad, and essentially bad, influences which are flowing from these errors. And we do not see that a remedy is likely to come from the body itself. The Papal Church is conservative in the extreme, and will not provoke dissent by venturing upon reforms. Nor are its errors mere appendages which are likely soon to fall off. They are inherent in the system—such that without them Romanism would have no existence. The very possibility of reform is taken away by its claim of infallibility. Any reversal of its accepted doctrines would be removing its essential foundations. Even in matters purely scientific, and where it is in error beyond the shadow of a doubt, it still avows the untruth rather than confess fallibility. Its decision against Galileo is a case in point. The errors of Romanism have then a peculiar tenacity of life.

Recent events in Italy have been hailed as harbingers of the downfall of the Papacy. We entertain no such expectations. The edifice may be a crumbling one, but it will last nevertheless. It is not like pent up waters which flow away when barriers are removed, but like the pyramids of Egypt, which would be pyramids still though every stone of which they are built were crumbled to earth. Who has devised a measure of duration for an institution like that of the Papal Church, thoroughly compacted in structure, cherished with an unquenchable love by two hundred millions of the best part of the population of the world—protected by history, by its wealth, by its admitted utility in past ages, by its interlacement with systems of government, with all departments of art, and science, and learning, with social organizations, financial schemes, and private interests? It has a basis of endurance which few have attempted to estimate, and upon which there is small hope of successful aggression, except by the slow progress of truth, or the special interposition of Divine Providence.

We fully believe that the errors to which we have called attention must at length yield. But we do not see relief very near, from Protestantism. In the first place it is *Protestanism*; that is, it is a confessedly opposing, protesting organization against the Papacy, and every catholic naturally puts himself in a posture of defence against aggression. Besides, Protestantism has too much of conformity, it was too timid at the outset in its protest, and therefore the power of its protest has to some extent the weakness of a concession. Moreover, we cannot deny that even its excellencies, especially its individuality, its freedom of opinion, its direct appeal to each man's spiritual nature, make it not less an ultimately successful power, but less an organized and potential encroachment upon organized error.

We have now to inquire whether the Greek Church contains more potent means of aggression upon this congelation of errors, and we believe it does. It is not, like Mohammedanism, for instance, so totally unlike the Papal Church as to forbid all contact and influence. It will be independent of Rome,

and yet not antagonistic in the sense that Protestantism is. It has great and increasing numerical power. It already predominates over more than half of Europe, and along the borders of Asia ; has possession in great measure of the Levant, and has its outliers along the Nile and the borders of Africa. It occupies the most coveted parts of Europe, and is extending towards those inviting fields of Eastern Asia which are now the recipients of Christian philanthropy and a widening commerce, and which promise early civilization. High demands will be made of this religious organization by Russia, in her present and prospective greatness. Some eastern Hildebrand must soon arise to sweep away its Byzantine effeminacy, and impart to it sagacity and order and efficiency.

This elevation granted, and it will become a power such as Rome has never yet had to encounter. It will be a Christian body, not national, but embracing nations ; not controlling them, but receiving their favor and support ; not the enemy of Rome, but independent of, and in some sense superior to her. Its historical antiquity is anterior to that of Rome. It will have maintained a continued existence, and come finally to a fresh and admitted power not damaged by usurpations, forgeries and crimes. Rome has not had anything of this kind to meet, and it will be an experience not the most acceptable.

We might, perhaps, conceive of two such powers existing in the world without collision, neither of them demanding supremacy, and neither of them holding dogmas adverse or humiliating to the other. But it is the special claims long asserted by the Church of Rome, and the demands of another class of emergencies, that will be likely to establish active antagonism. Let these two great hierarchies stand up in grand parallel, equal historically, not despairingly unequal numerically, and equal in the position and influence of the nations by which they are supported. Let one of them still claim to be *the church*, and deny salvation to all others, claim that to it is committed all revelation, and to it alone is committed the right to interpret revelation — that its head is God's vicegerent on earth, holding the keys of knowledge, and of power — temporal and

spiritual — of life and of death, and under certain limitations assuming infallibility in matters of interpretation and doctrine. To such gratuitous and overbearing and humiliating assumptions on the one hand, and assumptions which, unfortunately for itself, it cannot retract, it is hardly to be presumed that the other will tamely submit. The Greek Church can furnish the only proper resistance. It alone can go to historical sources, and substantiate for itself beyond denial all that the Papacy can substantiate for itself. There is little ground, historically, for conceding more to the Bishop of Rome than to the Bishop of Constantinople, even if we accept the Papal interpretation of the committal to Peter to bind and loose on earth and in Heaven. Such claims advanced and resisted, will establish an ecclesiastical antagonism, and become convenient starting points of trouble in matters of state. They will be the nuclei around which other difficulties will cluster. The result can scarcely be other, after pertinacious resistance, than ignominious retraction, and thus a relinquishment of the grounds of a thousand years of tyranny and triumph.

But, setting aside those differences, which cannot be held by one without humiliation of the other, there will be collisions growing out of difference even in matters of doctrine and practice. We may illustrate this by instancing baptism. The Eastern and Western Churches agree in respect to the subjects and the efficacy. But the mode will become a question of importance, because of its ostensible and popular character. It is the prominent external act in all church organizations — the one which the senses specially recognize. Above all others it enlists the interest of the masses, as observers, as recipients, parents and sponsors. Especially must this be the case when baptism is regarded as the regenerative act. In proportion as the Greek Church rises to a position of influence, will every administration of this ordinance by its priests become a reproof of the Western Church, and a protest against its innovation. The voice of Protestantism has not been heard in this particular, because, in the great preponderance of its strength, it has followed the error of Rome. The voice of history and philology has not been weakened by any

diversity in its utterances, but it has been powerless with the Catholic, because he accepts in its full force the historical and philological argument against his practice, and rests on the authority of his church to abrogate, modify, or establish. But when an equal of Rome disclaims such authority, and proclaims as unauthorized and invalid its baptism, and by so doing consigns to purgatory if not to perdition, Pope and prelate, priest and people of the whole Catholic world of the present, and of the ages that are past, the Catholic world cannot remain unmoved. Some weapons of warfare must come into use, and we would fain hope that they will be those of reason. It is easy to see how readily even this question alone would bring into requisition all the stores of learning, the strong points of exegesis, the authority of the church in council, and the authority of particular councils. Thus mind would be aroused afresh. The foundations of venerable usage would be re-examined, research would be stimulated, and conscience and reason would again acquire ascendancy over ignorance and prejudice and arbitrary power.

We thus see what seems to us a providential arrangement, first in the setting up of a strong and inflexible church power to mould turbulent peoples, and to control turbulent rulers, during a unique period of the world ; and yet, by an early schism, furnishing at a later age the means of terminating this power when its day of usefulness was past. If we have not much over rated the prospective greatness of the Greek Church, we see in it an obvious provision for resisting and checking the Papal power, which, however useful it may have been to ages past, has now become everywhere an evil. It is to be observed that this new power is not an accidental development, but, like the perfected insect after a long day of chrysalis torpor, it is an outgrowth from the rudimental teachings of the first Christian men. The ground-work of this antagonism to the greatest desecration to which the church has ever been subjected, was laid before these desecrations commenced. And if we read its future aright, it will prove to be not only adequate in power to the special effect which it seems destined to produce, but possessed of remarkable adaptations for such a work.

Perhaps we can scarcely assign a reason for the perpetuation of the Greek Church at all, through these long ages, if it be not as an instrument of future good. For centuries it has been inert, like a reserve force, biding its time. It is one of those instances of evident forethought, of which so many present themselves in the government of God.

While we thus look forward to the downfall of Romanism as a vast system for the perpetuation of ignorance and spiritual thralldom, and see in the Greek Church a special adaptation to accomplish such a work, it is natural also to look for great changes in the Greek Church as a result of its attrition with the Roman. When the exclusivism of the Papacy is once yielded, the action and reaction between the two organizations that must result, will exalt and purify both. Protestantism may then act its part upon the Greek and Roman Churches, and these upon Protestantism. We are not to presume, perhaps not to desire, that there shall ever be a disappearance from the church of all differences of opinion and practice. Diversity of mental structure and training will always give rise to diversities of doctrine and practice. Stagnation of mind will thus be prevented, discussion will be maintained, and general purity of doctrine preserved. Hence it is by no means certain that the partitions by which Christendom is divided will ever be removed. Instead of these being fewer, there may be an ever increasing number of sects. This is a matter of small moment. The great result to be reached is their purity. And free access to the Scriptures, and freedom to discuss their teachings, are the means of reaching this result.

ARTICLE III.—ON THE INSPIRATION OF THE APOSTLES.

(Continued from page 92.)

WE may now look at the exegetical grounds for supposing that the action of the Holy Spirit as the spirit of truth, meaning by this the spirit of the Christian life in general, did not secure to the Apostles such a degree of that life as to prevent error in their religious teaching. We shall refer to passages which are thought to prove that Christian knowledge is based upon a Christian disposition (p. 66 sq). It may, however, be useful to direct attention in the first place, to a two-fold sense of the term Christian knowledge. For it may be used to denote either the contents of the knowledge or the *peculiar way* in which it is received. The former is objective, the latter subjective. We must, therefore, be careful to distinguish between a discourse respecting that which makes the contents of knowledge Christian, and one respecting that which makes the apprehension of it Christian. It is no new discovery of our day that there may be a *historical* knowledge of the facts and truths of Christianity without an *experimental* knowledge of the same. Hence we may speak of Christian knowledge, that is, of experimental knowledge, as being a product of Christian life (and it is likewise an *element* of this life), without drawing therefrom the slightest inference as to the origin of the *contents* of the knowledge. The course of our investigation thus far, and the nature of the question at issue, must make it evident that we do not treat in these pages of *the way* in which the Apostles appropriated Christian truth, but of the truth itself which they received. It will, however, presently appear that in explaining the passages to which we are referred by our author, he has confounded

Christian knowledge as a *mode of appropriation*, with Christian knowledge as the *sum* of Christian facts and truths. For if it is affirmed in John vii : 17, that "whosoever will do his will shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God or whether I speak of myself," it is evidently not the meaning, that a historical acquaintance with the doctrine depends on the disposition to obey, but that an experience of its divine power and truth depends on such a disposition. Now does it follow from this, that when Jesus promises to impart to his disciples whatever of his doctrine He has not yet imparted, he can only mean what is *here* meant by the word *γνωσκειν*? Does he not rather speak of truths to be disclosed by the Spirit which, like his own teachings, may be found divine by Christian experience?

We may pass without remark the fact, that in that appropriation of the doctrine which is conditioned on doing it, the Holy Spirit is not here mentioned as active ; for we are by no means inclined to deny the action of the Spirit for this end.

A brief notice of the other passages will suffice. I Cor. viii : 1-3, teaches that the possession of *mere knowledge* tends to pride, and requires this knowledge to be penetrated by love, in order that it may have the stamp of genuineness. I John iv : 7, pronounces love to be an indispensable condition of correct, saving knowledge—which *γνωσκειν*, it is known, is frequently used to express—that disposition of the soul toward God which answers to his perfections. In Eph. i : 17, sq., Paul mentions his desire that God would give to his readers the spirit of wisdom and of revelation unto the knowledge of Himself, and enlighten the eyes of their heart, or inner man, to know by experience the value of those blessings which they had received through Christianity ; while over against this, in iv : 18, stands a description of the heathen who, as to their intelligent nature, are involved in darkness, and are alienated from the divine life, by reason of the ignorance that is in them. Not to insist upon the fact, that these two passages from the letter to the Ephesians may refer to the Divine Spirit as giving to Christians instruction, the verification of which by experience *results* in a proper estimate and sense of

the blessings of Christianity, while the want of it prevents the heathen from enjoying the divine life ; such passages prove this only, that something more is required for the production of Christian character than a cold, barren, intellectual knowledge, but not that the Christian possesses no treasure of knowledge, save that which is the product of the Christian life.

If, now, we question their experience also, it will not be denied that the Spirit did much more for the Apostles than barely aid them in laying the doctrinal foundation of the Church ; all the knowledge at their command, in addition to the words of Christ which they remembered, being merely the result of a Christian life as brought to their consciousness. For, first, the sufferings and death of Christ, together with his resurrection and exaltation to the glory of the Father, were *matters of fact*, which not only produced a change in the character of the Apostles, but also at the same time laid a foundation for the most valuable elements of Christian doctrine. If Peter was able on the first descent of the Holy Spirit to give at once a satisfactory account of the whole plan of God, which had been thus far concealed, and to explain its true nature, can we assert that what he made known was a product of his Christian life as developed up to that time ? Or was not this correct view of God's entire scheme of redemption the fruit of the Spirit's illumination ? We, at least, have no knowledge that this working of the Divine Spirit was preceded by another working, productive of Christian life, and that through this life the illumination was effected. How far this supposition is required by psychological laws, will be considered particularly hereafter.

A second historical fact, which by an example related in detail gives us a very definite account of the way in which the Holy Spirit communicated instruction to the Apostles as occasion required, entirely excludes the supposition that his teaching was but an inference from previous Christian experience. It is the instruction given to Peter in a vision, according to Acts x, that the heathen, of whose destined conversion to Christianity he was well aware, were to be received without

demanding of them a prior submission to Judaism. No one will insist that the knowledge which Peter obtained from this vision was a product of his former Christian life ; so far at least as his own word may be trusted (v. 28, cf. v. 14), it was a truth which he could not have learned from himself and which God taught him *in opposition* to his previous belief ; the truth that the heathen were called to Christianity without taking Judaism by the way. This event proves, also, that when it became necessary the Spirit enlarged the circle of the Apostles' knowledge ; at the same time it removes all ground for the fear, that their earlier teachings may have been somewhat erroneous ; for they only proclaimed as *doctrine* that which the Spirit ratified by His testimony.

The argument from this event is apparently, though not really, weakened by the account in Acts xv, according to which the question was afterwards raised, whether Gentile converts were to submit to circumcision and the other rites of the Mosaic law. For there was no debate as to whether the Gentiles were to be received into Christianity, or as to whether those received were actually Christians ; for it was true beyond all doubt, that God had given them witness of their acceptance by the communication of his Spirit (v. 8). A difference of opinion existed on this point only, whether the intimate union of Gentile with Jewish Christians, their unity in the church, did not demand an observance of the Mosaic law on the part of the Gentile Christians ; but it became evident that a compliance with certain rules demanded by the spirit of moral purity which distinguished Christianity, or else by no means burdensome, would suffice to establish a cordial intercourse between the two classes, in harmony with the true spirit of Christianity. Hence the question at issue was not strictly a point of doctrine, but rather of discipline, although it was a point of the greatest moment to the interests of Christianity. Moreover, the tone of serious authority which the Apostles here employ, indicates their consciousness of being correct in their view. But to require, that as men enlightened by the spirit of God they should have suppressed all discussion of the matter before the

church, under the claim of infallible authority, would be to betray a very imperfect view of that which is wrought by the illumination of the Spirit. Inspiration was not given to supersede the use of reason, and to enable one to domineer over the spirits of men, but rather to aid one in presenting the clearest and most convincing grounds of action. In the consciousness of such a superiority the Apostles acted.

But the more exact statements of Paul give us clearer light respecting the way in which we are to conceive of the Holy Spirit as teaching the Apostles. For in Gal. i: 11, sq., while distinctly affirming that his knowledge of the Gospel was not obtained through men and their teachings, and so was not of merely human authority, he declares on the other hand that this knowledge was imparted to him by revelation from Jesus Christ. To say that Paul may have had a historical acquaintance with the works, the sufferings, and the teachings of Christ, does not affect the question at all. For undeniably he is here speaking of such a knowledge of Christianity as qualified him to be an *apostle*, and for the attainment of which it seemed to be necessary for him to have enjoyed the intimate acquaintance and the instruction of the other Apostles. Hence he shows very fully and carefully (v. 16, sq.), that never, during many years of his apostolic labors, had he come into such contact with other Apostles as by any possibility to have received his knowledge of the Gospel from them. Hence, too, he lays particular stress upon the fact, that when he finally met with the chief pillars of the church, they agreed in doctrine with him, without making any addition to his knowledge (26, sq.), and that he differed from them only by virtue of his peculiar qualifications to labor among the Gentiles. Since he speaks in this place of an *addition* to his knowledge which he *does not need* (ii: 6), the language evidently refers to knowledge for the attainment of which, intercourse with the Apostles must have seemed indispensable, and great presumption will be found in that language if we do not assume that the fruit of Christ's revelation to him was something else than a quickening of his inner life, which life he had so interpreted as to gain light on the meaning of the Gospel. Nay, the

entire drift of his argument must have been different, if the primitive Christians had generally supposed that the Holy Spirit merely awakened a new *life* in the Apostles, the product of which appeared in their ideas and representations. For in this case, he must rather have laid stress upon the fact that Christ had kindled up this life within him. While, now, it was everywhere known that he possessed historical accounts of the author and origin of Christianity, no emphasis could be laid on the circumstance that he never had sufficiently protracted intercourse with any of the Apostles *to account for his knowledge of Christianity as derived from them*—for he admits a short visit to the Apostle Peter, when he also saw James (i : 18), and which, if that had been the matter in question, might have *quicken*ed his spiritual life. If that view of the action of the Spirit in the Apostles which is advocated by the treatise of *Elwert*, had prevailed among the first Christians, then only a momentary contact with the Apostles would have been necessary in order to kindle the inner life, or test the life already kindled, and thereby explain all which Paul accomplished. Hence, plainly, the Apostle's narrative has a meaning and an object only on the supposition that a correct, comprehensive knowledge of the doctrines of Christianity must be imparted by Christ, through his Spirit, to qualify one for the calling of an apostle.

We might here notice the objection that instances can be pointed out where the Apostles fell into errors of doctrine. But while, in the theory proposed, these errors are referred to the *form* of the doctrine—though certainly in a quite unusual sense of the word—we cannot discuss them here, where we are speaking of the result of the Spirit's action, in so far as this is brought before us in a general way historically; but rather when we come to examine the limits within which the form must be kept.

If, now, we proceed to consider what is presupposed by the Apostles in their deportment and in their statements concerning themselves, our attention is first drawn to the view which they entertained of the contents of the Old Testament, as a work of the Divine Spirit. For, beyond dispute, they held

that the Spirit was not operating in their own Christian day with *less* power than in former times ; but that his workings were in every respect more diversified and perfect. Hence, if they believed the contents of the Old Testament, as a work of the Divine Spirit, to be infallible, they could not deem the mingling of falsehood with truth consistent with the influence of the Holy Spirit, which they themselves enjoyed ; and if it was exactly the contents of the Old Testament which seemed to them to be indorsed of God by reason of the inspiration of the Spirit, we have simply to imagine them as not wholly beyond the atmosphere of thought which surrounded them, in order to be certain that they did not exclude from their idea of the Spirit's action a revelation of *doctrinal* truth. Now they had gotten from their Master a view of the contents of the Old Testament, which ascribes to the same, even in the minutest details, an inviolable sanctity (Matt. v : 18) ; which interprets a remark contained in the Old Testament, on the nature of marriage, as a divine explanation (Matt. xix : 4, sq.) ; which insists that no declaration of Scripture can fail of being fulfilled (John x : 55) ; and which declares that Christ might not withdraw Himself from any part of his suffering, because he would thereby contradict the purpose of God as recorded beforehand in the Old Testament (Matt. xxvi : 54, cf. Luke xxiv : 26, sq. and 44-46). Only such a writing as bears the stamp of divinity on the whole and every part of its contents, can be so esteemed and employed.

Moreover, we find that the Apostles ascribe a most definite sense to particular passages of the Old Testament, as divinely inspired (Peter in Acts ii : 30, sq., and Paul in Acts xiii : 36, sq.) ; that they considered the particular events of Christ's history as taking place according to Scripture (I Cor. xv : 3, sq., cf. I Peter i : 11) — which accordance is inconceivable, unless the particular expressions of Scripture are significant ; and that the Old Testament gives a fitting reason for the *universal* depravity of man (Gal. iii : 22). These particular illustrations of the Apostles' view cast the proper light on their more general statements, even allowing that such statements taken by themselves in their connection are

susceptible of a different explanation ; even allowing, *e. g.*, that the theopneusty ascribed to the Old Testament writings, or presupposed in them, by II Tim. iii : 16, could be understood in a wider sense than many interpreters dare to infer from the passage. Yet it should be noted, that in this very passage the theopneusty of the Old Testament is supposed to give it a character from which may be *inferred* its manifold good influence — the good influence being *presupposed* on the ground of inspiration, and not the inspiration inferred from the good influence. The same view prevailed among the first Christians, as we learn from II Peter i : 21 ; for according to this passage, even if we understand the negation as comparative, an action of the Divine Spirit is undeniably presupposed which reveals the future, and is thereby distinguished from whatever the best human will could have drawn from the mind of its possessor.

With such views of the action of the Holy Spirit and conscious of being supported by Him, we find the Apostles everywhere confidently proclaiming the Gospel, and, however modestly they estimated themselves in other respects, never giving the slightest intimation that their preaching was affected by any remnant of their former errors. Instead of this, whenever their doctrine was attacked, they withstood the assault with the greatest earnestness and zeal. This appears with equal clearness in the words of Paul (II Cor. vii, sq., Gal. i, Col. ii), of Peter (II Ep. ii), of James (ch. ii), and of John (I Ep. iv, II Ep. v. 9). And the Apostle declares that the curse of God must rest upon every one who shall preach a Gospel different from that proclaimed by him (Gal. i : 8, sq.). Nowhere do we find the Apostles referring to their Christian life as the source of their knowledge, or as establishing by its genuineness the credibility of their doctrine ; though we readily grant that they claim to be disinterested in their work, having preached the Gospel without any prospect of worldly gain. The gift of inspiration was thought to enable one to understand the divine plan (cf. Eph. iii : 2, sq.), and the duty of believing the teachings of the Apostle is inferred from the fact that his doctrine was attested by the same confirmatory

miracles which sustained in general the authority of an apostle (cf. Ro. xv : 19, II Cor. xii : 12, Heb. ii : 4). Nor do we ever meet with intimations that any one of the Apostles proposed the degree of his (relative) sinlessness as the measure of the knowledge intrusted to him or developed from him. It would involve at least a great confusion of religious ideas, if the hope of an apostle (as Paul, Phil. iii : 1, sq.), to make constant progress in Christian virtue, should be so referred to the doctrines of Christianity as to make it seem necessary for him to include in this progress a rejection of his earlier views as erroneous.

On the contrary, Paul speaks in this passage of the advantage secured to him by the knowledge of Christ (v. 8) as superior to any other advantage. The *γινῶναι*, v. 10, as is fully proved by the added explanation *τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀγίας τῶς αὐτοῦ*, denotes the increasingly *fruitful* entering into the knowledge of Christ — if indeed we should give to *γινῶναι* in this place the meaning *to know* and not rather *to appreciate*. But in order to this spiritual appropriation and deeper apprehension of knowledge, there must be a treasure of knowledge to be thus appropriated or apprehended. And one's previous knowledge is so far from being made to appear partially erroneous by *this* growth, that it is rather more and more incontestibly authenticated by it as a divine germ. We hope also it will not be required of us to argue the point, that when Paul in I Cor. xiii : 8, sq., speaks of a cessation of the gifts of prophecy, of tongues, and of knowledge, because they are imperfect, he does not mean by this that they will appear to have been worthless and erroneous, but only that they will cease as things which bear the stamp of defectiveness, while everything will then be transfigured into the perfect. By reason of the finite nature now encompassing us, our whole *mode of cognition* (v. 11, sq.) is one which, in comparison with the mode of cognition in the future world, never reaches to a clear vision of the light. But to draw from this the conclusion that there is for us no knowledge possible, which, while partly true, is not of necessity erroneous in other parts distinguishable from the true — this it will hardly be expected of us to admit.

The words τὸ ἐκ μέρους καταργηθήσεται, do not affirm that certain *elements* of our knowledge will hereafter be rejected as false, but that our *defective mode of cognition generally* will cease.

But, it is objected, the decided language with which the Apostles ascribe to their preaching a divine origin and character, relates merely to the immoveable *ground* of Christian faith, and to the certainty with which this faith was impressed on their hearts. Compare such passages as I Thess. ii: 13, iv: 8; II Cor. v: 20, I Peter i: 23. But I might ask in the first place, how it would have looked had the Apostles, while conscious of proclaiming in every particular only what was divinely attested, affirmed of certain doctrines: this must be received, for we, the Apostles declare it? That would have been a poor Divine Spirit within them, on whose authority they claimed a stone-blind faith. But it was suitable for them to appeal *in general* to the fact that what they communicated was to be received as doctrine coming from God, and verifying its own truth. And had the Apostles been conscious of a mingling of the human with the divine in their teaching, it may well be doubted whether they would have claimed for it, as in I Thess. ii: 13, so unconditionally, and emphatically, and repeatedly, the divine impress. This assurance, appearing likewise in Gal. i: 8, points us to their certain consciousness that no strictures could be made on their doctrines as being erroneous or but half true; unless, perhaps, we are ready to charge them with unseemly arrogance. For whoever has reason to fear such strictures will be more careful and modest in his language.

Accordingly it does not perplex us, if an apostle submits his declarations to the scrutiny and judgment of his readers, if Paul calls upon them in I Thess. v: 21, thus to try his teaching, and if the members of the Thessalonian church are praised in Acts xvii: 11, for doing this; but it would perplex us if the Apostles had reason to withdraw their doctrine from careful scrutiny; for in this case they would demean themselves as men whose illumination by the Divine Spirit was of a doubtful character. But I must wonder at

the selection of proof-passages in the present instance. In I Cor. x : 15, to be sure, Paul turns to his readers as "wise men" — now it is to be hoped the insight given by the Spirit of God does not have to address those destitute of sense! — and exhorts them to judge what he is going to say. But the matter which he brings before their judgment does not concern *a doctrine of the faith*, but rather the *conduct* which ought to follow the admission of certain truths of which no doubt on their part is intimated — the inconsistency of Christians in delaring that they are in fellowship with Christ by partaking the Lord's Supper, while they declare themselves to be in fellowship with idols by partaking of their sacrifices. Still less appropriate will be found the appeal to I Cor. xiv : 37, where Paul insists on just this fact, that whoever is in any manner under the influence of the Divine Spirit will be constrained to recognize his writings as the commandments of the Lord. In fact, those who maintain that the influence of the Divine Spirit communicated to the Apostles infallible truth, may well venture to meet stronger weapons than those with which they are here resisted.

But we have clear intimations that the Apostles in preaching the Gospel did not start from the conviction that this preaching would simply enkindle in the hearer the life which existed in the preacher, and make this life the source of suitable knowledge. For, first, the remark of John xii : 42, assures us that a *belief* was produced, by preaching, in many who did not openly confess the same, for fear of the Pharisees. Here, then, we have persons in whom *conviction* was wrought, without being accompanied by a Christian life ; thus they *knew* the truth which should have led them to give themselves up to Christ, but they did not admit the element of life which this conviction would have kindled in them, had they not purposely repelled it. Again : the words of Paul in Ro. x : 13, sq., give us evidence of the way in which the Apostles conceived of men as being won to the Gospel. According to this passage, it is impossible for any man to call savingly upon the Lord — or, in general, to worship Him devoutly — without faith ; while faith is impossible without the preached

word ; the preached word, without preachers ; and preachers, without a commission. Not only is faith here made to depend on *hearing* (which again postulates a *Word of God* to be heard), while there is nothing said of *transplanting the Christian life into others* ; but faith is evidently used to signify a cordial reception of that which is heard, and from this faith springs a further fruit, the pious worship of God, or Christian life. Hence this life is not the root of faith, nor faith the root of knowledge ; and whoever calls upon us to recognize this latter process as the one by which Christian character is formed, asks for that which is plainly and utterly inconsistent with the view presented in the New Testament. For with such a representation, how could the Apostle (cf. I Cor. ix : 27) have thought it possible for himself to be rejected, while yet he could preach to others, and, as appears from the same letter, not without saving results ? How incredible and hurtful to the good cause would have been his declaration, in Phil. i : 18, that he rejoiced and would always rejoice, that Christ was preached, even by those who were not sincere ? *Could* he have done this, if the efficiency of preaching was traceable to the life of the preacher passing over into the hearers ? If there were no truths which by means of preaching could come to the *knowledge* of man, and without regard to the disposition of the preacher, verify their convincing and life-giving power ?

And so, at last, we come to the unanswerable argument, drawn from the event related in Gal. ii : 11, sq., without being terrified by the remark (p. 72, sq.), ‘that we can no more gain anything here by making a distinction between moral guilt and error of teaching, than the interest of the papacy can be saved asserting that sinners enough, but no heretics, have sat in the chair of Rome.’ Indeed, we cannot conceal our surprise that such a conceit, which leaves the real question untouched, should be set up in opposition to the earnest and conscientious investigations which sustain the other view. As to the popes — whether they are infallible or not — the whole character of the position assumed by them in the church, the propriety of the way in which they reached this position,

the dependence of spiritual gifts on outward dignity, the historical evidence for the infallibility claimed by them, and how much besides!—are not only with good reason doubted, but are proved untenable by the most convincing arguments. But we have in Peter an apostle called by the Lord himself, and assured by Him of the qualifications necessary for his office; yet not so qualified—for this was never promised him—that he was not liable to many a weakness in his acting or forbearing to act. With such a weakness we here find him overtaken, since he withdrew himself—out of regard to the Jewish Christians—from close intercourse with the Gentile Christians. And as this *conduct* was not according to (known) truth (v. 14, *ὅτι ὁρθοποδοῦσι*), Paul felt himself constrained to *reprove* it as *hypocritical*. But not to mention the bearing of the whole narrative in the second chapter of Galatians, how can it be left in this case to our choice, whether to presuppose an error in the mind of Peter, or a course of conduct opposed to known truth, when the incontestible evidence of history shows that Peter had long before been set right on the point in question (see Acts x: 54, sq., and cf. xv: 7, sq.), since he confessed with joy his conviction that Gentiles might embrace Christianity with precisely the same rights and immunities as Jews? Moreover, Paul throughout his address to Peter, appeals to the fact that the latter had hitherto sanctioned the very course which by his conduct he was now opposing.

Hence, we *cannot* trace his withdrawal from the Gentile Christians to any want of correct knowledge. Admit that we could not help drawing the darkest conclusions from this state of the case, it is yet a *matter of fact*, against which no wishes of ours can be of the least avail. Yet the fact need not so greatly terrify us, since the care and maintenance of Christian truth, although it was put into the hands of fallible men, was not put into the hands of one man, but rather of many, who were essentially faithful, so that if one of them were overtaken by any human weakness, no permanent injury in the providence of God would result therefrom, since another standing at his side could interpose a timely admonition. And this reminds us of a noble aspect of this dark event; for we

behold in it two men who claim almost equal admiration from us, the one with his disinterested zeal for the support of the Gospel in its integrity, and the other with his repentance and acknowledgment of guilt, securing by this conquest of himself the most glorious victory to the good cause. Thus we have a proof in this narrative of the care of Divine Providence that a threatened obscuration of Christian truth by the conduct of a great pillar of the church should work no mischief, since a powerful champion was at hand to defend the right. And as to Peter, if a Paul had not helped him to recover himself, we may yet be certain that he would not have dared to *teach* and maintain as the *word of God* what he had been *gradually* misled to sanction by his conduct. For we are far more likely to deny our convictions in what we do or omit, especially if we are only drawn step by step into a certain course of action which, in its origin, is favored by many a prudential reason, than we are to contradict a known truth in our teaching, especially if we are called, as were the first Christians, to risk property and life in confessing the truth. In the case before us, Peter was doubtless influenced at first by a suitable anxiety not to repel the Jewish Christians by his conduct; but in yielding to this anxiety, he lost sight of his duty to the other side. Hence this event in apostolic history seems to have been put on record as a *proof* that *the truth* was not endangered by the imperfection of those who were chosen to communicate it to mankind.

After what has now been said, the biblical result can hardly appear doubtful. There was promised to the Apostles a communication of the Holy Ghost *to teach* them, and thus qualify them to perform the duties of their office by a *full understanding of Christian truth*, and they never acted otherwise than as men who were in full possession of this truth. But since it has been asked with reference to the last event, by way of objection, whether we can seriously believe that a moral offence is possible with a perfectly clear knowledge, without some, at least momentary, darkening of the understanding? we now proceed to answer the further question; *Whether the laws of psychology require us to substitute that mode of the*

Holy Spirit's action which is advocated by Elwert, for the mode determined by exegesis?

We shall first lay before our readers that representation of the Holy Spirit's action, which our investigation thus far has shown to be biblical. As the constant companions of Christ during his public ministry, the Apostles were possessed of a great sum of facts which they had learned as eye and ear witnesses, and of which therefore they had a historical knowledge. What Christ had done, what He had taught, what had occurred to Him, they had together seen and heard. Moreover, although the reception of the Holy Spirit was conditioned on the departure of Christ, and was made possible by that event, we should form a wholly erroneous conception of the spiritual state of the Apostles during the life of Christ, should we suppose the Spirit to have remained a total stranger to them — a view, besides, which would be inconsistent with a right conception of the Holy Spirit's action. Had not Peter — and with him the other Apostles in whose name he spoke (Matt. xvi: 18, sq.) — a definite conviction of the Messianic character of Jesus; a conviction which qualified him in the judgment of Christ to be the founder of his church, and which could have been derived from the Father only? Indeed the believing attachment of the Apostles to Christ, gaining strength perpetually through their intercourse with Him, was a work of the Holy Spirit which only needed to be maintained and carried forward in the future to be the unchanged basis of all their fitness for the apostolic calling. But Christ could not give the proper centre from which the Holy Spirit could reveal the whole truth, so long as the object of faith was not yet a perfected Redeemer; so long as they could not yet look upon Christ as exalted to glory through the suffering of death, and hence could not receive Him in his full truth. The complete work of the Spirit in rectifying the views of the Apostles could not be performed until all that God would give to men in Christ was put in place at the foundation. Very essential to the production of the Christian view were the facts yet to be accomplished.

But it was not less important that the knowledge for which a

historical basis was now fully given, should be moulded into the genuine knowledge and doctrine of the Gospel. And here, according to the assurance of Jesus, the action of the Divine Spirit came in to carry forward, as well as to supplement, the Saviour's teachings. The Holy Spirit had from the first enabled the Apostles to appropriate truth laid before them. And the fruit of this was such a transformation of their spiritual nature as fitted them to be called by Christ, while in the flesh, his own ; yea, more, to be preachers of the kingdom of God ; for on a certain occasion Christ sent them forth in this capacity to communicate to others the truth already understood by them. In this respect there was no need of a promise to the disciples of a special and yet unexperienced influence of the Holy Spirit. The power to *interpret* correctly the whole mass of historical truth before them, to look into the plan of God and understand how it was to be apprehended as a provision for the reconciliation of man with God, to assign to every particular its proper relation to the whole, and, since nothing erroneous can appear in the territory of truth without working confusion, to remember accurately the past, to have a view of what had already taken place and of what was yet to be done, in order to judge the wants affecting the church from the right point of observation and without error, to penetrate the depths of human depravity and the ground and nature of divine grace — all this was given to the Apostles by the Holy Spirit, "leading them into all truth ;" and it demanded of them a very wide reach of faith ; for in Christ, to whom their souls clung in love, they now found inconceivably more than had ever been brought to their certain apprehension while with Him in the flesh, although their anticipations may have outstripped their distinct knowledge.

Such was the revelation made to the Apostles by the Divine Spirit who led them into all truth — being at first, as on the day of Pentecost, a general view, the particular elements of which were not separately and clearly recognized, a luminous, central, inalienable germ-thought, embracing in itself an incalculable fulness of saving truth, destined to exercise a sure control over the whole inner life and knowledge, thus

verifying its heavenly origin. In and of itself it would have answered, for the future, to borrow from this luminous seed-thought ; with this thought there must have been in the Apostles a deeply rooted confidence that they were partakers of the genuine light ; in this thought lay the consciousness of a mutual agreement in faith, and of an undisturbed harmony with themselves in every development of inspired truth. But although this treasure of truth given by the Spirit of God must have continued to work in a peculiar manner, yet we should resign it to the same fate with any luminous thought flashing upon the human mind, if we were to imagine the influence of the Divine Spirit withdrawn in the sequel, and this treasure exposed to the inroads of a perverted human nature. Instead of supposing the Holy Spirit's action banished by these corrupting inroads of human nature, we are to suppose a *constant guidance* of the Spirit to resist them ; even as this was promised to the Apostles by Christ, to the end that their human imperfection might not mar the divine seed-thought, but leave the same pure and intact, both in germ and in development, although revealed through and for human nature. We may, indeed, grant that the blessed presence of Christ might not have availed to prevent every manifestation of sinful weakness and perversity in the Apostles, yet it would have been able to guard his own companions from giving themselves up to the bondage of error and the perversion of truth. But the help of the Spirit was to be a full equivalent for his own presence ; this He promised.

While now we are perfectly sure that a truth thus revealed by the aid of the Divine Spirit — or better, a circle of truths thus revealed — cannot fail to have a highly quickening influence upon the moral and spiritual powers of man, we do not intend to deny to the simple action of the Divine Spirit this fructifying influence, or even to restrict in any measure this influence. For if the truth which enlightens will, if not resisted, enkindle love in the soul ; surely the illuminating action of the Spirit must be regarded as also quickening. Hence, while we do not refuse credence to the enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit, as clearly promised in the New Testament

to the Apostles, we are not therefore chargeable with having no eye for that influence of the Spirit which pervades the whole life of the Christian. We merely have no hesitation in rejoicing that this life was not *rooted* in partial error, but in God-given and God-preserved truth. We also believe that we do not thereby assign to the Holy Spirit a mode of action which either contradicts or sets aside the laws of psychology. On the other hand, we would remind our readers of the power to pervade and illuminate, as with a single beam, the whole nature, which is possessed by some thought given us by a fellow-man ; how a solid mass of darkness is at once changed into the light of day ! Are now any psychological laws violated by the force of this thought, communicated from without but appropriated by us ? are they not rather revealed in their integrity ? And should that which a human thought succeeds in doing, be denied to a thought awakened by the action of God ? But if it is objected, that what is human, when communicated in human form, should interest men — we reply : Is God, then, so far removed and estranged from his world, and from man, his image, that He — who revealed Himself to us through the veil of Christ's humanity — cannot bring truth by his Spirit so near our spirits as to be apprehended by us ? Or rather, if we speak of the truth which begets in the soul a right disposition toward God, is it not fitted to penetrate the innermost nature of man, and thereby secure the harmonious action of all psychological laws, by revealing itself to the spirit as the most certain of all its knowledge, and the surest of all its possessions ? In fact we do not understand the ground of this reluctance to ascribe to the human spirit a capacity to receive as *truth* a thought given to it of God, while yet some other action of the Holy Spirit upon men is admitted.

If the disciple of a human teacher who had wrought such a transformation of his spiritual nature by the communication of a thought, should wish in the sequel to connect with that luminous thought divers opinions incompatible with its import and authority, would it be a proscription and not rather an emancipation of his natural powers, should that teacher assist him by

further instruction to reject those erroneous views? And do we then clothe the action of the one perfect and heavenly Teacher of the Apostles with a lordly, proscriptive power, if we assign to his wise hand the work of preserving this luminous thought from perversion, as it unfolds into its particular elements in the consciousness of the Apostles? It seems to us that their true freedom would be, not merely unabridged by this action, but rendered continually more and more secure.

Moreover, we have observed that a genuine spiritual *awakening* springs from *truth* distinctly apprehended, and that it draws into its service all the powers of the spiritual nature. The thought does not spring from the awakening, but produces it; while the latter, we have no wish to deny, is in turn prolific of yet other thoughts. But these further thoughts, if they do not disturb and contravene the awakened life, must be consistent with and derived from the fundamental thought. Is it, then, the distinguishing peculiarity of the ground-thought given by the Spirit, that incongruous, erroneous ideas, having their origin in human imperfection, can be united with it, without disturbing and crossing the moral life which springs from this thought? By no means. Many an idea of simply human origin has taken under its control and into its possession the entire spiritual nature of man, and has operated so powerfully that every disturbing, irreconcilable element has given way and disappeared. If now we ascribe to the ground-thought awakened by the Spirit of God, such a psychological power only, and suppose the influence of the Divine Spirit to be thenceforth wholly withdrawn, yet if it is a thought which takes hold of the deepest spiritual nature of man with most genuine and significant truth, shall it alone, after once penetrating the entire life and soul of the man, cease to operate and transform? Shall it alone consent to be on terms of friendship with his remaining errors, and still the life awakened by it be recognized as genuine? But when the divine action which awakened that thought, in harmony with the deepest nature of man, is also an abiding action, and this central thought is likewise immediately true—can it nevertheless consent to unite itself with error? will it not, as springing

from God, and invigorated by Him, put to flight a man's error? So far are we from believing that the truth imparted by the Divine Spirit is to be considered a mere lifeless thing, that we grant ourselves unable to form any conception of the life of such an original truth in the spirit of man, as shall not, when protected by the Divine Spirit, exercise this corrective power on all the views of its possessor. And if it be claimed that this corrective agency of the Spirit must then manifest itself in every Christian, we can admit this in certain respects, while in other respects we may properly limit this claim. And our limitation is found in the view which we have already explained, and which is insisted on by the other party, that the mode of the Spirit's action is always adapted to the position and calling of every one in the church. Now it was the calling of the Apostles to lay the foundation, so that the church might be built upon the foundation of the Apostles and prophets (who discovered the divine will and purpose). This foundation *has been laid* by them, and that special influence of the Divine Spirit required for this work can no longer be expected or claimed. On the other hand, every Christian and the entire church of Christ, needs to possess the same treasure of truth given to the Apostles. Hence this can be drawn from their teaching through the constant aid of the Holy Spirit — but gradually, even as the light, though given at once to the Apostles in the germ, was yet gradually developed. And as that development, under the constant guidance of the Spirit, protected them from error in doctrine, so does a true adherence to the Word, which the Divine Spirit helps us to appropriate, protect us from the by-paths of error, and our participation in truth is not abridged so long as we are only willing to follow the right way.

In all this, we do not see that we have presupposed anything inconsistent with the laws of our spiritual nature. Least of all, after rejecting, as we have done, the assumption that the peculiarities of inspired men were sunk or repressed by their reception of truth from the Spirit, can we accept the statement (s. 19, sq.), that the supposed inspiration of the Apostles involves a surrender of personal freedom in receiv-

ing the contents of Scripture. At least with the view of inspiration which we have thus far set forth, it must appear to be obviously unfounded. Any *truth* made known in any way to the human spirit — provided only it be in reality a truth, and be made at the same time *comprehensible*, (and how else could it be a revelation?) — cannot fail to benefit and emancipate the human spirit by its action. And if it succeed in asserting its authority on the simple ground, “it is God’s Word,” then in case it is really his Word, the actual submission of the soul to the truth thus gained, can only result in blessing; and it need occasion no anxiety if the truth, when apprehended and recognized, produces its *natural* and blessed fruit. But grant that a truth which God’s Spirit communicates to an individual, is designed to become the possession of mankind, why should not its appropriation, especially where it is set forth in the most varied exhibition of its life-giving, life-revealing power, and not as a bare, cold dogma, lay claim to the action of the man himself, and not only to assure himself of its divine certainty, but also to incorporate it with the individual peculiarities of his mind, and to make use of it in a legitimate way? We certainly have no fear that truths shown to be from God must lie dead and unemployed, merely because they are of divine origin. Christian truth at least has been received as from God during many centuries, and most decidedly so, *e. g.*, at the time of the Reformation. Has it on this account lost its life-giving power? Or has it not, apprehended as *truth*, called forth the most various opinions.

No psychological law, it seems to us, can be pointed out which would be infringed by assuming that the action of the Divine Spirit imparted to the Apostles truth in the form of thought. There is here no reason for guarding our exegetical result by any new theory or labored devices. The following is offered to us by Elwert (86, qsq.): “The original work of the Spirit is faith; and since the Apostles were to impart this to the world, it necessarily had in them a typical character.” This faith consisted in the power to copy the life of Christ. The Spirit awoke in the minds of the Apostles a consciousness of their intimate union with Christ. Its action must be con-

ceived as affecting, not a particular element, but the very *centre* of their life. Their *knowledge* as well as every thing else, was attained under the influence of the Spirit; and while this influence was greater in the Apostles than in any other subject, their knowledge of God and of Christ must have exceeded that of all other men. Still it was their own act of reflection, although guided by the Spirit, which gave form to their knowledge and wrought out their system of religious ideas. This theory is required partly by the assured way and manner of the Spirit's action, and partly by the manifest variety of form in the different writers of the New Testament, etc.

In regard to the latter fact, which we do not hesitate to admit, we maintain it to be at least supposable, according to the nature of the case, that one and the same truth may be presented in a great variety of forms, without being marred or mingled with error; and the choice of these various forms will be determined partly by the peculiar character of the teacher, and partly by the peculiar wants of the taught. For the latter reason we find that Christ himself clothed the *one* truth in many a different garb and connected it with various events, yet this truth was surely unchangeable in Him, nor was it falsified by any of his representations. Hence the variety of form in which the truth appears does not argue a defective apprehension of it, while on the other hand, the skill which is evinced in selecting for a given purpose, in every case, the most suitable expression, indicates a deep and sure understanding of the same, an understanding which secures the possessor of this treasure from perplexity in reproducing it as varying circumstances require. We cannot, therefore, accept this diversity among the Apostles in their manner of presenting truth, as any sort of proof that they had received the truth with some admixture of error. It bears witness rather to the genuineness and excellence of that truth, which not only holds when set in one expression, when clothed in one form, but rather rules these externals so as to become the common good of all. And plainly there is no need of further argument to show that, if the diversity of minds in our race

requires this diversity of form in presenting truth, then also a corresponding diversity in the natural peculiarities of inspired men is requisite. We have already observed that human imperfection and the admission of the Apostles themselves that they had not yet attained to perfection, need not involve either an erroneous apprehension or exhibition of the truth given them by the Spirit, and we have likewise protested against confounding an intermixture of error with an imperfect discernment of truth, or an imperfect experience of truth with a deficiency of knowledge.

We will now examine more in detail our author's theory of the way and manner in which the Apostles became possessed of Christian truth through the action of the Holy Spirit. But we confess our inability to follow the course marked out for us, or even to satisfy ourselves precisely how we are to conceive of this course. We are taught,

1. That the original work of the Spirit is to produce faith.
2. That this faith is identical with the Apostles' consciousness of being spiritually and closely united with Christ.
3. That the Spirit's action was directed to the centre of life ; while one ray from the quickening effected by it was their knowledge.

Here we readily grant that the life of faith is identical with the communion between Christ and the Christian, by which Christ lives in him and he in Christ ; for faith consists in a voluntary consent to God's eternal plan, as fulfilled by his holy love in Christ, and hence in the appropriation of Christ as the Saviour given us by God — which appropriation involves at the same time a full surrender of the soul to Him, that it may be wholly transformed. But the plan of God to which I heartily consent, the Saviour whom I willingly receive and to whom I give my heart that it may be transformed, must be *known* by me as the proper object of my faith. But how this knowledge is to be an *effect* of the Spirit's action, *through and from faith as a germ*, I confess myself unable to perceive. The life of faith will *prove by experience* that Christ is just what he was supposed to be by the act of faith ; and it will lead him who possesses it into even deeper knowledge,

i. e., into the knowledge of the inexhaustible fulness of Jesus. But the faith must unquestionably have an *object* to which it is directed. And that which faith receives and approves must not be merely a vague somewhat, the contents of which cannot be certainly represented; for in that case it would be something unworthy of a rational man, not to say inconceivable in a rational man. We may, to be sure, receive the impression of that which is believed, without comprehending the same in its entire fulness and in all its particular elements. Yet faith is only possible where there is some definite object of faith. Now, although the Apostles knew Christ personally, and during his earthly life became familiar with many points in which the plan of God was fulfilled by Him, yet we learn from the word of Christ that they were in need of still further instruction, and we are certified, on the other hand, that on the day of Pentecost they proved themselves to be already qualified, by such a view of the plan of God as they had never gained before, to give the most impressive instruction to the surrounding multitude. Can we then say that this knowledge, at their command just when it was needed, was a result obtained by reflection from their life of faith? And if in other circumstances, especially in writing, a suitable representation of Christian truth was secured by deliberate examination and reflection, could not this truth—even if we exclude, as we have no right to do, the guidance of the Divine Spirit—be maintained in its purity, though the exhibition be the work of imperfect men? To present the treasure of Christian truth under the figure of a precious jewel, whose value, however great it appears at first sight, is more and more evinced by possession; will the further contemplation of it, which is made possible by possession, lead, as its result, to an erroneous account of the object? or will this account, however correct it might have been at first in a general way, be confirmed as well as completed by the subsequent and particular examination? And if we bear in mind that this treasure of truth, whose meaning is ever becoming clearer, is a gift of the Divine Spirit, and the impression which it makes an effect derived from Him, must it not be of such a nature as to be

in the general correct? This, indeed, will be granted. But if this truth discloses its divine power more and more in the life, should it then follow that one's knowledge, as it becomes more and more definite, will mix itself up with error? or, rather, will not the later account of it always verify and at the same time unfold in every direction the earlier?

I cannot refrain from adding in this place a remark which the modern theories—theories which sustain themselves by their vague and floating contents—overlook, however important it may be for them to ponder it. If, according to these theories, the object of knowledge is exhausted, so to speak, in what is discovered through the life; nay, if even more is contained in principle in the life than appears in knowledge; what is there to stimulate its life? Must it not be self-satisfied, if only what lies before its eyes is known? But this, at least, is not the spirit of Christianity. For the spirit of Christianity holds before us the perfection of God as the goal of our endeavors; hence, this must be conceived in some sort, without being realized in the life. Christianity refers us to the image of Christ, into which the believer should strive to be changed from glory to glory. But how can this gradual transformation go on, if the Christian has no more knowledge than is drawn from his past experience? If, indeed, the Spirit does not enter the man as a mere mechanical principle, to set in motion what is already there, then its natural operation will be to produce *more* and *higher* knowledge than the limited mortal, in his poor, feeble action, has already attained. Miserable truly would be the faith which could offer its possessor no more in Christ than he was now able to manifest in his own conduct, so that he must take his idea of Christ from his own life. I count myself happy, in having something *divine* in Christianity, and in having unspeakably *more* than I or any other man will fully represent in conduct. But if we need for the incitement and development of our religious life something in advance of that life, it is not enough for us to be aware historically of what was said or done by Christ; we must also perceive the inner connection of the truth. For that truth is not fashioned through the life, which exists inde-

pendently of this or that truth ; but *the life is developed from the truth.*

In view of this, we can determine what must be the influence of any corruption of the truth, whether as apprehended or as taught. We do not speak of men whose entire being is estranged from God and Christ, and who may, therefore, have in their memory the contents of Christianity, as historically transmitted, without allowing them any influence upon their disposition. If it is in itself conceivable that they may learn these contents in some good degree outwardly, yet they gain thereby no insight into their inner connection, and hence an erroneous apprehension of them in many respects is very probable ; for Christianity does not come to us as a theory, for speculation, but as an institution, for actual life. Wholly otherwise is it with the single outbreaks of remaining sin, which only serve to remind a man of that sinfulness in himself which Christianity presupposes. For it is the nature of Christianity, as all know, to offer salvation to the *sinful*, to the end that sin may give place to the divine life. But this is not brought to pass by a stroke of magic ; no Christian, however mature, has outgrown all connection with sin. Still his experiences of remaining sin do not render spurious the divine life, where this life exists, but they are adapted to excite in us a more earnest longing after the life in Christ, who is far more than we can represent in our life, and to make us seek with renewed eagerness Him of whom we have been taught our need by our deepest, truest nature.

Such sins, not reaching down to the germ of Christian life, but showing its unsatisfactory development—to the shame of the Christian—do not stand in any necessary connection with a subversion of Christian truth, since Christianity was designed for men who are not pure from all contact with sin, but rather for men who are constantly exposed to its temptations, and who cannot pretend to have kept themselves free from it. We could hardly have received the Epistle to the Romans from an Apostle who was conscious of being free from all sin, and especially that part of it which is most useful in founding and nourishing the Christian life. We can-

not, therefore, admit the assumption that every prominent moral fault must have corrupted Christian truth, or have been produced by such corruption. In committing a sin, we simply fail of allowing the truth to have its legitimate influence. But sin—in case we do not give ourselves up to its power—often impels the conscience to hold the truth before us more distinctly and sharply than it would otherwise have done. A close observer of himself will scarcely be able to say that he has not been greatly benefitted by a deeper knowledge of his own heart, and by a more thorough use of the Christian truth at his command, even when these were occasioned by a sin which revealed to him the depravity of his moral nature. Hence, if we look upon the Holy Spirit's action as natural, we cannot assume that every sin of which the Apostles were guilty occasioned a corresponding withdrawal of the Spirit's enlightening power, nor that every such fault testifies of the withdrawal of the teaching of the Spirit. Besides, there is such a thing as *grieving* the Holy Spirit, and this must consist in a denial of the true knowledge which He secures and sets forth. But not every outbreak of sin is to be regarded a "grieving" of the Spirit of God in the strictest sense, much less does it have of necessity a disturbing and perverting influence upon the knowledge and communication of truth. Hence, we cannot look upon Christian truth as being seriously endangered when it was put into the hands of men who were not yet delivered from a sinful nature. We remember, indeed, with sadness, that even Peter, out of regard to his Jewish brethren, could be moved to withdraw himself from the Gentile Christians in such a manner as was inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity. But we are nevertheless sure that he would not have dared to mix with his preaching the error that a colder and more distant relation should subsist between Jewish and Gentile Christians. Many an inward reproof must have brought silently before his soul the wrong which he had done, before the earnest word of a fellow Apostle helped him finally to confess in conduct what was known to him as truth by the incontestible evidence of history.

Closely connected with what has already been said, is the

theory, which is foisted upon us as self-evident, respecting the communication of Christianity, first by the Apostles and then by others, namely, that it was the Christian *life* which was transferred from one to another, and then in the sequel Christian knowledge. We cannot here presume to pass without notice the influence of the Christian life of others upon ourselves. But we would call attention to the *moral faculty*, whose action in every person, so far as it has life and action, must be his own, incapable of transfer from another ; hence, also, the life cannot properly be imparted, but may come into being without dependence on the *life* of another, as it may likewise immeasurably transcend that life by which it was awakened, both in compass and inward power. In proof of this, we need only to mention the Great Reformation ! The life which then sprang up and bloomed was not inherited from others ; it grew out of a genuine reverence for the word of God. Even where there is the most irregular communication of the truth, it may kindle in others a spark that will increase to a joyful and blessed flame. How miserable would be the fate of mankind, in whole or in part, if they were ever to lack the life from which the true life might flow ! No, the truth ! the truth ! it is, which by its own power finds a lodgement in the soul, and kindles there a life that glows and increases, although no life of man has produced it. But Christian truth is not something to be created in man and by man ; it was given by God, and what it makes known was instituted by Jehovah, in order that man might have something, not derived from himself, but received by him, and bearing fruit in the life without limit and without measure. Hence, the chief requirement of Christianity from the first has been *faith*, given with and involved in a change of heart, and receiving from God what man does not find in himself, to wit, the knowledge of salvation. And wherever this knowledge is found deposited as a message from heaven, it is adapted to turn the heart to God, even if no other man is near us who has submitted his heart to Christ. Therefore, although Christ did not choose for his disciples men whose life threatened to conflict with the truth committed to them ; and although they so

turned to Christ and found their salvation in Him that they could exhort: "Be ye followers of us" (I Cor. iv: 16; I Thess. i: 6; Heb. vi: 12), and a John could express his strong desire (I Ep. i: 3) to draw his readers into fellowship with himself; yet this desirable fellowship was conditioned on the fact that John himself was in fellowship with the Father and the Son. The exhortation to be "followers of us" involved simply this, that the members of the church as they had been led to Christ by the Apostle, should also, *like* him, enter more and more into Christ's life, but not that this life in Christ was conveyed to every Christian through the life of the Apostles, not that the life of all others was dependent on that of the Apostles, and was of necessity transmitted *through* the Apostles, as through priests standing nearer than others to Christ. "*The glory of the Lord is mirrored in us all*" (II Cor. iii: 18); hence it is no reflection, formed in any one man or church, which is imparted to every Christian, but it is *the glory of Christ himself* whose reflection is promised for every one who will receive it. We therefore utter an earnest protest against all those representations which leave it uncertain how fully and purely the individual can possess Christ, because he is dependent on the church for the Spirit of Christ. The Spirit of Christ does, of course, rule in the church, but not in such a way that it comes to the individual *through* the church, but because it is imparted by the grace of God *directly* to every one who believes in Christ. The impurity which mingles itself with the action of the Divine Spirit in the church affects the individual also, yet not in such a way that he is compelled *to receive it into his own heart*; but the Spirit of God which he has received from *Christ*, the Lord of the church, *and not from the church*, qualifies him to repel and reject the spirit of *the world*, which seeks to bear sway along with the Holy Spirit.

From the preceding discussion, it follows, we conceive, that a survey of the laws of psychology, for the purpose of learning what it was needful for the Holy Spirit to impart to the Apostles for our benefit, establishes this point, that every thing depends in our own case on our ascertaining the *contents*, and

opening our hearts to the reception of *truth*. But in seeking for truth, we shall by no means neglect the treasure which the Scriptures bring so graphically before our minds in the life of Jesus Christ, and in the varied experience of believers under the influence of Christian truth. Hereby we doubtless learn not only the blessed nature and power of Christian truth, but also its certainty and depth, far better than we could, if it had been transmitted to us in a mere dead symbol. But this renders it only the more important for us to obtain the pure, unmixed *substance of truth and doctrine*, which underlies the life; for against a false representation of this doctrine and life, we are most earnestly and carefully warned by the Apostles.

For this reason I have never been able to see how, in a system of dogmatic theology which is founded on the Scriptures, any other body of Christian truth can be unfolded than simply and precisely what is laid down in the Scriptures. How much influence soever a regard to all the circumstances of the case may properly have on the form of communication, we must hold fast to the underlying substance of truth as *God-given* and *inviolable*. If there has once been made known in the Scriptures a Gospel which is not a product of human thought, but which rests on divine facts, and was revealed to men by the action of God as that which it *really is*; and if, moreover, this Gospel has been authenticated in manifold respects, being placed thereby in a far clearer light, I cannot see how anything else remains for us than simply to maintain this Gospel in its purity, teach it to the Christians of every age, and in every exhibition of truth insist on *it alone* as strictly Christian and immovable—although the relations in which, the forms under which, and the points of view from which, this one unchangeable truth must prove its validity and its influence, are adventitious and mutable. While it is by no means true, as some proudly assume, that the development of human spirits is always progressive—for it is sometimes, also, retrograde or devious—still it is undeniably necessary, with ever new variations, and entering into the constant resistance of the sinful heart to the plainness of Christian

truth, to show forth what is distinctively Christian. Hence, with every great change of opinions, there will be a change as to form in the *system* of Christian truth. Yet Christianity itself, as the Bible expresses and conserves it, does not change its nature, but only shows that it has increased in power by every change, has controlled and taken into its service every form of the system. Hence, we may boldly decline to retract our assertion that *genuine Christian truth can never become anything else than genuine biblical truth.*

(To be concluded.)

ARTICLE IV.—THE NEW TRIAL OF THE SINNER.

THE benefits which accrue to the human race from the death of Christ are not only various in kind, but they differ in the order in which they follow each other. Some are immediate, others are remote. One portion is indiscriminate, and flows spontaneously to the whole race. The remainder are discriminate, and are made contingent upon certain specific conditions. This distinction may be expressed as follows :

I. The first and immediate result of the death of Christ, is to arrest, for the time being, the punishment of the sinner, and to put him on a new trial for his life, under circumstances which, in some respects, are more favorable to a happy issue than were those of Adam before his fall.

II. Upon the sinner's compliance with the conditions just indicated, the remaining benefits of the Atonement are sealed to him as his own, and follow in their appropriate order. These benefits include the forgiveness of all sin, imputed or self-committed—justification unto life—sanctification of the heart—salvation of the soul—redemption of the body, and exaltation at the right hand of God.

The result first mentioned above, of the death of Christ, differs from all the others in that it is the portion of all sinners alike — whether they be those who are styled “elect according to the foreknowledge of God,” or those that are lost, “in whom the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believe not.” It is entirely independent of any act of will or previous mental effort on the part of the sinner, being bestowed freely upon him, without consultation with him, and without his knowledge. The other benefits alluded to require an antecedent exercise on the part of the sinner.

Without the death of Christ, this arrest of judgment could never have taken place. The race would have been exposed to destruction immediate and irretrievable. The sin of Adam would have entailed at once an irrevocable ruin upon every one of his posterity. For, aside from his actual offence, he transmitted a nature which was sinful as such, it was fit for destruction only, on the same principle that men destroy pernicious plants — not waiting until these have borne a crop of poisonous berries — but because they know that when borne the fruit will be evil, and only evil, and that continually. Men sometimes speak as if nothing but actual sinful acts should make a creature deserving of punishment. This will do in governments merely human, where we proceed on the principle that the exercise of justice is solely with a view to self-protection. In the divine government it is otherwise. Sinful *acts* may be easily remedied. They are each one isolated and alone, and might be dealt with leniently. A sinful nature, on the contrary, makes the creature immeasurably more deserving of destruction than would a thousand sinful acts which have no power of propagation. If the poisonous berries, which are the fruit, deserve to be trampled under foot, much more does the tree which for a long series of years will continue to produce such crops! A sinful nature is an actual fountain of sin.

Apart from the death of Christ, the grant of a new trial could never have been made in sincerity, and therefore could not have been made at all; for even supposing the impossible case of a descendant of Adam complying fully with some

new condition that would be consistent with the divine honor, yet justice would still require his condemnation, on the ground of his former connection with Adam, to say nothing of his own past transgressions. A new trial could, therefore, never have been of any utility, even though superhuman assistance were bestowed upon him to carry him through successfully. But in connection with the death of Christ, such a grant can be made, and is made in sincerity and truth. Because, on the favorable termination, with divine assistance, of the new trial, provision is made, in accordance with which all the personal effects of sin may be justly cancelled.

A certain class of men are accustomed to declare against what they wickedly call the unfairness of condemning them for the unhappy issue of trial in another. This is a fearful charge to bring against the righteousness of the Throne of Heaven. It is, moreover, as is always true in such examples of presumption, as suicidal as it is wicked. For if it be wrong to condemn any man on account of the sin of Adam, then it is *equally* wrong to justify any one on account of the righteousness of Christ. The principle is one and the same in both cases. The resurrection of our Lord for our justification, proclaims the falsity of this bold blasphemy. He who utters it, signs his own death-warrant, and seals his own damnation. But let this pass for the present.

The sinner claims the privilege of standing trial, each individual for himself. Had he been thus favored, and had he failed, then he would acknowledge his condemnation to be just. Be it so. Every mouth shall be stopped, and the whole world become guilty before God. "O the depth of the riches both of the Wisdom and the Knowledge of God. How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out. For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" Mark now the greatness of his condescension — the goodness of that God who is the Savior of all men, especially of them that believe.

While preparing for his people the salvation ordained of old, God will at the same time satisfy the demand so arrogantly made by the sinner. He will now let him stand for

himself, as Adam did. The Lawgiver will assume a new attitude towards the sinner, and the sinner shall be placed in an altered position before his judge. And while God anticipates his appeal, and grants him a new trial, He will so order it that the terms of the new trial, taken as a whole, shall not be less favorable; nay, more than this, He will so order it, that all things considered, it shall be *more* favorable. God will magnify at once his mercy and his justice.

This change in the position of the sinner does not consist in the forgiveness of Adam's sin, nor in doing away with the effects thereof in any shape or form; but it consists in his being placed in such circumstances, that upon compliance with the prescribed condition, he may do away with all that has been incurred by whatever means — regain all that has been forfeited and lost, and, furthermore, superadd an additional weight of glory.

His is simply the condition of a person who has violated a law and stands condemned to suffer its penalty, but who, for the sake of some sacrifice and intercession made by a third person, receives the grant of an opportunity to recover that which was lost. In the meantime the old charge stands on record in all its binding force, and the old sentence still impends in all its terror, but delayed till it be seen what will be the result of this new issue.

If he pass the new trial satisfactorily, well; then, and not till then, will the hand-writing of ordinances be obliterated; then, and not till then, will the polished blade of vengeance be returned to its scabbard. But if the sinner fail — if the new condition which God sets before him is not honored and complied with — then the sentence which was merely *suspended*, not *expunged*, will be executed upon him with unsparing vengeance. He will then have to suffer not merely the consequences of the first failure, when everything was made to hinge upon *perfect obedience*, but he will undergo the penalty for a second failure, when everything is made to depend upon *simple faith*.

This new trial shall begin where the old one ended, and shall take the sinner as the old one left him. It shall make

him retrace the road of error, step by step ; for every distinct stage in his downward progress, there shall be a corresponding stage in his upward course. As Adam's failure began by his listening to the voice of Satan, so the recovery shall begin by making him listen to the voice of the Son of God. As the next step in Adam's deflection consisted in darkening the understanding, so now, the next step shall be the illumination of the understanding. "This is the true light, that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world." As the succeeding step in Adam's case was losing faith in God, so here the next result shall be producing faith in God. As the final result in Adam's case was actual transgression, so the final result in the new trial will be actual obedience to the law.

This trial shall be so ordered that, so far as God is concerned, it will give a new and astonishing exhibition of the divine glory and of the majesty of the divine law. So far as the believer is concerned, he shall be made to render to God that *very* honor of which Adam deprived Him. Nay more : he shall render to God *greater* honor than Adam would have done if he had obeyed. For the real aim of trial, even of Adam's trial, was the production of faith in God. Had Adam obeyed, the real value of his obedience would have resulted from the faith which prompted it. He, therefore, who exercises faith, attains the very highest result demanded in a probationary trial. Therefore the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us who exercise faith in the Son of God. Adam distrusted God in consequence of one lie, and that by no means especially plausible. But now the believer shall be made to trust God in spite of a thousand lies of Satan, told at a thousand different times, and under circumstances which render them highly plausible. Indeed, the whole life-time of a believer on earth is a constant series of acts of faith, each one of which accomplishes anew the purposes of Adam's trial. So far as the reprobate is concerned, he will prove his own condemnation *just*, from the fact that, being placed in circumstances as favorable to the exercise of faith as was Adam, he will nevertheless deliberately sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression. The sin which was his

by *imputation*, will now become his by *actual commission*. When he upbraided Adam, he condemned himself. "Therefore thou art inexcusable, oh man! whosoever thou art, that judgest, for wherein thou judgest another thou condemnest thyself, for thou that judgest doest the same things."

In endeavoring to exhibit the correctness of these declarations, it will be necessary to amplify what has been already intimated, and introduce some further particulars. What is to be said may be classed under three distinct divisions, viz.: circumstances common to the two cases; circumstances in which Adam had an advantage over the sinner; circumstances in which the sinner has an advantage over Adam.

II. *Circumstances common to the two cases.*

1. Adam was under trial. Certain specified results, distinctly named, were to be the consequences of the course he might choose to take with reference to a certain indicated matter, viz.: a tree growing in the garden of Eden, and called the "tree of knowledge of good and evil." This is an acknowledged part of our Bible system of truth.

The sinner is *likewise* under trial. Certain specific results are made dependent upon the course he may choose to take with reference to a personage called the Lord Jesus Christ. This also is a received truth. The sinner is under trial as Adam was; that is, in a similar manner, and with a view to the same end; a right to eat of the "tree of life" and live forever.

2. A condition was imposed upon Adam which was to form the turning point of the whole trial. This was a necessary characteristic of the trial considered as such. Upon compliance therewith, Adam would have finished the ordeal. There would have existed no obstacle whatever to his partaking of another tree, the pledge of happiness. He would have been confirmed in life. This condition was one in every way honoring to the character of God, and suitable to the nature of Adam as he left the hands of his Creator, which was that of a perfectly pure and holy being, having a perfect knowledge of his duty and a perfect ability to keep it. This condition was *Obedience*—obedience to the law, perfect and complete.

So likewise a condition is placed before the sinner, which is the turning point of his trial, and which determines irrevocably his future destiny. This new condition is one in every way suited to the circumstances of Adam's descendants. They are no longer *perfect*, like their great progenitor in his original holiness. On this account they can never become righteous of themselves; they can never render the complete obedience required, for righteousness is but the acting out of holiness. The stream must cease to flow when the fountain is dried up. They are helpless and dependent, not able to perceive and understand fully what the law requires, nor able to keep it when they do perceive it.

In the new trial, therefore, God has had reference to this situation of the human race, and has imposed a condition in accordance therewith. This new condition is faith — faith in the righteousness and atonement of the Redeemer.

Faith is a condition of life, in the same sense that obedience was. That is to say, until the condition had been acted upon, no change could take place in the circumstances of the person under trial. Adam was in a state of life, and continued there, until a violation of the condition placed him in a state of death. The sinner is now in a state of death, where Adam left him, and continues there until a compliance with the condition translates him into a state of life.

3. Adam in his trial was exposed to evil influences. Indeed this was indispensable in order to *constitute* it a trial. We cannot speak of Adam being under trial, until the contingency of external evil influences is taken into the account. We never can speak with propriety of his being under trial, in any such sense as a steam engine or some new piece of machinery is put upon trial. Men are accustomed to put their own inventions upon trial, because they are not sure that the machinery has been so contrived, or so adjusted, that it will at once answer the end for which it was designed. They have apprehensions, arising from the known imperfections of the best of skill. But as concerns Adam, no such doubt could have existed. To say that he was upon trial in any such sense, is to say that the Creator was distrustful of the works

of his own hands. This never can be admitted for a moment. Adam was a perfect being. Had he been left to himself as he came from the hands of the Creator — had no evil influence been brought to bear upon him from without, we have no reason to think he ever would have sinned. His powers of mind, the various impelling powers of his nature, were so harmoniously adjusted, that he would have gone through eternity rightly discharging the duties imposed on him. This alone is a consistent view of a perfect being. He was morally unable to fall, in and of *himself*, just as the sinner now is unable to repent and believe without superhuman influence. That is to say, Adam never would have fallen, as the sinner never will *repent*, without a pressure from without. That the sinner is exposed to vicious influence, needs not to be stated. In this respect, therefore, both trials are alike. If it be said, the sinner is exposed to vicious influences, greater in number, arising from within as well as from without, the statement is most freely acknowledged. The way in which compensation is made for this will be considered by and by. At present, the fact of such an exposure being common, is all that is essential.

4. Finally, the condition in Adam's case was one which addressed itself directly to his will ; that is to say, to his own free choice. Until his *will* had determined, he could not be said to have decided the case against himself. The new condition, faith, is one which likewise appeals directly to the will of the sinner — not to his ability to keep the law, that was out of the question — but to his will. The understanding and the affections are most intimately concerned in the decision of the question ; so they were in Adam's case. But the ultimate decision lies in what we designate an act of the will. The case of *any* sinner "under exercise of mind" will illustrate this. If one day a faithful friend talks with such a man, and leaves him balancing the subject in his own mind, and strongly hopes soon to learn that he has made his peace with God, but on the following morning finds him resolved on continuance in his former course ; why is this ? Have his worldly appetites gained such an increase of power during a

single night? No! But by an act of *will* he has decided that at present he cannot give up the world and become a Christian. In both cases the *decision of the will* is the turning point of destiny, and the comminations of the word of God take effect in view of this decision. "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," is the assurance in the one case. "He that believeth not is condemned already," is the equally positive announcement in the other. It will be perceived, therefore, that in whatever constitutes the elements of a trial, in the sense already mentioned, the analogy is uniform and striking. In the next place we notice,

II. *Circumstances in which Adam appears to have had decidedly the advantage over the sinner.*

1. The condition imposed upon Adam was in the form of a prohibition, whereas, the sinner's condition is in the form of a command. The one was commanded to *refrain* from a certain thing — the other is commanded to *do* a certain thing. Was not the first easier to comply with than is the second? In Adam's case, in order to compliance, the *absence* of uncongenial activity was required. In the sinner's case, the *existence* of uncongenial activity is required. It would seem easier to continue in a congenial passive state, than to leave such a state and enter upon an uncongenial active state.

Look at this point for a moment, and mark the commutation. In order for Adam to violate his condition, it was necessary that he should leave the passive state of righteousness and enter upon an active one of transgression. But in order to comply with the second, the first thing the sinner is called upon to do is to leave an active state of rebellion, and enter the passive state of submission to the righteousness of God. "For they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves to the righteousness of God." In beings constituted as we are, which is the easier, to become passive or active? If there be anything in this point, the advantage is not all on the side of Adam. But to come to something more practical.

2. Adam was not under the influence of evil passions. No

depraved and unholy appetite combined to influence him to disobey. On the other hand, the sinner is born corrupt. Unholy propensities form a part of his nature, and constantly lead him astray. By these things he is held in bondage.

All this is true. But we must have correct views of the *nature* of this bondage which he is under. It is not such a bondage as a man is in who is bound in manacles and fetters, and cannot stir from his dungeon; but it is such a bondage as a king is under, who is surrounded by evil disposed courtiers who have acquired such an ascendancy over him that he cannot bring himself to oppose their wishes, but invariably complies with their whims and caprices in administering the affairs of state. The will of the sinner is unfettered in its decision, save in so far as depraved appetites over-persuade him; the bondage of his will, therefore, is a bondage of over-persuasion — not of physical force. But it will be said that we do not escape the difficulty by this statement, for even though the weakness of the sinner involved guilt, yet is it not true that in some sense the sinner is entirely without strength? Is there not a wicked something born in him which, if not counteracted, will effectually retain the sinner in his wicked course? Is there not a deficiency, on account of which he will certainly fail in complying with this new condition? Is there not wanting still a weight to make the balance-beam horizontal? Is there not need of some agency from without to act directly upon the soul in some superhuman manner? To all these questions we reply affirmatively. The sinner's will is corrupted. That is a fact. In and of himself, it is harder for him to choose good than it was for Adam. But now we propose to show that in the *new* trial God has provided some compensation to make up for this deficiency, and if the difficulties have been increased many fold, the constraining power in favor of a happy choice, which is brought to bear upon the will, has *also* been increased many fold. Let us proceed, therefore, in the last place,

III. *To notice certain things in which his posterity have an advantage over Adam.*

Bear in mind the great question now at issue between God

and the sinner, is not primarily, whether he will lead a life of good works. In that he would assuredly fail. But it is to see whether he will believe. "This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him whom He has sent." Will you, or will you not, exercise that one exercise of mind and heart which is called Faith? Herein is the trial; this is the condition.

1. We observe, then, the sinner has an advantage in the object concerning which the trial is made. A command to have respect to the person of an ambassador ought certainly to make a greater impression than a command to have regard to some little article, which was the property of that ambassador. Adam was commanded to obey. That command was given about a single tree, and a certain kind of fruit growing in the garden of Eden. Apparently, therefore, it was something comparatively trivial. But then, it will be said, the obligation did not derive its binding force from the value of the object concerned, but from the dignity and authority of Him who gave the command. Very true. This point we also would render conspicuous, and therefore observe that the condition now imposed upon the sinner is likewise by the command of God. Men are required to repent and believe the gospel, because now God commandeth all men everywhere to repent. In this respect there is no difference. But now mark the subject on which this new condition terminates. It is none other than the second person of the Godhead, the only begotten of the Father—the dearly beloved Son in whom He was well pleased—the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person. By as much as the blessed Saviour is exalted above an apple, by so much, is the new condition more weighty and impressive than the old; by so much has the sinner a stronger motive to compliance, not a *higher* motive—for nothing can be higher than the command of God—but a motive doubled in constraining power. In the first instance it was God at the beginning, and a simple apple at the end of the condition; but now it is God at the beginning and God at the end.

2. In the magnitude of the rewards promised in case of obedience.

Had Adam complied with the condition, he would have been confirmed in life. But we have no reason to conclude it would have been any higher type of life than that which he possessed. His body might have been purified of its earthliness and made fit for Heaven, but there is no reason to affirm that he knew even of this. Certain it is, he knew of no wonderful promotion, for his curiosity was manifestly excited with the prospect of something higher, when the devil said, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil."

But in the event of compliance with the new condition, what is the promised reward? Life — life eternal — and not only life eternal, but likewise a new and more exalted form of life; something superior to anything that angels possess, for they are but ministering spirits; a life which receives its first throbbings from the heart of God himself, and which derives its blood fresh and warm from the veins of the Redeemer; a life which makes him in some mysterious sense one with Christ, as the head and the hands form parts of one particular body; something which brings the possessor very near to the throne itself, while adoring angels must stand like Gentiles in days of old, in the outer court of the Temple. He is called to be an "heir of God, and a joint-heir with Christ;" an heir of God because united to Christ. This honor was not held out to Adam. Those only who are redeemed from the earth are called one with Christ, and joint-heirs with Him. And see what an inheritance is promised. It is no longer a garden watered by rivers whose sands were gold, but it is all the vast inheritance that belongs to Christ. "For by Him were all things created that are in Heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by Him, and for Him."

Nor yet is this all. God himself is to be the exceeding great reward of those who exercise faith. What a wonderful gift is this. To reward faith with a rich temporal blessing is a great thing; to reward it with spiritual blessings is a still greater thing; but to reward faith by the gift of God himself, who would have thought of such a thing as that. "That they

may be one in us!" And yet still more wonderful, "I in them, and Thou in Me;" the heart becomes faint with a sense of weakness, and the brain grows dizzy as we look upward to the exalted height to which that one sentence points: "I in them, and Thou in Me."

Not only is the reward greater in magnitude, but it is much more fully exhibited to the sinner than Adam's was to him. It is set forth under every variety of attractive form. Universal nature has been laid under tribute for imagery in which to set it forth. At one time it is called the Paradise of God. This seems expressly to indicate that all that was promised to Adam shall *still* be given, and a great deal more; it is not the Paradise of Adam and Eve, but the Paradise of God. Again: the reward is set forth under the form of an inheritance—an inheritance that shall possess every attribute that can possibly increase its desirableness; "it is incorruptible," it cannot be depreciated or impaired in value; "undefiled," that is, it involves no stain upon the character in getting it, no upbraiding of conscience, no unquiet whisperings of soul attend its acquisition; "that fadeth not away," it cannot be spent or wasted, or gradually consumed, as earthly estates are. Then again it is called a city, "whose maker and builder is God," and this is set forth in all the splendor which an inspired human imagination can paint or describe.

Then it is called a crown, to show what dignity the sinner shall attain to, if he will but comply; a crown of life, to show that he shall ever live and bask in the sunshine of Heaven; a crown of joy, to denote that unspeakable bliss shall be his portion; a crown of righteousness, to show that he shall stand complete and perfect, and will never again be subjected to trial. He will have a harp of rejoicing given to him, and a palm-wreath of victory, to denote that the battle once fought is fought for eternity. Death, the very last enemy, shall *himself* be destroyed. In this way is this new trial so ordered that it may appeal the most powerfully to every desire, and every hope, and every aspiration of man's nature.

3. The sinner has a stronger motive to compliance in the magnitude of the penalty in case of refusal.

This surely accords with reason. If the bare and abstract statement that if a man does wrong he shall be punished, ought to make him do right, how much more powerfully ought he to be moved, when the Lawgiver proceeds to explain to him the particular way and manner in which he shall be punished ; when he points out to him the dungeon in which he shall pine away, and the ring-bolt to which he shall be chained !

Now Adam was told, that in the day he ate thereof he should die — the penalty was death. But what did *he know* of the meaning of the word death ? what conception had he of the awful mysteries that lay concealed in that one expression ? What did he know of all that was involved in the anger of God ? He was but a mere child in knowledge of this kind, in comparison with us. He had never seen any one struggling in the agonies of dissolution — he had never seen the sunken cheek and the glassy eye, he had never heard the death-rattle in the throat of the sufferer. Having no conception of what was meant by *temporal* death, much less could he understand what was meant by *spiritual* death.

How different it is with the sinner under the new trial ! God tells him if he believes not he shall die. “ If ye believe not that I am He, ye shall go away and die in your sins.” The sinner’s mind is impressed with the fact, that non-compliance with the condition on his part will be a greater sin than that of Adam, and will demand, therefore, a greatly increased punishment. This is evident from the language used in the Word of God to describe it. It is called despising the riches of God’s goodness, and long-suffering, and forbearance ; it is called making light of Christ, despising Him that sent Him ; it is counting the blood of Christ an unholy thing ; and finally, it is called making God a liar. Great as was Adam’s sin, yet who thinks of making against him these and similar fearful charges, in the full degree of their aggravation ?

Not only is the punishment *greater*, but it also is set forth in a way adapted best to influence the sinner. We remarked above, that all the joys of Heaven are displayed to excite his desires on the one hand ; we must now observe further, that

all the pains of perdition are marshalled to arouse his fears on the other. Eternal death has been dissected, taken to pieces as it were, in the Scriptures, and then held up, part by part, analyzed, and its terrible ingredients displayed one by one before the sinner, to the end that his mind may be suitably impressed with their fearful aggregate as a whole. At one time it is spoken of as "the wrath of the Lamb" — showing that if the sinner still refuses Christ, Christ who even now weeps over him, will frown upon him and drive him from his presence. It is the wrath of God — it is the place of blackness and darkness — it is called, "everlasting burnings," "devouring fire," "the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone," "the place of weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth," "the place where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Our first parents had none of this explicit information.

4. The sinner has an advantage in having had experience of the evil of sin.

We have often heard the remark made, that could Adam have foreseen, could he have known before his fall only a *few* of the results which followed, even in *his* short life-time, how carefully he would have avoided the forbidden tree! Had he known from a little bitter experience what was to follow disobedience, how he would have shuddered at the suggestion of the tempter! He had no such experience; his trial was over before his experience came. With us it is different. We have experience *first*, and our trial comes afterwards. We look back over the history of our race; we behold the little fountain of evil that commenced with Adam, every century increasing in volume, and wearing out deeper channels with its floods of unmitigated evil. Turn whithersoever we will — go whithersoever we may — on every side, and under all circumstances, we have the multiplied evidence that God's threat was not an unmeaning thing — that the world's suffering and death are not unmeaning terms. We see the whole creation groaning and travailing in pain; nay, more, in our own persons have we this painful experience of what is meant — we feel it, and we feel it *unceasingly*. Every ail-

ment of body—every infirmity of life—every anguish of soul—every sting of conscience—is a motive to compliance which our first parents never possessed. We know what Adam did not know, that the devil was lying when he promised that disobedience should make men wise. We know from experience that the paths of sin are paths of wretchedness, that the way of the transgressor is a hard one, that the service of sin, instead of being *liberty*, is a *debasing* and *exact-ing* bondage. Adam was under a delusion; we are under no delusion.

5. The sinner has an advantage over Adam, in being surrounded by good advisers.

In our first parents' hour of temptation, they had none of their own flesh and blood, none of their own feelings and sympathies, to advise and urge them to choose the path of obedience. But in view of the death of Christ, God has appointed ministers of reconciliation, who are required to give themselves wholly to the work of persuading men—praying them in Christ's stead to be reconciled to God. These men dare not refuse the discharge of this duty. "Woe is me if I preach not the gospel." In season and out of season, they are required to be upon the watch-tower, and raise the voice of exhortation and warning. Wisdom crieth without—she uttereth her voice in the streets—she crieth in the chief place of concourse—in the opening of the gates—in the city she uttereth her words, "Hearken unto me, O ye children; for blessed are they that keep my ways." "To-day, if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts."

It is no small part of the power of this ministry, that *they themselves* are living examples of the blessedness of turning to the Lord. In this there is a special wisdom and mercy. God has lined the shores of the swift and turbulent stream with friends and neighbors, calling aloud, that those who are being borne onward to the cataract below may hear the voice of warning, and be encouraged to lay hold upon the same means of deliverance, before the boiling flood shall engulf them forever.

Here, then, is the state of the case. Allow us briefly to

recapitulate. God suffers the sinner to have a new trial for himself. He makes one condition, and *only* one, just as he did with Adam. He makes it one eminently suited to man's fallen nature. While in some respects the sinner's position is *inferior* to that of Adam, in others it is *far superior*; that is to say, He allows the sinner to taste a little of that cup he has raised to his lips—He makes him feel what is coming upon him—He makes him see what is in reserve for him—He leads him up to the mouth of the pit, and makes him look adown its sulphurous course—He makes conscience sting with a little of that power which it will possess in the world of the lost—He makes him to smart under a little of that anguish that pertains to perdition—He makes him to reap beforehand a little of that harvest which he is sowing—He makes him to taste of a few of the first drops of that fiery indignation that is to consume the adversary.

And then, at such a time, under such circumstances, with his eyes fully opened, with the awful consequences of Adam's mistake fully developed before him, with the painful sense of it in his own soul—under *these circumstances*, the most favorable to a happy issue, does God renew the trial.

There is another thing to be noticed which completes the preponderance of the scale. It is the offer of the Holy Spirit—it is the offer of the assistance of an Almighty Helper to overcome those evils of a sinful nature, of which the sinner complains. Adam's will was rightly inclined, and, therefore, God did not offer him the Holy Spirit, but left him to stand in his own strength. But the sinner's will is *not* rightly inclined, and, therefore, God solemnly tenders him the aid of the third person of the Trinity, if he will but open his mouth and ask for it. Can the sinner not ask? Is his moral inability of such a nature as to prevent him from opening his lips and breathing the prayer, Give me thy Holy Spirit? It is written in the word of God, "Ask and ye shall receive, knock and it shall be opened unto you." The sinner cannot open the door, but can he not knock?

There are other considerations which might be adduced, to show advantages on the side of the sinner, and which exhibit

a greater degree of condescension and forbearance on the part of God towards him than was shown to Adam. Thus, for example, Adam had no control over the circumstances of his trial. He could not say how long that trial should last, and when it should stop. So long as he lived in the garden, had it been for a hundred years, he would still have been under trial; for there the tree would ever have stood before him, and the fruit would ever have been inviting his gaze. But the sinner now can end his trial at any moment he chooses; that is to say, the very moment he will exercise faith, that moment his trial is settled for eternity. The indulgence of of the Divine character is shown more fully in the new trial; for in Adam's case punishment followed at once, upon the first non-compliance, but now the gospel is still preached to the sinner after a thousand non-compliances. Every separate time that he hears the invitation of the gospel and neglects to comply, he is guilty of such a non-compliance as caused the death of Adam. So that in reality he has a *thousand* trials where Adam had one.

What more can God do, and stop short of actual compulsion? Name it, ye who find fault with the divine dispensation! What more can God do to his vineyard, than he has done already? Nay, more, let us answer the question for ourselves. If we were asked to suggest a way in which the human mind could be most favorably fitted for a proper choice in respect to some given course of life, what stand-point would we choose for ourselves? that of a youth just starting out in life, with nothing but beautiful visions before him, or the stand-point of an old man of seventy, who has, like Solomon of old, seen through the thorny maze of life, and knows from bitter experience that it is vanity and vexation of spirit? Surely, we must all admit the stand-point of the old man to be the better for the exercise of judgment in making a choice. So has God dealt with us who are sinners of the race of Adam. He has given us the experience of old age, and then allows us, as it were, to re-tread the pathway of youth. He gives us experience of the cruel taskmaster to whom our father Adam sold himself in his ignorance, and, while our

backs are smarting under the lash, He gives us an opportunity to reconsider his choice, to say whether henceforth we will yield ourselves servants to sin unto death, the bitterness of which we have tasted, or to obedience unto righteousness, the blessedness of which we see enjoyed by thousands around us.

We mean distinctly to affirm, that the circumstances of trial in which the human race is now placed are better than were those of Adam, and were devised in mercy to give the sinner the greatest advantage possible. In viewing God's plan, therefore, we ought not to err in the relations which the two Adams sustained to the race. Instead of saying that the second Adam was supplementary to the first, we should express the truth more correctly by saying that the first Adam was preliminary to the second. Instead of saying that the second trial granted to the sinner is a mere appendix to the first, we should accord better with Paul's teachings in Romans to say that the first trial in Adam was merely preliminary to the new trial, which is granted him under the atonement, and which so much more than the first serves to exhibit the glory of God. Among ourselves, trials are sometimes held before petty tribunals, not with a view to their being decided there, but solely with the view to prepare them for investigation before a higher judicatory, where the greatest legal skill and knowledge can be brought to bear upon them. "For where sin hath abounded, grace hath much more abounded, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so, by the righteousness of one, the free-gift came upon all men unto justification of life." That is, if evil came upon us through Adam without our knowledge or consent, so likewise has good come to us through Christ without our knowledge or seeking. The atonement has come *to* all men, and *upon* all men; its coëxtensiveness with the effects of Adam's sin, is seen in that all creatures, such as infants and insane persons, incapable of refusing it, are saved without their consent, just as they were involved in the sin of Adam without their consent. The reason why others are not saved, is because when the atonement comes to them and upon them, instead of consenting to be included in it, they reject it. If

they are born under the curse, so likewise are they born under the atonement which is intended to remove that curse — they remain under its shelter until they are old enough to repudiate it — they shut out its influences as a man closes his window-blind to shut out the beams of the sun — they ward them off by active opposition, as a man builds dykes around his field to keep out the streams that would otherwise flow in and fertilize the soil.

In view of such circumstances, how just is the condemnation of the sinner made to appear! If Adam was to blame for falling into a condition he knew so little about, how much more is the sinner to blame for choosing to continue in this condition when he knows so much about it! "God will be justified in his sayings, and overcome when He is judged." Every mouth shall be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God.

A.

ARTICLE V. — CONANT'S MATTHEW.

(Continued from page 108.)

In the January number of this *Review* a few pages were given to the consideration of Dr. Conant's revision of Matthew, published under the authority of the American Bible Union. After characterizing, as well as we could in general terms, this scholarly production, we descended to some details of commendation and animadversion. We will now proceed to finish what, for want of space, we were obliged to postpone.

Chapter x: 9.—"Provide not gold, nor silver, nor brass, in your *girdles*." The principle on which this revision is made, is stated in the introduction to be, "as little variation from the words of the common version as is consistent with fidelity to the original, and a proper regard for present English usage." The question suggests itself, on reading the change from

"purses" to "girdles," is it *required* by the law of fidelity or of propriety? Inasmuch as the girdles in question, or at least a particular section of them, served for *purses*; and inasmuch as this was the only use of them to which reference is had in the text, we think the received version should have been retained. The term "purses" conveys to the English reader, at once, the same idea substantially, as was conveyed to the disciples by the term ζώνας, whilst the term "girdles" requires a note of comment for its explanation. The word chosen by the old translators seems to us the appropriate designation. It had already come into use in Cranmer's and the Bishops' Bibles.

x: 32.—"Every one, therefore, who shall *acknowledge* me before men, him will I also *acknowledge* before my Father who is in heaven." We would make the same remark on this change of the common version as on the preceding one. It does not seem to be *required* either by fidelity to the original, or by a proper regard to present English usage. The gain, if any, is too slight to compensate for the loss of a word grown familiar to the eye and ear of Bible readers. Even if "acknowledge" could be shown to be a slightly more adequate representation of ὁμολογέω, than "confess," still we should cling to the latter term *on the ground that it is in the received translation*. But we have other reasons for our preference. The roots of the phraseology in our version can be traced back through mediæval history, to the times when, amid the persecutions of pagan Rome, the martyrs sealed with their blood their testimony for Christ, and were, in consequence, denominated "Confessors of the Faith." The word "confess" is the English of the Latin "confiteor," which was in common use amongst the early Latin Christians as the translation of ὁμολογέω. It was used by them to denote the public declaration of their faith in Christ. This word and its English equivalent, "confess," seem to us to be sufficiently accurate renderings of the term in the text. And, therefore, for the sake of its historical associations, we would, by all means, retain the latter in the version.

xi: 12.—"And from the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven is taken by violence, and the

violent seize upon it." It must have cost the reviser of Matthew a severe struggle to sacrifice to the above rendering the beautiful rhythm of the common version. Nothing short of a seeming exigency could have induced the sacrifice. And yet we have not been able to discover any necessity for the change here introduced. According to examples quoted by excellent authorities, the rendering of *βιάζεται* by "suffereth violence," is fully authorized. Under this rendering of the word Liddell and Scott refer to Thucid., 1, 2, and 4, 10. Bretschneider, N. T. Lex., translates this passage by "*regnum coeleste vim patitur*." This rendering, moreover, is venerable in the history of translations. Jerome, after some MSS. of the old Latin, renders "*regnum coelorum vim patitur*." The Anglo Saxon rendering is "this heofena rice tholath nead," "the heavenly kingdom suffereth violence." So also Tyndale, the Genevan, Cranmer's, and the Bishop's Bible. This version, so ancient, so constant, and so well authenticated, exhibits admirably the nice shade of distinction between the two members of the sentences, preserves the musical cadence so agreeable to the ear, and is, in our judgment, the very best translation possible.

xi: 23.—"Thou shalt go down to the *underworld*." We are not aware that this compound has yet come sufficiently into use, at least in the sense in which it is here employed, to be admitted in Bible translation, or in good composition of any kind. It is scarcely recognized in English lexicography. In some of the old writers in our language it occurs a very few times, but in the sense of "this lower, sublunary world." In the use made of it by the reviser of Matthew it is unnaturalized. It therefore sounds very oddly here, and it will sound more oddly still in some other passages where the principle of rigid uniformity observed in this revision will require its introduction. For example, Rev. vi: 8, "He that sat on him was Death, and *the underworld* followed him." Rev. xx: 14, "And Death and *the underworld* were cast into the lake of fire." We have very little expectation that the readers of the English Bible will reconcile themselves to this strangely sounding compound.

Besides, we seriously doubt whether the term *underworld*,

in the sense simply of "the abode of the departed, the world of spirits," as here defined and used, expresses all that was intended by the original term in the present passage, and in various other passages. If all that was threatened Capernaum was, that her inhabitants should enter "the abode of the departed, the world of spirits," where are the emphasis and terror of the denunciation? Would not all others equally enter that abode? There manifestly must have been something in the term *ἀδης* as used by our Lord, and as understood by his hearers, which this translation does not bring out. This word, as well as its corresponding Hebrew word, *לִישָׁׁ*, must have signified, in some of its applications, not simply the world of departed spirits, but *a state of woe* in that world. This position was established, we think, by Moses Stuart in his essays on these terms, and it could be successfully defended by an appeal to examples. Amongst the proof-passages we should not hesitate to cite the one now before us.

Should it, therefore, be considered important to rule out the translation of *ἀδης* by the term "hell," which, perhaps, is not too strong in this particular instance, then we should much prefer to "underworld" the transferred term "*Hades*," the term adopted by Dr. George Campbell in his translation of the Gospels, and by Dr. Tregelles in his translation of the book of The Revelation, and by other eminent biblical students.

xiii : 4.—*ἡ μὲν ἔπεσε*. "Some fell," &c. The word *seeds* is manifestly *implied* here, and according to the rule elsewhere judiciously adopted, and after the example of Campbell's and Norton's translations, it should have been inserted for the sake of fulness and clearness of expression.

xiii : 7.—"And others fell *upon thorns*," *ἐπὶ τὰς ἀκάνθας*. It is not obvious why the article is omitted in rendering this particular expression, as in all the other instances where it occurs in this connection it is retained. Thus we have, "*the rocky places*," "*the good ground*," &c. In addition to the apparent arbitrariness of this distinction, we can see a good reason for rendering the article in every instance in the way of specifying particular parts of the ground into which the parable divides the whole field. "*The thorns*," viz.: the

thorns that occupied a portion of the soil sown. At least, we would say, retain the article in every case, or else omit it in every case except the first, where it *must* be given.

xiii: 20, 21.—The accumulation of four “ands” in these two verses might have been avoided, and the whole rendered more elegant and agreeable to the ear, by substituting “yet” for the third “and,” as in the common version, in Campbell, Kendrick, and in most of the old versions. The rendering of $\delta\epsilon$ by “yet,” seems to bring out the precise force of this particle of transition. Or, if something different is required, it is not the continuative “and,” but rather the adversative “but.” This is one of the many instances in which this revision seems to us to sacrifice somewhat of the rhythm and beauty of the received version, without gaining anything in the way of accuracy, but rather the contrary.

xiii: 23.—“This is he that hears the word and understands, *who bears fruit* ;” for, “which *also* beareth fruit,” of the received version ; $\delta\varsigma\ \delta\eta\ \kappa\alpha\rho\pi\omicron\phi\omicron\rho\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$. By this rendering, the force of $\delta\eta$ is altogether lost. The particle seems to have been added to $\delta\varsigma$, as the reviser remarks, “to distinguish the character referred to from all the preceding, as the only one of whom the statement can be predicated.” It brings out the fact that in addition to hearing the word and rejoicing temporarily in it, *this* one did indeed bring forth fruit. It seems to us that this distinction should be indicated in some form in the translation ; and if it be true, as the reviser affirms, that we have nothing in English exactly corresponding to $\delta\varsigma\ \delta\eta$, then we must avail ourselves of that which most nearly corresponds. Better approximate the original than suffer the influence of the significant particle to be wholly obliterated, as has been done in the revision before us. And perhaps the common version gives the original thought as well as can be done without resorting to periphrasis ; “who *also* brought forth fruit.” This is the almost uniform rendering of all who have translated the passage. Campbell’s is somewhat paraphrastic, but it brings out the distinction with considerable clearness.

xiii: 25.—“But while men slept, his enemy came and

sowed *darnel* among the wheat." Here we have "darnel" substituted for "tares" of the received translation, and of the earlier translations generally, beginning with that of Wycliffe. The etymology of the word "tares" points out a weed that wastes and consumes grain. And of such a weed do all readers of the English Bible perfectly well understand the discourse here recorded. We would, therefore, let the word stand as expressing with sufficient accuracy what was intended to be illustrated by the parable. Besides, it is not quite certain that the term "tares" was not once applied to what is now called "darnel," or that it is not so applied at the present time in some parts of England and America. On this passage, the remarks of Mr. Granville Penn are so appropriate and so just, that we will quote them entire. "It has, of late years, been deemed a point of meritorious discrimination, to substitute 'darnel' or 'cockle' for 'tares,' in this parable; an object not worthy of the occasion, which was not designed to distinguish minutely '*between weeds*,' but generally '*between weeds and corn*;' and whatever springs undesignedly among corn, is relatively *a weed*. But, as the native vegetation of Syria and of this country (England) are not exactly the same, and it is therefore a hazardous affectation to pretend to identify, in our indigenous vegetation, the particular plant here designed; I have deemed it more advisable to leave the long established reading '*tares*,' than to inflict on our version an unimportant novelty, likely to be as erroneous as it would be strange; especially as '*tare*' is now naturalized in our dictionaries as a term denoting '*a weed that grows among corn*.'" Inasmuch as a question of judgment and expediency is involved in the matter under consideration, we will add the judicious note of Mr. Norton on the present passage: "Is 'tares' the correct rendering? The weed denoted by the word used in the original is probably darnel, *Lolium temulentum*, the 'infelix lolium' of Virgil. See Campbell's note. But supposing this to be the case, it may still be doubted whether it would be well to change the rendering." In this conclusion we fully agree. By all means leave us "*The Parable of the Tares*." "*The Parable of the Darnel*" would savor of affectation.

xv : 25.—“Then came she, and *bowed down to him*,” saying Lord, help me.” There is nothing in the account of the Syro-phœnician woman’s application to our Lord for a miracle of healing in behalf of her daughter, to render it certain, or even probable, that she did not recognize his higher nature and claims ; nothing to warrant the changing of the received version which represents her as *worshipping*. Indeed, the whole narrative of this wonderfully persevering suit, makes it evident to our minds that the woman’s prostration at the feet of Jesus was an act of profound worship. This seems to have been one of those few instances, to which belong the visit of the Magi at Bethlehem, and the coming of the Greeks to the Temple, wherein Jesus elicited Gentile homage during the period of his ministry. This woman’s faith and humility — a faith that, like that of Jacob, would take no denial ; a humility that cordially accepted the most offensive of all truths, the rightful sovereignty of God in the distribution of his favors — make it safe, it appears to us, to let the common version stand.

xvii : 4.—“If thou wilt, let us make here three *tents*,” &c. If the word “tabernacles” of the received version, and of the older versions, is to be displaced, then “booths” might be better substituted, inasmuch as it cannot be supposed that Peter proposed the construction of “tents” properly so called. For tents of canvas they had no more material on hand than for tabernacles of wood. The proposal was, without doubt, to weave the branches of the trees upon the mountain into a sort of huts or booths. We see no good reason, however, for disturbing the received rendering, particularly for substituting “tent” for “tabernacles.”

xxi : 16.—“Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings thou hast *prepared praise*.” We should be very loth to relinquish the beautiful reading of the received version in this place, “thou hast *perfected* praise.” Still, if there is any philological necessity for the revision, we must, of course, yield any preference we may have for the old translation of the verse. But *is* there any philological consideration necessitating the change before us ? Perhaps a simple reference to the original

expression in the Hebrew of Ps. viii, might lead us to decide this question affirmatively. But such a reference would hardly lead us to decide in favor of the rendering here offered us. The word יָסַד signifies first, to *found*, with reference especially to a building; then, to *ordain*; and then, perhaps, in a very general way, to *prepare*. With this verb, in the passage in the Psalm referred to, is connected a noun that signifies, not *praise*, but *strength* or *glory*. So that the literal rendering would be, "out of the mouth of babes and sucklings thou hast founded, or ordained, strength, or glory, for thyself." Our Lord, however, did not quote the original Hebrew, but adopted for the occasion the Septuagint translation, καταρτίσω ἄνουν. And we are now to inquire whether this expression is not properly and suitably rendered by "thou hast perfected praise." This verb occurs several times in the New Testament, and generally it expresses something like adjustment, the knitting of broken ties, the restoring of sundered relations, thus conveying a fulness and richness of meaning not expressed by the word prepared, a meaning too that seems peculiarly appropriate to the occasion for which the words were quoted by our Lord. For this richer meaning of the verb in question, see for example I Cor. i: 10, where the Apostle exhorts the disciples, in view of certain unhappy contrarieties that had obtained amongst their membership, that they be "*perfectly joined together*, in the same mind and in the same judgment," ἦτε δὲ καταρτισμένοι. κ. τ. λ. Again, in Galatians vi: 1, the apostle has the following language of exhortation touching offices of Christian fidelity and forbearance. "Brethren, if a man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are spiritual καταρτίζετε τὸν τοιοῦτον, restore, readjust, rearticulate, such an one, bring him back into living and efficient union with the body." In these and most other passages where the word is used in its ethical sense, there seems to be a tinge of its literal, surgical meaning of resetting dislocated joints. It imports a fitting together of things truly belonging to each other. We cannot but think, therefore, that the change proposed is not required by any philological reason, and that a very beautiful thought is lost by it; the thought, viz., that the hosannas of the chil-

dren in the temple were *especially becoming* to the occasion, and as such were especially grateful to the ear of Jesus on that glad morning. Theirs was *model* praise by virtue of its spontaneousness, simplicity, faith, and humility. It was as welcome to the sense of fitness as the opening of the flowers in spring-time. Maldonatus's explanatory note here is, "*perfectam laudem consecutus es*" — "thou hast from the lips of children obtained perfect praise."

xxiii: 5.—"They make broad their *protectives*," instead of the common version, "they make broad their '*phylacteries*.'" We trust that the word "phylacteries" will be restored by "The Committee of Final Revisers," or at least that the original will be rendered by some recognized English noun. We are not aware that the word here given has passed out of its adjective sense, except as a new-coined Americanism, signifying a kind of wardens connected with fire companies. If any other word were to displace the one in use, then "preservative" or "defensive," would be preferable to the one offered, as *they* are both found in good writers, and are both recognized in our lexicons, and they *might*, either of them, suggest the idea of a prayer-fillet to serve as an amulet. But we cannot suppose that there is the slightest necessity for any change whatever; for the word "*phylactery*" has long since become perfectly naturalized in our language, and is as much an English word as *synagogue*, *blasphemy*, *parable*, *hypocrite*, *angel*, *prophet*, *apostle*, *shekel*, *eunuch*, and scores besides, which the reviser of Matthew does not hesitate to use. The reviser's remark, "there is no ground for transferring the word," raises, unintentionally we suppose, a false issue. There cannot be, in the nature of things, any question about the transferring of the term. That point cannot be brought up in the present tense. For the word *φυλακτήρια* was transferred and naturalized centuries ago; and therefore the question now is not, "shall the word be transferred?" but "shall it be rejected from the English Bible?" We have no doubt as to what the answer will be.

xxiv: 3.—"And as he sat on the Mount of *the Olives*," ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους τῶν ἐλαιῶν. So in chapter xxi: 1, "when they

were come to the Mount of *the* Olives." For this semi-appellative rendering, the reviser refers to Hackett on Acts i: 12, where the passage in Matthew xxi: 1, is rendered "Mount of the olives," not Olives. But, in that immediate connection, Prof. Hackett has occasion to say, "Bethany was on the eastern declivity of the *Mount of Olives*." The same writer, in his "*Illustrations of Scripture*," also speaks repeatedly of "Mount Olivet," and "the Mount of Olives." Evidently, therefore, this is the form of translation he would retain in Matthew xxi: 1; xxiv: 5, sacrificing, if need be, bare and literal exactness to long usage and elegant expression; leaving "*The Mount of Olives*" to be associated, as a proper name, with "*Gethsemane*," and "*Calvary*." Admitting that "the mount of the olives," is a more precisely correct rendering than "the Mount of Olives," yet who would insist on introducing into current allusions to the sacred spot the former expression? Who would wish to hear such phraseology as the following: "Jesus went out with his disciples to the mount of the olives." "Our Saviour struggled in his prayer of agony at the foot of the mount of the olives." "Our Lord ascended from the eastern declivity of the mount of the olives." We really think this would be an insufferable affectation of precision. Why, then, should a translation be adopted that will necessitate the use of such phraseology, or, rather, that will be alien from the form of expression that will be invariably used in all allusions to the sacred locality? "The Mount of Olives," and "Mount Olivet," have come to be the universally accepted and preferred designations of the spot, and they will remain undisturbed as long as the English Bible is read.

There is something more to be said on the beautiful phrase, "The Mount of Olives." It is the translation of the Hebrew, *הַר הַזַּיִת* Zech. xiv: 4, of which the Septuagint version is, *τὸ ὄρος τῶν ἐλαιῶν*, the form copied into the New Testament in the passage under consideration. Now, according to the use of the article in connection with proper names in Hebrew, especially when preceded by nouns in the construct state (see Nordheimer Heb. Gram., § 721, 3: a. b.), this phrase would

seem to be more properly rendered by "the Mount of Olives," than by "the mount of the olives," just as הַר הַלְבָּנוֹן is "the Mount of Lebanon," and הַר הָהָר is "the Mount of Hor," etc. The presence of the article in the Septuagint, and in the New Testament quotation of the Septuagint, is thus easily explained without necessitating any change in the received translation of the phrase.

xxiv : 22.—"And unless those days were shortened no flesh would be saved ; but for the sake of *the chosen* those days shall be shortened." This rendering of ἐκλεκτοὺς by "chosen" is affirmed by the reviser of Matthew to be "far preferable to the term 'elect' of King James's translation." The ground of this decision is not given, unless it be in the reference made to some of the older versions, or in the reference to other passages in Matthew where the present revision renders the same word in the same way. This change will, of course, be carried through the revision of the entire New Testament, and should it be adopted as the standard English version, will necessitate the substitution of the term "*choice*" for "*election*" in Christian literature. Our theological terminology will have to be altered to bring it into accordance with Bible phraseology, and in our ecclesiastical symbols we shall have to substitute articles on "the doctrine of choice," instead of "the doctrine of election."

Now, before adopting a revision involving so many inconvenient changes, we desire some reason more weighty than the mere affirmation that it is "far preferable" to the received rendering. Why is it "far preferable"? It cannot be the decisive weight of modern authority in Bible revision. For that authority is about equally divided, numerically considered. And amongst those who adhere to the common version, we find such names as George Campbell and Kendrick. Nor is the term "elect" so unworthy a representation of ἐκλεκτός, or so far inferior to "chosen," as to make it important to substitute the latter for the former as a biblical term. In fact, etymologically considered, "elect" seems to come a little more specifically close to ἐκλεκτός than "chosen." It is almost the original word, and yet is English. And it is precisely this

slightly more specific sense of the word that makes it, in our judgment, the preferable term here, and in many other passages in the New Testament. There are places not a few where ἐκλεκτός signifies something different from barely *chosen*, where it means "selected from the mass as an object of divine favor," "chosen out from others as the recipient of special grace." And this sense is not yielded, necessarily, by the term proposed to be substituted for elect. This latter word has long since come to be accepted in religious phraseology to signify a fact connected with the Christian calling that would not be so fully and unmistakably expressed by the other word. In short, it has a theological and technical sense which it is important to preserve, but which is lost by the employment of the more current and secular word "*chosen*."

xxiv : 27.—"And immediately after *the affliction* of those days," is here substituted for "immediately after the *tribulation* of those days." One of the practical questions here to be considered, as in so many similar cases, is not, 'would "*affliction*" be a better rendering than "*tribulation*" if the version of the Scriptures were now making for the first?' but, 'since the word *tribulation* is already in the version, has been rendered familiar to the ear of Bible readers, and has become incorporated in thousands of quotations, is it best now to displace it?' We do not see enough to be gained to warrant any change. "*Tribulation*" is quite as strong and expressive a word as "*affliction*," etymologically considered it is quite as eligible as "*affliction*," and unless our sense of the force and fitness of the words is at fault, it is quite as appropriate as the other term to characterize the unprecedented and unparalleled troubles set forth in Matthew xxiv. Indeed, we cannot but think that "*tribulation*" is far preferable to "*affliction*," to represent the distresses of that fearful crisis when the Jews were being crushed beneath the threshing-sledge—the *tribulum*—of the divine judgments; distresses "such as had not been from the beginning of the world until that time."

xxvii : 52, 53.—In these verses we have the term μνημείον twice translated "*grave*," the same as in our received version.

In v. 60 we have the same word twice translated "tomb." And in chap. xxviii : 8, we have the same word translated "*sepulchre*." In chaps. xxiii : 27, 29, xxvii : 61, 64, 66, and xxviii : 1, this last rendering is given as the translation of *τάφος*. We do not point out this variation in rendering the same original word by different English terms, and different original words by the same English term, in a spirit of carping criticism, or for the purpose of objecting to the exercise of reasonable discretion in translating from one language into another. We know that the same original terms and expressions may have different shades of related meanings in different connections, and that such a difference of signification must be represented in a spirited version by the judicious employment of, so called, synonymous words. Our object in calling attention to the liberty here exercised on the part of the reviser is, to show that the rule of uniformity elsewhere insisted on is not maintained throughout, as in the nature of things it ought not to be.

xxviii : 18.—"Go ye, therefore, and disciple all nations *immersing* them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit."

On the rendering here and elsewhere given to *βαπτίζειν*, Dr. Conant has expended a great deal of apologetical labor. The reasons for adopting this rendering are succinctly given in a note on chapter iii : 6, and a supplementary treatise of one hundred and seven pages has been executed, professedly, in the service of the substitution of "immerse" for "baptize."

For the collection, in part, and the classification of the numerous passages and testimonies contained in this treatise, and illustrating "the meaning and use of *baptizein*," Dr. Conant deserves our heartiest thanks. They are drawn from the whole range of Greek literature, and it is claimed that, in a certain sense, they exhaust the use of the word. The fact seems, however, to be recognized by Dr. Conant that, *in its reference to the Christian rite*, the term occurs in a multitude of instances not given in his collection of examples. We have verified a considerable number in the Byzantine Historians, and it is well known that many are to be found in the Church

Fathers. It is only in reference, we understand, to the usage of the term as defined in sections 1 and 11 of the Appendix — sections relating to the word in its literal, physical sense ; in its tropical use ; and as employed in the Greek versions of the Old and New Testament — that this collection professes to be exhaustive, although the point is somewhat obscurely stated. It is also probable that the word occurs in a tropical sense in at least one passage not included in Dr. Conant's examples, to which reference may be made further on. —

This treatise will do good service to our denominational principles. It will help to convince our ecclesiastical opponents of the impregnable nature of our position philologically considered. It has fully established what we hold could not be reasonably doubted before ; what, in fact, leading Pedobaptist authorities have candidly and freely admitted, that so far as the external act is concerned, *baptizein* signifies simply and only a total submergence, or immersion.

The immediate object of the treatise, however, is to justify the introduction into the English version of the New Testament of the term "immerse" in place of the term "baptize." And it seems that the simple establishing of the term immerse as the exclusive physical sense of the original word is, in the estimation of the reviser of Matthew, a sufficient reason for the proposed change. The subject, however, is one that demands gravest deliberation, inasmuch as it is complicated with various considerations besides the simple question of the literal meaning of *baptizein*. We are very far from being convinced of the expediency of adopting the new rendering. And in this we suppose ourselves to hold with an overwhelming majority of the Baptist denomination.

Before proceeding to set forth some of the grounds of our opposition to displacing baptize by immerse in the English Scriptures, we wish to make two or three preliminary statements.

And first, the attitude that we assume in this matter ought not to be interpreted in a way to bring doubt upon our soundness as respects the peculiarities by which Baptists are separated, ecclesiastically, from other Christian communities. Be-

liever's immersion for baptism, and the consequent tenet of what is called restricted communion, constitute *the ecclesiastical physiognomy* of our denomination. We shall do all we can to prevent her losing these features of her organization.

One other remark. The question of substituting immerse for baptize in the English Bible has been involved, in discussion, with the question of translating βαπτίζειν by terms of corresponding literalness in heathen languages. But, as has been often stated and shown, the cases are not parallel; and the obligation of literal renderings, so far as possible, in those languages, might be admitted without involving the logical necessity of such rendering in our version.

In proceeding to state some of our reasons against the proposed revision, we will for the present treat the subject as a question of simple expediency. We will afterwards consider the matter of the literal rendering of *baptizein* as a question of obligation.

It seems to us, then, in the first place, a valid objection to the change, that nothing is likely to be gained by it to the cause of truth as respects the first Christian ordinance. It is obvious that the same arguments would be required to justify the translation of the original exclusively by "immerse," as to fortify our present interpretation of the word "baptize." We cannot see how our task would be rendered lighter or more agreeable than it is at present, by simply changing the *form* of the controversy, whilst its *character* should remain essentially unaltered.

On the contrary, there is reason to apprehend a very serious practical loss from such substitution. The word "baptism" has been too long and too universally accepted as an English word, and has become too thoroughly rooted in our language to be relinquished as the current designation of the Christian ordinance. It is found in all the great vernacular translations of the Bible. It is imbedded in our religious literature. It obtains in the common vocabulary of Christian intercourse. From the time of Robert of Gloucester at least — through a period, *i. e.*, of nearly six hundred years — it has held an undisputed and undisturbed place in our language, as the

common word with all Christian communions, for the introductory rite of the Church.* Any attempt to dislodge this word from its position and use must, we think, prove utterly futile ; and any version of the Scriptures in which another word is systematically substituted for it, must, on that account, fail to exert any considerable influence over the public mind, must even fail of being extensively read. A Bible thus spotted, and segregated from the great mass of editions in use from the earliest periods of English literature by universal English Christendom, would be decried by common consent, no matter what might be its intrinsic merits ; and a people adopting it would be considered as " aliens from the commonwealth of Israel." Baptists, should they accept such a revision, would, therefore, lose their present most important vantage ground for proselyting contact with the other divisions of the Christian Church. The imputation might be utterly unjust, but such a work would be regarded and treated as a *sectarian* version — as a *Baptist* or *immersionist Bible* — as made not sincerely and only in the interest of evangelical truth, but chiefly in the interest of creed and party. Its influence would be, therefore, to sunder the Baptists more widely than at present from other families of the protestant faith, and weaken their protest against the modern misinterpretations of the term *baptizein*.

We believe that a part of our denominational mission is to bring back English Protestants to the beliefs and practices of the times when *baptizein* was almost universally acknowledged to mean, as respects the outward act, dipping. And that this *is being done* somewhat extensively, and increasingly, in the use of the common version of the Scriptures, is patent to every one who watches, in this particular, the movements of the times. In the revivals of late years many have been the instances where one third, or even half, of the converts joining Pedobaptist communions have claimed and received immersion. We have been personally cognizant of repeated cases of this kind. And the necessity is beginning to be felt

* See Prof. Cutting's Historical Vindications, Appendix 1. B.

of providing places of Pedobaptist worship with baptismal fonts of the most generous capacity. The influence of truth is operating to restore ancient uniformity in the administration of baptism, whilst leaving us in possession of a common Bible.

Shall we, then, through any undue impatience to precipitate this movement, do that which will be likely to weaken our hold upon the Christian conscience of our brethren of other communions, or alienate us from the circle of their sympathies? The adoption of a version that should publicly and formally inaugurate such a policy, would be a very damaging misstep for the Baptists. It would diminish, immensely, their power for effective protest against the wide-spread departures from the original and long continued form of the Christian rite.

Another objection to displacing the word "baptism" from the English Scriptures, and from common use as the designation of the first ordinance is, *the impracticableness of a self-consistent and relentless uniformity*, such uniformity as is demanded on the theory of this revision. To say nothing of the departures from the law of uniformity in respect to the rendering of other words, we find in Dr. Conant's Matthew what we must regard as deviations in the rendering of βαπτίζειν and its derivatives. For example, in chapter iii: 1, and elsewhere, Ἰωάννης ὁ βαπτιστής is rendered "John the Baptist," not "John the Immerser," as strict self-consistency in the revision would require. To be sure, this deviation from an awkward literalness, is defended on the ground, as asserted, that "ὁ βαπτιστής is constantly used in the New Testament as the *surname* of an individual, by which he was distinguished from all others." And we are directed, on this point, to the testimony of Josephus, and to the term ὁ χριστός, in such passages as Matthew xvi: 16, xxii: 42, and Acts v: 42. But the passages cited do not afford satisfactory proof that ὁ βαπτιστής is, in any proper sense, a *surname*. In the first two passages, ὁ χριστός is not preceeded, as ὁ βαπτιστής is in the passage before us, and *everywhere else*, by a proper name. In these two passages ὁ χριστός is not a surname, but either a proper name, or a well known epithet applied to the Son of God. The third reference is not in point, for according to the best critical editions

of the New Testament, Lach. Tisch., etc., the true reading is τὸν χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, where Jesus is properly a surname, Christ Jesus. To constitute John a surname in the passage before us, the reading should be Ἰωάννης βαπτιστής, and the English rendering would be *John Baptist*, as it is given in some of the French and Italian versions. Thus we have Συμεὼν πέτρος, Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώτης, etc., Simon Peter, Judas Iscariot, etc. So, then, ὁ βαπτιστής appears here and everywhere else as an appellative, and in strictness, according to the principles of this revision, should have been rendered, *The Immerser*.* Especially is this sense of ὁ βαπτιστής to be insisted on, since the expression as used in the New Testament was *recent*, and could not well have lost its appellative signification.

As for the quotation from Josephus, we are at a loss to know why it is cited here, for it reads, Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἐπικαλούμενου βαπτιστοῦ, not τοῦ βαπτιστοῦ, and is properly rendered, as indicated by the reviser of Matthew, "John who was surnamed *Baptist*." According to this the rendering of Matthew iii : 3, should have been "In those days came John Baptist, preaching," etc. This form of expression is exactly paralleled in Acts xiii : 1, Συμεὼν ὁ καλούμενος Νίγερ, Simeon who was called Niger. But neither of these proper designations of a surname is in point for the reviser's position in regard to the different construction in Mathew iii : 1.

We are thus led to state another objection to any denominational adoption of the term immerse for baptize. Not only must Ἰωάννης ὁ βαπτιστής be rendered, on the principle of this revision, John the Immerser, but, *as has been often and correctly said*, should such a rendering be accepted by our denomination, we must forego our ecclesiastical title, and become known as the sect of *The Immersers*, or *The Immersionists*. This suggestion may be, as it has been, pronounced preposterous. But we may be sure that we should have to

* Dr. Alexander Campbell of Bethany, Va., in his Compiled New Testament, in strict and unflinching accordance with the literal rule of translation, which he too adopts, but which he also often violates, renders Matthew iii : 1, "In those days appeared *John the Immerser*."

bear the ridicule of some such title, should we ever acknowledge as ours a version that would legitimate it. In that case we might pronounce the fixing on us of such an epithet, an undeserved reproach; we might protest with all warmth and earnestness against being labelled with such a grotesque designation, but the label would be put on us, and we should be compelled to wear it as the penalty of repudiating the word by which the Christian world has agreed to designate the initiatory rite of the visible Church.

With reference still to the expediency of the proposed change, we may further remark the awkwardness that passages would exhibit under the transformation. For example, Matthew iii: 7, "When he saw many of the Pharisees and Sadducees coming to his immersion." This awkwardness has been somewhat obviated by the reviser's adopting a reading of the text that omits *αὐτοῦ*, and rendering, "coming for immersion." And this omission is defended by the following note: "The true reading omits *αὐτοῦ*. See Lachmann and Tregelles." But against this decision we have the authority of Tischendorf, Bloomfield, Alford, etc.; and, apparently, a decided preponderance of MSS. evidence. The following is Bloomfield's note, in his supplemental volume of Critical Annotations, 1860: "*αὐτοῦ* is cancelled by Lachmann and Tischendorf, 2," (but Tischendorf in his last edition restores it), "from B. Matth. B., and Orig.; but wrongly, since the authority for the expungement is quite insufficient. Nor is it confirmed by internal evidence, since the word was far more likely to be omitted or expunged in two MSS., as thought superfluous, than to have been, for no particular reason, *introduced* into all the rest." Probably Dr. Conant's decision that the true reading omits *αὐτοῦ* will be set aside, and the awkward rendering of the passage will have to be, "The Pharisees and Sadducees came to his immersion." In Matthew xx: 22, a passage is omitted from the received text in accordance with evidence, but as the passage is genuine in Mark x: 38, sq., it must there be rendered, "I have an immersion to be immersed with," and, "Can ye be immersed with the immersion with which I am immersed?" It is only by a free

and paraphrastic rendering that this awkwardness can be avoided, but paraphrase does not comport with the principles of this revision, and therefore the above must be the English form of the passages. In Mark vii : 4, we must read, "And when they come from the market, except they immerse themselves, they eat not ;" and in Luke xi : 38, "And when the Pharisee saw it, he marvelled that he had not first immersed himself before dinner." These are, in fact, the reviser's renderings, p. 67, Appendix. "The immersion of repentance" occurs in Luke iii : 3, Acts xiii : 24, and elsewhere.

Now we most strenuously object to the introduction into our English Bible, and into the common religious speech, of such strange and uncouth combinations of words, unless there is a philological and religious urgency for the innovation. We object, except it can be shown beyond a peradventure, that some great principle in the interest of evangelical truth, is to be sacrificed by a refusal to surrender the word "baptism," in connection with the first ordinance, for a word signifying nothing but the physical act involved.

On page 67 of his Appendix, and also on the last three or four pages, the reviser of Matthew has given reasons for what he considers *the sacred obligation* to render *baptizein* by "immerse" in the English version. We should be glad to transfer these paragraphs entire to our pages. But for this we have not space. The substance of them may, we think, be condensed into a single statement, viz. : that inasmuch as the *literal* signification of the word is always and only immerse, it should, therefore, be so translated in every case when it occurs in the New Testament. It is only another form of this statement, when it is made an objection to the word "baptize" in our English Scriptures, that it is "a strictly ecclesiastical term ;" and when it is claimed that the original word *was not in any sense ecclesiastical*, as used first by John, and afterwards by our Lord and his disciples. If we were disposed to adopt the *argumentum ad hominem*, we might ask, why is this point of the simple, secular import of this particular word so pertinaciously urged, when the principle involved is so freely and widely departed from in respect to many other

words? For example, the term ἐκκλησία means properly a *congregation*, or *assembly*. Adopting substantially the language of Dr. Conant in regard to βαπτίζειν, we might say, "the Greek word ἐκκλησία expresses nothing more than a simple collection of people;" the special significance of the term, its religious significance, if it ever has any, is derived from the circumstances in which the people collect. The *fact* designated by the word is in all cases the same; it is nothing more than an 'assemblage of people.' The word ἐκκλησία does not, in itself, express a *body of Christian believers, meeting together in an orderly manner, under proper officers, for the transaction of ecclesiastical business, and the observance of religious worship*. Whenever the word is used of the Christian assemblies, in the New Testament, this meaning is clear from the connection, and from the necessary association of ideas. But the word itself means simply, purely, and only, an *assembly or congregation*, and, *therefore*, it should be invariably so rendered." The above is a fair paraphrase of Dr. Conant's argument on the word βαπτίζειν. See page 67 of the Appendix.

Let us now see how Dr. C. has rendered ἐκκλησία, and why he has so rendered. Matthew xvi: 18, of the revision: "Upon this rock I will build my *church*." In the note justifying this rendering we read: "The word '*congregation*' (as the rendering of ἐκκλησία) was earnestly contended for by the early and devout Reformers of the Church of England, and for a long time was consecrated by the usage of the English vernacular version. The Bishop's Bible substituted for it the word '*church*' (used, in a few instances, in the Genevan version), and this, by direction of King James, was perpetuated in the Bible for the English race." In a foot note to the above, we read as follows: "Present use forbids the restoration of this favorite rendering of the early English versions. In Matthew xviii: 17, for example, '*tell it to the congregation*' would not now express the Saviour's meaning."

We commend to very careful comparison this treatment of the word ἐκκλησία with the treatment of the word βαπτίζειν in this revision. We are mistaken if the reviser has not in the former case, given up every point for which he contends in the

latter. For, is not ἐκκλησία just as capable of a precise English definition as βαπτίζειν? Has not the word "church" come to be quite as much an ecclesiastical term as "baptism?" And, according to the reviser's own showing, has not "congregation" quite as legitimate a claim to a place in the English Scriptures as "*immerse*?"

Not to urge this point further, we pass to say that we have strong objection to the term "*immerse*" as designating the the Christian rite, *on the ground of its inadequacy to express all that is included properly in "baptism."* We have yet to be convinced that βαπτίζειν, as used first by John the Baptist, and afterwards by our Lord and his disciples, did not, from the very first, stand as a technical term *to designate a religious rite*; precisely as we now use the term "baptism." It has yet to be shown that John did not find the word already prepared for his special use of it, with a *complex significance*, importing, of course, the external act of immersion in water, but also importing several things besides, particularly the profession of a change of religious opinions and connections.

It was so, of course, if, as held by many whose names have great weight as authorities, *proselyte baptism* was already in existence when John commenced his ministry; if, that is to say, baptism under the new dispensation and during the transition period, had any historical connection with a religious rite previously established among the Jews. We are not prepared to affirm, unhesitatingly, this relation; still less are we prepared to dispute it. For, the hypothesis of this historical connection is rendered probable by the fact that no explanation seems to have been given or required concerning the general nature and significancy of the ordinance in the hand of John. Its meaning and fitness seem to have been at once and universally apprehended from the force of customs with which the Jews were familiar. They translated John's baptism into a religious ceremony. The fact of that administration was an ecclesiastical fact from the first.

The question suggested by the preceding paragraph is one, however, into the discussion of which we cannot now particularly enter. But its bearing on the position of the reviser of

Matthew is obvious. For, if proselyte baptism antedated the baptism of John, and if the religious ideas connected with it were already, before the time of John, familiar to the Jewish mind, then certainly John's baptism, accompanied by the proclamation of the kingdom of heaven at hand, was instantly understood as *a religious rite*. The principal objections to this view are of a dogmatic nature. And perhaps the chief objection of all is, that to maintain for the rite of the Baptist such a historical relationship, is to deny its appointment from heaven, and to place it on the ground of human tradition. We fail to see the validity of this objection. We cannot see how the originality of John's baptism, or its direct divine appointment as respects *its* subject, *its* conditions, and *its* special religious import, can be in the slightest degree impaired by the fact, if it be a fact, that the same rite, outwardly, had been administered to other subjects, upon other conditions, and with a different religious import.

We have not space to consider other objections, dogmatic and historical, that have been made to proselyte baptism as an antechristian rite. We will only add now, that it stands to reason, considering the embittered relations between the unbelieving Jews and the Christians almost from the first, that the former would not have borrowed from the latter the initiatory rite, the most conspicuous badge, of their organization. And it seems reasonable to suppose, moreover, that proselyte baptism must have been inaugurated, not after the Jewish state was broken up and dispersed, and when proselytes to Judaism were few; but in some previous and flourishing period of the Hebrew Commonwealth, when the descendants of *Japheth* were flocking in large numbers to the tents of *Shem*. And still further, the preponderance of authorities in the department of Jewish antiquities seems to be very decidedly in favor of this position. Amongst these authorities, omitting all reference to Jewish authors, are found such names as those of *Buxtorf*, *Bengel*, *Lightfoot*, *Witsius*, *Hammond*, *Shoëttgen*, etc., etc. We should be glad to give extracts from these writers on the antiquity of proselyte baptism, and also to add the weight of more modern authorities. We will, however, content ourselves with

Alford's brief summing up of the testimony. "It is probable," he says, "that John's baptism in outward form resembled that of proselytes. Some (De Wette, Winer, Paulus, Meyer,*) deny that proselyte baptism was in use before the time of John; but the contrary has been generally supposed, and maintained (by Lightfoot, Shoëttgen, Buxtorf, Wetstein, Bengel). Indeed, the baptism or lustration of a proselyte on admission would follow as a matter of course, by analogy, from the constant legal practice of lustration after all uncleanness; and it is difficult to imagine a time when it would not be in use. Besides, it is highly improbable that the Jews should have borrowed the rite from the Christians, or the Jewish hierarchy from John."

In thus declaring our belief in the historical connection of John's baptism, as respects its form and general significancy, with preceding rites, it is hardly necessary also to declare how far we are from adopting the many unwarranted inferences that have been drawn from the fact. The only inference bearing on the point before us, perhaps the only legitimate inference at all is, that the ceremony, as an emblem of separation and sanctification, as significant of a change of religious ideas and connections, was perfectly familiar to the Jewish mind, when John commenced preaching, in the wilderness of Judea, a baptism *unto repentance for the Jews themselves*.

It might be shown, we believe, that amongst the Christians speaking the Latin language, the term before us was adopted, by transference, and used from the very first, in its ritual signification. The word, as applied to the Christian ordinance, had with them, as it has with us, a complex meaning. It meant then, as it means now, and as it seems ever and everywhere to have meant when used religiously, immersion and several things besides. Tertullian, for example, when he speaks of the initiatory rite of the Church, calls it by the comprehensive name of *baptism*. When he writes a treatise upon the ordinance, it is under the title "*De Baptismo*." When, however,

* Alford might have added Olshausen, perhaps, though he expresses himself doubtfully, and limits the expression of his doubt to the question whether lustration was performed on the proselyte by *another* before the time of John.

he wishes to define the outward act involved in baptism, we find him saying, "*In aqua mergimur.*" That is, he both uses the term baptism in a general way to designate the religious rite, and also puts the point concerning the physical sense of the word, substantially as a Baptist of the present time might do.

We cannot, however, pursue this subject further, as we have already transcended our proper limits. We should be glad to trace the religious use of the word in question through its ancient and mediæval history, till it was at last taken into our language as the universally received designation for the first Christian rite. What we have said is in justification of the position that "*immersion*" does not express *all* that is included in the original term, and consequently is not an adequate representative of it. The question, 'what is properly signified by the original word whenever used of the introductory ordinance of the Church?' is to be determined just as we determine what is involved in the word ἀπόστολος, or ἐκκλησία. And as it would be inexpedient to render these latter words by "*one sent*," and "*congregation*," so it seems to us equally inexpedient and unwise to render the former by "*immersion*." WE, as Baptists, cannot define the original word for the ordinance to be anything less than *the immersion, by a proper administrator, of a person, on the profession of his faith in Christ, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.* All these elements are included in the term "*baptism*," and it would be a sad loss to have a term substituted for it that would comprehend only a single item of this complex meaning.

ARTICLE VI.—IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.

IN all the studies of philosophy and theology, hardly anything is more important than a correct acquaintance with fundamental principles. Especially in approaching the various questions that present themselves in these vast fields of reflection and investigation, it is important that we correctly apprehend the principles which the questions presuppose, or take for granted, and that our minds be not blinded or biased by any false philosophy, or by any such preconceived opinions as would necessarily hinder us from viewing the subject in its proper light and judging of it justly. So in our courts of law, jurors must have no opinions that will hinder them from hearing the testimony submitted to them, candidly and dispassionately, weighing it impartially, and giving a verdict in fair and just accordance with the law and the evidence. So, also, men that play with dice should be careful that they be not loaded.

The particular subject to which these remarks may be applied, is the recent phase of error called Annihilation or Destruction — the destruction of the whole man at death, the complete extinction of consciousness and being in the grave, and the final annihilation of the wicked. For this is a doctrine professedly drawn from the Bible, one that claims to rest for its support on the words of Scripture. But whenever we go to the Scriptures to learn what the doctrine of the soul — its life and its destiny — is, we surely ought not to have our minds preoccupied with any false notion or theory of the nature of the soul, lest we be like persons looking at objects through colored glasses — unable to see the truth in its own clear light, and hindered from receiving those impressions from the words of Scripture which they were originally intended to produce.

In this article it is proposed to consider the question of the immateriality of the soul, and this in a way that might be regarded as preliminary and preparatory to a special inquiry into the scriptural doctrine of the soul and its future destiny. In other words, we wish to pass in review the two different opinions that have been entertained of the nature of the human soul, with the grounds of them, or the main arguments by which they have been supported, and from a somewhat careful, though necessarily brief, examination of their merits, see what views we should carry with us, and what we should not carry with us, into our study of the Scriptures on this subject.

For ages, then, there has been a difference of opinion as to the nature of the human soul. On the one hand it has been regarded as an immaterial substance, simple and uncompounded, distinct from the body, though for the present connected with it, and capable of a separate and independent existence. But, on the other hand, man has been regarded as a being wholly material; all his faculties and powers as growing out of his material or physical organization, the soul being in no sense distinct from the body, or independent of it, but only a part, or a result of its peculiar and superior organism. Those who hold this latter opinion are called Materialists; those who hold the former, Immaterialists.

We proceed now to inquire into these two hypotheses concerning the nature of the soul (they are both properly *hypotheses*), to develop the principles involved in each, to state the principal arguments on each side, and estimate, according to our ability, their value.

I. First, then, of the Materialists, and their hypothesis of Materialism.

Here the opinion is, that man is simply what we see him to be, a body "fearfully and wonderfully made" indeed, but only a body, made of matter only, in which simple, uniform substance, all his powers, physical and mental alike, inhere; so that his powers of thought which are denoted by the term soul, the faculties of consciousness, conscience, reason, and will, are not to be referred to the mind as something distinct

from the body, but to the body itself in its peculiar and superior organization. Such as this is a brief and comprehensive statement of the doctrine of Materialism.

The arguments in support of this doctrine or hypothesis, are in substance the following :

1. The power of thought in man is always found in connection with an organized material system ; and the fact that thought and body thus uniformly accompany each other, with mutual dependence and reciprocal influences, leads naturally to the conclusion that the power of thought is the result or production of the material organization. The physical and mental powers, as every one knows, generally grow and decay together, so that we have the same reason for supposing that the mental powers are dependent on the body, or that they grow out of it, as we have for supposing that the physical powers, those of locomotion or digestion, are dependent on the body. Also, since different functions belong to different parts of the body, we are led to consider thought as the peculiar function of the brain ; at least we have the same reason for regarding it as such, that we have for regarding secretion as the peculiar function of the glands. And in this connection it is especially to be considered that the brain is absolutely essential to all the mental operation, sensation, reflection, volition, reasoning, imagination, consciousness, with all the emotions of hope and fear, love, anger, and every other ; the strength of the mental powers is uniformly found to be in proportion to the development of the brain ; and whenever it is disordered or destroyed, the powers of thought will be disordered or destroyed. Hence we are led directly and almost necessarily to the conclusion that the mental powers are dependent on the body — spring from it as a result of its organization. And no serious objection can be urged against this conclusion from the unlikeness of thought to the other properties of matter, for it is no more unlike them than some of its acknowledged properties are unlike each other. Extension and figure are entirely unlike each other, and yet they are regarded as properties of one and the same substance, and this for the simple reason that they are uniformly found in

connection with it and with each other, just as thought is always found in connection with a certain peculiar material organism, and is therefore to be regarded as one of its properties, or a function of one of its parts.

Again, the mind and the body, that is, our physical and mental powers, act and react upon each other, exerting a reciprocal influence continually. This is a very simple and familiar fact, every one learning it from his own experience. But the fact shows that these two sets of powers are not entirely distinct and different in their nature and essence, the one material and the other immaterial, for then it would not be possible for them thus to act upon each other. To do this, they must have some common principle, some point of contact, something in which they agree or are alike, just as men who wish to influence each other by argument, must first find something in which they are agreed, some mutually admitted principle from which they can reason. Therefore, this simple fact of the reciprocal influence of our physical and mental powers, proves that they must spring from one and the same root in us ; must rest upon one and the same basis of our nature ; must be the result of our physical constitution.

3. Again : all our ideas appear to be derived from the external world through the senses ; that is, from sensation. And this shows that the body is essential both to the *exercise* and to the *power* of thought ; to its *exercise*, because there can be no thought without ideas ; and to the *power* of it, since if it were not thus dependent on the body, we should expect to have ideas independently of the senses. That is, as without eyes we could have no ideas of light, and could not think of light in its phenomena, so without the body we could have no ideas at all, and could not think at all ; there would be nothing to perform this function of thinking.

4. And yet again : ideas are the images or representatives of objects, and therefore they are complex and divisible. For in order to be the true and faithful representatives of objects, they must perfectly correspond to their archetypes, be like them composed of parts and divisible. Thus, for example, a tree consists of various parts, the roots, the trunk, and the

branches ; therefore the true idea of a tree must consist of the combined ideas of all these several parts, must itself consist of parts, and consequently be divisible. But of course, these parts which constitute an idea, cannot be contained in a simple, unextended, indivisible, immaterial substance. Therefore the mind which does contain ideas, with their parts, must be extended, divisible, and material.

In fine, since all our ideas are derived from the outward world through the senses ; since these ideas are complex and divisible, and so containable only in that which has extension and is capable of division ; since to act upon the body, as we know that the soul does, it must have something in common with the body as a medium of intercommunication, have some principle of the same essential nature as the material substance of which the body is composed ; and since the various phenomena of the mind always appear in connection with a certain material organism, to which they may naturally and consistently be referred, it is concluded that our powers of thought and action, that is, our powers of soul, should be referred not to an inward, invisible, immaterial principle, but to the body itself as it is peculiarly and admirably organized.

Such in substance is the argument by which the system of Materialism has been defended by its acute and able advocates, from Hobbes, the philosopher of Malmesbury, to Dr. Priestley. To their profound discussions of the subject, the later writers among the Annihilationists or Destructionists have added nothing really new or important ; so far from this, they mainly content themselves with borrowing from the older and richer school of thought, giving an inferior value to what they borrow by recoinng it, and stamping it with their own image and superscription. Of one thing we may rest assured, if the doctrine of Materialism was not established by its older English advocates, it will not be established by any of those now defending it in this country.

But there are many considerations to be urged against these arguments of the Materialists.

1. And first with regard to the *origin* of ideas, and the argument drawn therefrom.

Here, if we should take for granted that all our ideas are *actually* derived from sensation, it would by no means follow that sensation is the only *possible* source of ideas, or that the senses are the only *possible* media of perception. For, while it is true that if we possessed no eyes, we should have no ideas of the phenomena of vision, it must still be allowed that we should have a capacity for those ideas ; because, as all admit, it is not the eye itself that sees, or is the seeing power, but this power or faculty lies back of the eye, at least one step back. Or suppose that a person has always been kept in total darkness, then he would have no ideas of light or of the phenomena of vision ; and yet he has eyes, and under other favorable circumstances would have the ideas. And so, while, according to our present hypothesis, all our ideas are derived from sensation received through the five senses, there may be in us other means of perception not yet manifested, powers of this class yet undeveloped, but only awaiting favorable circumstances for their development and manifestation. It may be said that this is only a supposition ; but if so, it is a supposition that cannot be shown to be either false or unreasonable.

But the notion that all our ideas are derived from sensation, is unfounded. We have ideas which cannot be accounted for on this hypothesis, as, for instance, those of space, time, cause, and substance. Let any one take his idea of space for an example, and inquire carefully into its nature and origin. If it is derived from sensation, it must be through a sense of sight, or of touch, or of both together. But those senses give only the idea of a solid with its properties, that is of body ; and Locke does not claim that they can give anything more than this. But the idea of body is quite different from the idea of of space. For body is something that is *in* space ; and though multiplied or increased indefinitely, it must still be in space, be bounded, be measured by it. The idea of space, then, is essentially different from that of body, and since sensation can give only the idea of body, it follows of necessity that the idea of space must come from some other source. The true account of the matter is, that when sensation or experience

has given the idea of body, then reason, at once of necessity, suggests the idea of space as the correlative of body, as the receptacle of it, and its indispensable condition. Here, then, in direct opposition to Dr. Priestley, we have a real example of an idea that does not "come to us by way of the corporeal senses," and therefore we are *not* led by this argument "to think that our mental powers depend *necessarily* upon our corporeal ones;" for if there is one single idea in the human mind, for which sensation cannot account (as we have just seen that there is), then this argument for Materialism must be pronounced unsound.

2. We pass now to notice the argument drawn from the *nature* of ideas, their complexity and divisibility.

This argument is founded on the notion or theory that we perceive external objects by means of idea-images, or representatives of objects, transmitted from them to the sentient substance, and acting upon it by impulse from contact; in short, that ideas are things distinct and separate from the mind that entertains them. It is from this point of view that Sir Isaac Newton asks the question, "Is not the sensorium of animals, the place where the sentient substance is present; and to which the sensible images of things are brought, through the nerves and brain, that they may be perceived by the mind present in that place?" Locke also from this same stand-point, says, "As to the manner in which bodies produce ideas in us, it is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in."

But respecting this notion of impulse by contact, there is no reason for thinking that substances ever come into absolute contact; and if it were otherwise, motion by impulse from contact would be as mysterious as in any other way. And it is not a little singular that, for ages, philosophers should have endeavored to explain the phenomena of perception by a principle in Physics, which is discovered to be entirely without foundation. At the present time the ancient theories of "substantial forms," "species," and "images," are justly discarded, because they are untenable when applied to the ideas derived from the senses, of light and touch, and when applied to other

ideas they are utterly absurd ; for what could be meant by an image of sound or of fragrance?

On this subject the true doctrine is, that ideas have no existence separate from, or independent of, the mind that entertains them. An idea is simply and solely a state of mind, that mental state which is subsequent to a sensation or perception. Therefore an idea is incapable of extension or division, as much so as a state or condition of rest or anxiety is incapable of extension or division. And consequently the whole argument drawn from the divisibility of ideas is without force.

3. From this we pass to the argument drawn from the assumed necessity of a common property or quality in the nature or essence of the mind and body, as an essential condition of their acting upon each other as they do.

This is a manifest and very gross *petitio principii*, a begging, we had almost said stealing, of the question. For, at the outset it assumes that an immaterial substance cannot act upon one that is material ; it denies the possible existence of an immaterial principle, a soul, in man ; and so excludes the opportunity for experiment and induction in the case. Also, the principle here assumed, if carried out in its practical applications, would necessarily compel us to regard God himself as a material being, or else deny the possibility of his acting at all upon the material universe. And, indeed, Dr. Priestley says in so many words, that "the hypothesis of the materiality of the divine nature is not a dangerous one ;" as also some of the apostles of modern spiritualism (falsely called Spiritualism, since it is a gross and monstrous Materialism), scruple not to speak of "the body of God." But in addition to this consideration, we would inquire, whose knowledge is sufficient to warrant his making this dogmatic statement, that the immaterial cannot act upon the material? We know that there are innumerable modes of action in the chemical and mechanical forces of nature ; that there are innumerable modes of existence and operation in the vast gradations of living beings between us and the Infusoria below, and between us and God above ; and how can we assert the absolute impossibility of such a

connection, and such reciprocal influence, as the Immaterialist believes to exist between the body and the soul of man? It is saying more than can be proved ; it is denying more than any man can be justified in denying ; and, therefore, the principle on which this argument rests is a wrong principle, and the argument itself is of no effect.

4. The other argument in favor of Materialism is that drawn from the uniform connection observed to exist between the mental powers and the corporeal system.

According to this argument, thought, being uniformly found in connection with a certain system of organized matter, is to be referred to that system, or the substance of it, as its property or quality ; or, in other words, the physical system is to be regarded as the basis, the substratum of the mental phenomena, the real source from which they proceed, the real cause which produces them. But we should always distinguish between a cause and a condition, even though it be an indispensable condition ; between an instrument and the power that uses it ; between machinery and the force that moves it. Suppose a person cannot see well enough to read without spectacles, but with them he can see distinctly and read easily ; is it, therefore, the spectacles that sees and reads ? Or take the telescope, which is absolutely essential to our seeing the satellites of Jupiter or the rings of Saturn, it is not the telescope that sees them ; that is only the occasion of our seeing them — the instrument by which we see them. In like manner the eye is an essential condition of seeing, but it is not the eye that sees, no more than the telescope or spectacles — it is only the instrument by which we see. And so the brain may be absolutely essential to perception and to thought, and yet be only a condition, an instrument, or organ, of the perceiving, thinking, power that we call the soul, without which the brain could no more see or think than the eye or the eye-glass. And as simple matter of fact, no considerations drawn from the connection that exists between the mental phenomena and the physical constitution of man, can carry us one step further than the conclusion that the brain is a condition of thought ; a condition, but not a

cause; an instrument, but not the thinking power. And about this position, that the brain is thus the condition of thought, and the organ of the mind, there is no question. The Immaterialists all admit and declare that the brain is preëminently the organ of the mind, that a certain physical organization is an indispensable condition of the mental phenomena of the human being, as he exists in this world. Thus if the nerves, which proceed from the organs of the different senses to the brain, be severed, we can experience no sensations; if the nerves that connect the organs of locomotion with the brain be severed, we may will to move those organs, but the power to do so will be found wanting; if the brain be injured in any way, the phenomena of reflection, imagination, and reasoning, with the action of the passions and emotions, will be disordered and irregular; and in general the state of the mind will be found corresponding to or affected by the state of the body, as in a fever, or in a case of pressure on the brain. But these admitted facts do nothing at all towards proving that the intelligent, perceiving, judging, willing power is material; that it is the brain itself that thinks and wills; for always, when power is exerted through an intervening medium, its manifestations are expected to be, other things being equal, in proportion to the perfection of that medium. So assuming that the brain is the organ of the mind, whenever that organ is disordered, we should expect to see the manifestations of the power that employs it disordered also. For illustration, take the case of an individual engaged in writing. He must have paper, ink, a pen, a hand and arm, and a nervous economy to transmit the condition of the paper to the brain, and also transmit the thoughts from the brain to the hand and paper. Now if any one of these instruments, the paper, the pen, or the hand, is wanting, the individual cannot write; but no one supposes that for this reason he has lost the power of thinking. Why then should we think that the power of thought is destroyed by a pressure on the brain, or by the destruction of the brain? There is no more reason for thinking so in the one case than in the other. We have heard mention made of a man who had lost all power of motion

from the shoulders downwards, but retained his power of speech and his power of thought as perfectly as ever. Suppose that his disease had advanced upwards and affected his speech, his eyes, and his brain, why should we think that it must have affected and destroyed his powers of thought, destroyed self-consciousness, memory, imagination, the power to will, which is back of the power to do? There have been cases in which persons have lain for a longer or shorter time in a state of apparent insensibility and death, and afterwards recovered from this state, and declared that they had been conscious during this time, sensible of passing events, possessed of the power to will, though entirely deprived of the power to move, retaining thought, consciousness, and the power of volition, although the power of manifesting these had been taken away. And we know that in sleep the mind pursues its operations as when the body is awake, sleep appearing to be a phenomenon that extends to the whole body, but over the soul has no power. As a distinguished metaphysician says: "All the proper and exclusive functions of the soul are discharged as readily and continuously as in our waking hours. Reason and recollection, judgment, fancy, the desires and the affections, still exercise their office; and the will, though it has lost control for a time of its actual servants, through their fatigue, still governs an ideal kingdom, and spurs its fancied ministers. There is no good reason to believe that sleep ever extends beyond the body, or suspends the exercise of a single function of purely intellectual life." Hence we see that the supposition that the mind is distinct from the body, and that the brain is merely its organ, the instrument by which it manifests itself, involves no inconsistency, and leads to no absurdity, but is rather consistent and in harmony with the facts of our present being. The notion, then, that thought is a function of the brain, and that the power of thought depends upon or springs from our physical organization, is a notion without any good foundation.

But there is something more to be said on this point. It seems very unphilosophical to rank thought or perception among the properties of matter. For perception is an action

or event that takes place in time, rather than a thing that exists in space. It is a simple act by which we are made acquainted with the various properties of substances. It is the beginning of our knowledge, and, indeed, according to some philosophers, the end of it. We may call in question or deny the very existence of matter; but the reality of our perceptions we cannot call in question or deny. Let any one make the supposition that there is no such thing as matter; the reality of his perceptions will remain just the same—entirely unaffected by the supposition. The properties of matter have respect to it as such, as extended and occupying space; but perception has no reference to space, does not occupy it, does not in any way distinguish it. If any one should say that perception is that peculiar property of matter by which it attains a knowledge of itself, or perceives itself, the saying would be veriest trifling; for that which perceives must, of necessity, be something distinct and different from the thing perceived. Therefore, it is manifestly unphilosophical to class perception with the properties of matter; for so far from being such, it is that by which we obtain a knowledge of the properties of matter.

Still further: it may be observed here, that if perception were a property of matter, it would be either primary or secondary, according to a very natural and proper classification that regards the qualities of objects as either separable or inseparable from their substances—the separable being called secondary, and the inseparable, primary qualities. Then if perception were a primary quality, we could not conceive of matter as having any possible existence without it; no more than we can conceive of matter as existing without extension, for, both in fact and in conception, the primary qualities are inseparable. But perception is not thus inseparable from matter. A great portion of it is certainly destitute of it, and it is easy to conceive the whole of it as being in the same state. But if perception were not a primary, but a secondary quality of matter, it would be immaterial like motion, or else be material and itself a substance, with its own peculiar qualities, like heat, which has the property of causing the sensation of

warmth. And in this case perception would have reference to space, which, as we have seen, it has not. So every possible view of thought or perception as a quality or property of matter is confused, unwarranted, and unphilosophical. But this very confusion and obscurity is an advantage to the Materialist, for by dwelling much upon the unknown essence of matter, the many diverse and wonderful properties which we know that it possesses, and the many others which for aught we know or can prove to the contrary, it may possess, he can maintain a show of argument which to many will seem wonderfully profound, and the fallacy of which it will be difficult to detect and expose ; but which, nevertheless, can be exposed completely and clearly.

In view of the last point alluded to, the advantage that the Materialists derive from their confusion and obscurity of thought and statement, it is surprising that any of them should leave this favorable position, and, as some of them have done, resolve thought into motion, thereby involving themselves in inextricable absurdity. If, however, it should be said, that thought results from motion, that it is produced by certain throbbings or vibrations of the brain, we should answer that the question here is, not what thought results from, but what it is, though we think it would be much more philosophical, and in every way more satisfactory, to say that thought produces those movements of the brain, than that it is produced by them ; for we know that thought produces innumerable movements or motions of the human frame, expressions of the countenance and gestures that are often more significant and emphatic than words. But if the Materialist should say that thought is motion, we should reply by inquiring what the language means ; for who can associate any distinct or intelligible ideas with the saying that thought and motion are one and the same thing ? And who, without the aid of a preconceived hypothesis, or without feeling himself in a desperate extremity, would ever suppose that his thoughts are satisfactorily accounted for, or explained, by saying that there are certain vibratory movements, throbbings, and undulations of the soft, pulpy mass of the brain ? The very state-

ment would seem to be more senseless than false. The account given of thought by saying that it is motion, is as unmeaning and incomprehensible as it would be to say, that it is time, or ratio, or moonshine. At least the account would need to be explained before it could be answered.

One other remark we must make in this connection, and this is, that the system of Materialism seems to tend inevitably to confuse and confound our notions of matter and spirit, and can only be maintained by making of matter something different from what it is, by giving it powers that it does not possess. So Coleridge says, "As Materialism has been generally taught, it is utterly unintelligible, and owes all its proselytes to the propensity so common among men, to mistake distinct images for clear conceptions, and, *vice versa*, to reject as inconceivable whatever from its own nature is unimaginable. But as soon as it becomes intelligible, it ceases to be Materialism. In order to explain *thinking*, as a material phenomenon, it is necessary to refine matter into a mere modification of intelligence, with the two-fold function of *appearing* and *perceiving*. Even so did Priestley, in his controversy with Price. He stripped matter of all its material properties, substituted spiritual powers, and when we expected to find a body, behold! we had nothing but its ghost—the apparition of a defunct substance."

Thus we find that such advocates of the system of Materialism as Dr. Priestley, have defended it on the erroneous principles, that all our ideas are derived from sensation, and that these have an existence distinct and separate from the mind that entertains them, and, as such, are complex and divisible; we find that the system tends to materialize God, or else exclude Him from all action or influence on the material universe; it confounds perception, and the properties perceived; it confounds organs and instruments with the power that employs them, and thus fails to apprehend or properly recognize the great ideas of power and cause, and the real distinction between matter and spirit. These considerations weigh heavily against Materialism, and compel us to reject it as an unsound and erroneous system.

II. We pass now to consider the hypothesis of the Immaterialists.

According to this hypothesis, man is not merely a physical being, a creature composed of flesh and blood, bones and nervous system, and possessed only of the material body that meets our senses, to which all our human capacities, faculties, and powers belong, or out of which they grow ; but he has, in addition to this, an inward, invisible, spiritual nature, an immaterial principle that is superior to the body, superior to chemical and mechanical forces, superior to animal instinct—a mind, a soul ; and it is to the soul as thus distinct from the body, and superior to it, that all our intellectual and moral powers are to be referred. Such as this is a brief and comprehensive statement of the doctrine of Materialism.

The general course of argument by which this view of the human constitution is supported, may be stated or indicated briefly as follows :

1. By an original constitution, we are led, naturally and necessarily, to refer all phenomena that we observe to some adequate or *sufficient*, as well as *efficient* cause, by which they are produced ; and every property or quality that we perceive, to some substance in which it inheres, or to which it belongs. This reference of all events to their causes, and of all qualities to their objects, is one of the ultimate facts of our constitution, of which no account can be given further than this : that it is a fact. If any one should ask for our vindication or justification of this reference, or for the grounds of our conviction that it is correct, we could only say that such is our constitution as God has made it, and we cannot suppose that He has made our constitution to be a delusion, and its dictates a lie unto itself. To suppose that He has done so, to call in question the trustworthiness of our original faculties and powers, and throw doubt upon the dictates of our original and fundamental constitution, is the last resort of universal scepticism.

2. Again, by the senses we are made acquainted with certain properties of bodies, such as extension, figure, impenetrability, and divisibility, and these qualities we refer to something

that is extended, figured, impenetrable, and divisible, but which, beyond this manifestation of its properties, is entirely unknown; for we know objects only by and through their properties, and our knowledge of these properties limits and measures our knowledge of the things themselves. Also, in like manner, by consciousness we are made acquainted with certain other phenomena, such as sensation, intellection, and volition, and these we refer to something possessing them as attributes, and performing the acts of perception, intelligence, and will. And since these qualities of which we are informed by the senses are entirely unlike those of which we are informed by consciousness, we of necessity refer them to dissimilar, distinct, and different substances — those of the senses to matter, as we call it, and those of consciousness to mind. And in doing this, we affirm nothing as to the nature or essence of matter or of mind, only that they are different, for the subjects of entirely different sets of phenomena must themselves be different. Phenomena that have reference to magnitudes and distances, must be referred to something which is contained in space, the receptacle of body or matter, which alone has magnitude and parts distant from each other; and other phenomena, that have reference, not to bodies that exist in space, but to events that take place in time or in succession, must be referred to something that has power to act in time — that is, to mind, which, created or uncreated, is to be regarded as the only seat or source of power in the universe, as that alone which can act efficiently and produce events, while matter is essentially and absolutely inert.

3. Once more, every person has a conviction, an irrepressible conviction, that his mental powers belong to himself as a single being, absolutely one and indivisible. Indeed nothing can be more certain than that the intelligent, reasoning, willing being, which is the man himself, the self, "the me," as it has been termed, is a thing of absolute unity, an uncompounded, indivisible, incommunicable personality. For it is impossible to conceive that what a person calls himself, "the me," is in any manner complex or divisible, composed of parts or resolvable

ble into parts. This can very easily be conceived of all material bodies, and they can actually be divided into parts, resolved into atoms, and these atoms be divided and subdivided indefinitely. We can conceive that our bodies are divided into parts, and they may actually be so divided—hands, and feet, and limbs be separated from the body—but the idea and the consciousness of personality remains in its totality, “the me” remains unimpaired and untouched. During all the changes of the body, while, according to Plato and the well-known facts of Physiology, one body after another is worn out and put off, and another put on, the self continues the same, conscious to itself of its personal identity and its absolute unity; and this single fact leads us inevitably to the conclusion that it is something distinct from the body and independent of it, an immaterial mind or soul.

4. Yet once more, we observe that the whole physical economy of man points to the indwelling presence of a power superior to mere animal organization and animal instinct, and to the manifest intention of the Creator that such a power should possess and control the physical economy. For, considered merely as an animal endowed with animal powers of life and instinct alone, man is the most imperfect, helpless, and dependent of all living creatures. To see this we have only to compare him with the lower animals—with one, for instance, that acts from instinct alone, without any semblance of reason. Such an one is found in the insect tribes, in the beetle. Let its whole organism be studied, and how admirably and perfectly it has been fitted for its sphere of life on earth. It has been provided for in every want, and armed at every point; its wings are encased in plates of mail; its breast is protected by a firm cuirass; its eyes are protected by a network of curious and skilful workmanship; it has organs of locomotion well adapted to its wants. It has an unerring instinct to guide it in the choice of food and in the capture of its prey; and, when attacked, it has the power of secreting a corrosive liquid, that almost always insures its safety. Such as this is an insect, endowed only with instinct, and a perfect specimen of animal organization, so perfect that

all the skill of man could not improve it in a single point. But man, without a higher spiritual nature, or soul, is the very opposite of all this. He is armed by nature with no coat of mail, nor any effective weapons of offence or defence ; he has no natural clothing, though exceedingly sensitive to climate ; he has no instinct to guide him in the selection of his food, or in the capture of his prey. Let the mere animal man be thus compared with the insect of which we have spoken, or with any of the lower animal creation, and which will show the best adaptation to his sphere of life ? The question need not be asked ; for one is perfectly formed, and incapable of improvement, while the other is imperfectly formed, and capable of improvement at almost every point.

But look now at the history of each, the insect and man. The insect is now just what it was at the creation, has always moved in the same narrow circle, and employed the same means to gratify the same desires. But man has improved his condition from generation to generation. Unclothed, unarmed, and defenceless, he has made for himself clothing, shelter, weapons of warfare, implements of labor ; made himself master of the world, of the brute creation, and even of the elements ; made the winds and the waters turn his wheels and waft his ships ; evolved the mighty force of steam, and made it grind in his mills ; made the swift and fearful lightning come down from the clouds, and run from land to land as an obedient messenger to tell his thoughts. Man, who as a mere animal was found to be the most helpless and dependent of all living creatures, has actually done these wonders on the earth. And how has he done them ? Not by physical might, for in this respect he is vastly inferior to many other creatures. Not by instinct, for he has but little, if any, of this power ; and also it is not in the nature of instinct to do such things, but only to do what it does do perfectly, and do nothing else, and make no improvement in anything. The bee does one thing better than any man could do it ; but it makes no improvement at all, and can do nothing else. But man can do a great and ever increasing number of things ; can improve in his doing of them ; can learn both by his own

individual experience and from others ; so that there is an improvement of the race as well as of the individual. Not by physical might, then, nor by instinct, has man achieved his progress and done his wonderful works on earth ; but by reason, by his inward powers of mind, by which he is perfectly adapted to his sphere of being, and to which all the facts of his material organism point, no less than those words of the Lord God, when, in the day that He made man, He said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness : and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth."

Man's entire organization, his organs of locomotion, his erect posture, his hands curiously formed with cunning points, and capable of all varieties of motions, his head surmounting the material structure, and free to look before and after, above as well as below, the wondrous organs of speech, the marvellous expressions of countenance and attitude, and the various sensations, all declare the presence and the agency of mind in man. The voice is an organ of mind, for the utterance of words, the representatives of thoughts ; and like that vast, complicated, and grandest instrument of music, the organ, it cannot be used without intelligence ; the brutes can utter various cries, and some words, but they have no language. Walking, also, involves intelligence and volition, for they are necessary to attain and to keep the erect posture, and move the limbs ; and what a thrill of joy does the mother feel when first her child can for a moment "stand alone," and walk a single step. It is the triumph of the growing mind in the growing body, for the child has to learn to walk, and walking as well as standing depends on the action of muscles that are controlled by the will. The various sensations, also, are under the control of the mind, are manifestly intended thus to be governed, cultivated, composed, and for manifold purposes. And finally, while the various animal tribes are blindly devoted to the gratification of their appetites and passions, man has the lofty power of restraining and governing them, can subject himself to a rational self-control. And all this shows

the presence and the action of mind in man — something distinct from, independent of, and superior to, the body — as the Scriptures say, “a spirit in man.”

5. Still further we may observe, that human language, which has fitly been called the mirror of the human soul, shows with remarkable distinctness man's deep conviction that he has a soul distinct from the body, that he has a higher spiritual nature; for all languages have terms that indicate the difference between mind and matter, the superiority of mind over matter, and especially the superiority of our minds over our bodies. And this is nothing less than the universal human consciousness reflecting or expressing itself in language, and declaring the existence of the soul, in the same way that our own personal existence, the outward world, and the reference of every event to a cause, are universally admitted truths. To be particular on this point, let us inquire what is the testimony of consciousness as to the soul's being independent of the body? Let us consider some particular action of the body, the raising of an arm, for instance. It is a mechanical act, performed by certain muscles. But these muscles cannot raise the arm in and of themselves; there must be some power or moving force back of them, and which uses them as instruments in the operation. The idea of a predetermining, directing force back of the muscular apparatus of the arm is necessary, and one that no man questions. Now take the case of a person in a state of complete abstraction, seeking the relation between two truths, of geometry, for instance. Does the brain originate and carry on this mental process? No more so than the muscles of the arm can move themselves. There must be some predetermining and directing force back of the brain; and this is found in the mind. It seems to enter into the very consciousness and original conceptions of man, that he has a soul, and that all the members of the body are its organs or instruments.

6. And still further, we wish to call particular attention to the fact that man is the possessor and ruler of his body with all its members, as no mere animal can be. In all languages, various parts of the body are called organs, and each man

speaks of them as his own, the brain no less than the hand or foot, the eye, or ear, or heart. This is a very significant and important fact, that men always speak of the brain, not as themselves, but as something that they possess, and say "*my* brain." All this involves the absolute necessity of an inward, spiritual principle; a mind, or soul, as the possessor of the body, and its governor; the power that employs its organs at its will. This deep conviction of the human soul, the fact of it, and the process by which it is reached, has been well expressed in the following striking lines of philosophic poetry:

"Am I but what I seem, mere flesh and blood?
A branching channel, and a mazy flood?
The purple stream that through my vessels glides,
Dull and unconscious flows like common tides;
The pipes through which the circling juices stray,
Are not the thinking I, no more than they.
This frame, compacted with transcendent skill,
Of moving joints, obedient to my will,
Nursed from the fruitful glebe like yonder tree,
Waxes and wastes; I call it *mine*, not *me*.
New matter still the mouldering mass sustains,
The mansion changed, the tenant still remains,
And, from the fleeting stream repaired by food,
Distinct, as is the swimmer from the flood."

In this connection we cannot refrain from making a quotation of some length from the *Lowell Lectures* of Professor Francis Bowen, "on the Application of Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the Evidences of Religion." It is from the lecture on "The Idea of Self, or Personal Existence," in which the argument for the immaterialty of the soul drawn from its *unity* is developed with great clearness and force. The reference is to Mr. James Kennard, Jr., of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, who died in 1847, at the age of thirty-two, after having been for nine years unable to walk:

"When just entering upon active life and the full duties of manhood, [he] was attacked by the terrible disease which physicians call *anchylosis*, or stiffening of the joints. First one knee refused its office, and as this was accompanied with great pain, and perhaps the nature of the complaint was mistaken, the leg was amputated, in the hope that the evil would stop there. But the disease soon passed into the other limb, stiffened the remaining knee

and then crept on slowly from joint to joint, making each inflexible as it passed, till the whole lower portion of the body was nearly as rigid as iron, and the muscles had no longer any office to perform. Gradually, then, it moved upward, leaving the vertebral column inflexible; the arms and hands, which, in anticipation of its approach, had been bent into a position most convenient for the sufferer, stiffened there; the neck refused to turn or bend, and the body became almost as immovable as if it had been carved out of the rock. Years passed between the first appearance of the disease and the awful completion of its work; years elapsed *after* the hopeless patient was thus hardened into stone, and still he lived. Nor was this all; his eyes were attacked; the sight of one was wholly lost, and the other became so exquisitely sensitive that it could seldom be exposed to the light, and never but for a few moments at a time. And thus he remained for years, blind, immovable, prisoned in this house of stone, and echoing, we might suppose, the affecting exclamation of the Apostle, 'Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?' But no word of impatience escaped him; the mind was clear and vigorous, the temper was not soured, the affections were as strong and clinging as ever. His good sense, his wit, his knowledge of books, his interest in the passing topics of the day, made his chamber a favorite resort even of those who might not have been drawn thither merely by sympathy for his sufferings; for not infrequently he was still exposed to agonizing pain. But in the intervals of this distress, his active mind sought and found employment, and numerous contributions which this living statue dictated for a periodical work are now in print. The secret of his wonderful composure and gentleness may be told in two words — religious resignation.

What says the Materialist to a case, like this? Was that powerless body, maimed, stiffened, blind, hardly animate — was *that* the person, *the man*, still active, inquisitive, industrious, generous, and affectionate? or was it only a prison-house, in which the fettered soul was compelled to await its time of release? I envy not the feelings or the intellect of him who could stand by the bedside of that patient sufferer, and still *disbelieve* that 'there is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding.'"

We are thus led by many considerations to the conclusion that man has a soul, an immaterial principle, distinct from the body, and independent of it. But perhaps the greatest difficulty with some, in the way of accepting this doctrine of Immaterialism, is the fact that no man has ever seen a soul. The physician, who has embraced the principles of Materialism, says, I have dissected many human bodies; with my scalpel I have searched carefully in every part of the system, even to the nerves and brain, but I have never been able to find a soul, have never seen one! And many Materialists so reason, if they do not so state their reasoning. What answer

shall be made to this objection? What shall be said to remove the difficulty? What but the declaration of Cicero, that, although we do not see the mind, as we do not see God, still as God is known by his works, so the mind of man is known by its manifest and undeniable operations.* God is a being "whom no man hath seen or can see," because he is a spirit, and the demand to see Him, or perceive him by any of our senses, involves both an impossibility and a self-contradiction; still his works declare his being so plainly, that the Bible pronounces all who refuse or fail to "believe that He is," to be "without excuse." And so it is of the human soul. Being immaterial or spiritual, its very nature forbids its being an object of perception, and makes the demand to see it self-contradictory. But we behold its manifestations in others, and are conscious of its operations in ourselves. Thought, reflection, generalization, abstraction, self-consciousness, memory and forecast, the power to understand our own relations, to reason from them, and to employ our conclusions in the great work of self-government, self-approbation and disapprobation—these are things that show the presence and the power of mind, as something altogether superior to material forces and animal instinct, so that the most wonderful performances of the best trained animals are not at all surprising in children even, and not to be so much as named in comparison with the intellectual endowments and achievements of man. Thus the conclusion is forced upon us, that man must have a soul that is independent of the body, that he is a spirit clothed in garments of flesh.

Having thus examined the two systems of Materialism and Immaterialism, we may remark in passing, that on each side there is a danger of error to be avoided; the error of giving too great or an exclusive attention to the phenomena of perception on the one hand, or of consciousness on the other; of giving too great a prominence to the outward world, or to the

* Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides: tamen ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus eius, sic ex memoria rerum et inventione, et claritate motus, omnique pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis agnoscito. (Tusc. Disputationum, Lib. I, c. xxix.)

inward soul. Some, on the one hand, giving too much prominence to the outward world, have ascribed to it all our knowledge, made it, through sensation, the source of all our ideas. So Aristotle did, and Locke ; and though this was not itself Materialism, it resulted in Materialism. On the other hand, some have made too little of the outward world, and, by attending exclusively to the phenomena of the mind, have produced the opposite system of Idealism, though this has much less of sophistry and absurdity, and much more that is worthy of the soul, noble and ennobling, than Materialism. It would be much better to believe that we are kindred to the angels only, than to the brutes alone. But we should be careful not to build our system on any partial observation of phenomena ; not to give an exclusive attention to the outward world or to the inward soul ; lest, lost in abstract contemplations, we lose sight of the external world, or engrossed by the objects of the senses, suffer our material organism to usurp the place of our souls. The true order is, the soul first, and then the body ; just as it is first God, and then the world.

The immateriality of the soul does not of itself directly and positively prove its immortality ; and the doctrine is not here put forth as affording such proof, but rather as removing an obstacle in the way of receiving or establishing that doctrine, as removing a presumption against it, bridging over the deep, dark gulf that Materialism digs between us and immortality. It is not absolutely necessary that a Materialist should be a disbeliever in human immortality, for Dr. Priestley was not ; but his consistency in the matter is by no means apparent. For if we are only material beings, though most admirably organized, there is ground for the doctrine of the Annihilationists, that death is the destruction of all our living powers, that the dissolution of the body in death is the total extinction of our being, and that the only possible hope of immortality is through the reconstruction of the body in the resurrection ; but if we have souls as well as bodies ; if there is in man an immaterial principle, a mind, distinct from the body and independent of it, its possessor and its governor, surviving unimpaired the changes of the body day by day,

and the loss of limbs and organs, and able to carry on its wondrous operations while the body sleeps as well as when awake, then it is very easy to believe that over the soul death has no power — that it is not annihilation, but only putting off the vestment of the body as we put off our garments — that, according to the Christian teaching, death is but a sleep, the body's sleep, while the spirit wakes, and, absent from the body, pursues its wondrous course in other, unknown worlds. In other words, these views of the immateriality of the soul have the character of fundamental principles, a knowledge of which it is important to carry with us into our study of the Scriptures, so that we may approach the subject of our inquiry from the same point of view with them, and, after a fair and candid examination, sum up their teachings, unbiassed by any erroneous theory of the soul as material.

ARTICLE VII.—BERKELEY AND HIS WORKS.

The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained. By the Right Rev. G. BERKELEY, D. D., late Lord Bishop of Cloyne. Edited, with Annotations, by H. V. H. Cowell. London: Macmillan & Co. 1860.

WE place at the head of this article the reprint of a defence of the "*Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*," published by the celebrated Idealist, Berkeley, soon after the appearance of the original. It has not been included in any collection of the author's works, and had passed out of the memory of all except a few collectors of metaphysical rarities. The passing mention made of it by Mackintosh and Hamilton has led to this new publication and edition of the Treatise. The work of the editor has been well done, and he deserves the thanks of all lovers of our older philosophical writers.

Few persons who have not made the philosophical literature of England a special study, are aware of the number of works

of equal acuteness and learning which our language contains. Berkeley has been more fortunate than most of his contemporaries and predecessors. He has been kept in the minds of men by the eulogists of his personal character, and the zeal with which his doctrines have been opposed. Berkeley has also a peculiar claim upon Americans. He was among the earliest Englishmen to manifest sympathy for the moral and intellectual wants of our country. He resided among us for several years, and wrote one of his ablest works on our shores. We have thought that a rapid resumé of the leading events of his life, and a glance at his peculiar notions, would not be unacceptable to our readers. We have been accustomed so long to acquiesce in the verdict of the French and Germans regarding the incapacity of the Anglo-Saxon mind for bold and original speculation, that we are in danger of forgetting that our ancestors were the rivals of the early French school of abstract thinking, and the teachers of Germany. While we recognize the genius of Malebranche and Fichte, we ought not to forget the equal claims of Berkeley and Collier.

The following facts of Berkeley's life have been condensed mainly from the life prefixed to Wright's edition of his collected works.

George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, in Ireland, was born at Kilerin, in the county of Kilkenny, March 12th, 1684. He received his early education at Kilkenny school, and was admitted a pensioner of Trinity College, Dublin, at the age of 15 years. He became a Fellow of the same College at the age of 23. In 1707, the same year, he published his first work, which was a Latin treatise entitled "*Arithmetica absque Algebra aut Euclide demonstrata.*" This was followed by some Mathematical Miscellanies, containing some very curious observations and theorems. In 1709 he published his "*Essay towards a new Theory of Vision,*" and the year following, his "*Principles of Human Knowledge,*" which contained the first distinct enunciation of his doctrine of Idealism. In 1713 he went to London, and published a defence of his Treatise on human knowledge, in three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.

Acuteness, learning and imagination were so conspicuous in his writings, that Berkeley's reputation was now established, and his society courted even where his opinions did not find admission. Among the Whigs, Steele became his patron, and introduced him to Pope, who was ever after a fast friend. Swift, among the Tories, recommended him to the eccentric Earl of Peterborough, who, having been appointed an ambassador to Sicily, took Berkeley with him in the capacity of chaplain and secretary. After his return from Sicily, finding no preferment, he became a travelling tutor to a Mr. Ashe. In this function he remained abroad four years. During this period he wrote a Latin treatise concerning Motion, which was communicated to the Academy of Sciences at Paris. After his return, he went to Ireland as chaplain to the Duke of Grafton, then Lord Lieutenant. In 1729 his patron, the Duke, promoted him to the Deanery of Derry, worth £1,100 per annum. The year succeeding, he published his "*Scheme for converting the savage Americans to Christianity, by means of a College to be erected in the Bermudas.*" He evinced the disinterestedness of his motives in proposing the scheme, by offering to resign his opulent preferment, and devote the remainder of his life to the instruction of Indian and American youth, on the moderate salary of £100 a year. To accomplish his object Berkeley relied on the promise of £20,000 made by Sir Robert Walpole, under the sanction of a vote of the House of Commons. This sum for the endowment of the College was to be raised from the sale of crown lands in the island of St. Christopher. On the faith of this promise, and assisted by some private subscriptions, Berkeley set out for America. He took his residence temporarily in Newport, R. I., in view of purchasing estates, the rent of which should support his College. The estates were bargained for, but the funds promised by Walpole were not forthcoming. The sale of the crown lands in St. Christopher had realized £90,000, but £80,000 of this sum was required to endow a royal princess about to be married, and the remaining £10,000 was, through the influence of Gen. Oglethorpe, appropriated to the aid of the Colony of Georgia. Berkeley, thus betrayed by the Ministry, was obliged

to return to England. He had spent a large part of his private fortune, and seven years of the prime of his life, only to realize a complete failure in his benevolent design. Harvard, Yale, and Brown, founded in obscurity by the colonists themselves, from the voluntary contributions of the people, lived and flourished, while the College of St. Paul, chartered under the leadership of a dignitary of the Established Church, and supported by a vote of the House of Commons and the personal good wishes of a powerful monarch, died before seeing the light. While in Rhode Island, Berkeley was not inactive. He preached almost constantly for his brethren of the Episcopal Church, and while residing near Newport, meditated and wrote his "*Minute Philosopher*." His favorite haunt on the shore of the ocean is still pointed out. He gave an organ to a church in Newport, still in use—conveyed the estate on which he lived, together with over 800 volumes of choice books, to Yale College. These donations to the cause of good learning have served to illustrate his liberality of feeling, and to keep his memory fresh in the hearts of American scholars. His prophetic poem, whose last stanza has pointed so many patriotic harangues, indicates how clearly he foresaw the future greatness of what the statesmen of the day thought an insignificant colony, hardly worth a thought, compared with the complications of Hanover with the petty principalities of Germany.

In 1732, immediately after his return to England, he published the "*Minute Philosopher*," which still holds a high place in the literature of Christian Apologetics and Theodicy. In about two years after his return he was created Bishop of Cloyne, in Ireland. He here distinguished himself by the most earnest labors for the good of the people of his diocese, and by his unabated ardor in study. His intellectual activity is proved by the publication of his "*Analyst*," addressed to an infidel mathematician, his "*Queries for the Good of Ireland*," and several sermons and smaller works, called forth by his duties as a prelate and a magistrate. His last work was the curious essay on materia medica, entitled "*Siris, or a Train of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries concerning the*

Virtues of Tar Water." This work, to which we shall not again allude, is a vast accumulation of crude hypotheses, scholastic and classical learning, scarcely to be paralleled in literature. It was said by Berkeley to have cost him more labor than any one of his works. One of his biographers remarks, that it is "a chain, indeed, that reaches from earth to heaven, conducting the reader by imperceptible gradations from the phenomena of tar water, through the depths of the ancient philosophy, to the most sublime mysteries of the Christian religion." While in America, he thought himself to have received benefit from tar water, and the benevolent desire to make others acquainted with its healing virtues, led him to write the treatise. It gave the authors of the *Encyclopedie Methodique* a chance to make the good bishop the butt of their ridicule. The notice of this great Philosopher and Divine is dispatched substantially in these words (we quote from memory): "Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. He wrote a treatise on tar water." As early as 1756, the *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* were translated into French, and, together with the *Clavis Universalis* of Collier, published at Rostock, with notes by the translator, Eschenbach. That these works produced a powerful effect upon the best minds on the Continent, is evident from a variety of reasons, which we cannot spend time to specify. It is enough to say that his system of idealism differs little, but in form of statement, from that which, half a century later, gave immortality to the name of Fichte, and in our own day has elicited so much admiration in the pages of Emerson. In 1752 Berkely removed to Oxford, to superintend the education of one of his sons. Too conscientious to be a non-resident and inactive bishop, he sought permission of the Secretary of State to resign his office and its emoluments. So uncommon a request excited the curiosity of the king, George II, to inquire the name of the extraordinary man who proffered it. On being told that it was Dr. Berkeley, his old acquaintance of St. Paul's College, the king declared that he should die a bishop in spite of himself, and gave him free permission to reside where he pleased. Shortly after his removal to Oxford, while sitting

with his family, he was seized by a disease of the heart, and instantly expired. His death occurred in 1753, at the age of seventy years.

The writings of Berkeley are much talked of, and but little read. In the minds of many, his writings take rank with the lucubrations of Emanuel Swedenborg and Jacob Behmen. Such an opinion will soon be dissipated from the mind of any one who will read attentively any portion of his works. He wrote a pure and racy English, which, though somewhat diffuse, was always clear, enriched from the stores of his learning, and enlivened by his cultivated taste and vigorous imagination. His style alone entitles him to a place among the British classics. It may be safely said that no writer since Cicero, has managed the Platonic Dialogue with more grace or skill. The first, and, in some respects, one of the most important of Berkeley's works is the "*Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*." It has possibly been overrated, but all must admit that it marked a new period in psychological analysis. Not being able to analyze the work, we will state the point at which the author aims, in the briefest way possible.

Before Berkeley's time, it had been supposed that the measurement of distance by the eye was due, in the words of Hamilton, to "an original law of the constitution." Various attempts had been made to determine the exact conditions under which this knowledge comes into the mind through the sense of sight. Among these, the hypothesis, that the greater or less divergence of the rays of light reflected from any object to the eye, gave to the mind a knowledge of the distance of that object, held a prominent place. But experiment soon proved that there is no necessary relation between the apparent distance of an object from the eye, and the greater or less divergence of the rays of light which render the object visible. Dr. Barrow, in his lectures on Optics, had frankly admitted that the commonly received doctrine was insufficient to explain all the phenomena necessary to prove the hypothesis to be a general truth.

The greater or less divergence of the optic axes, in the vision

of objects with both eyes, was also brought forward, to account for the judgment of distance by sight. But though the the conscious effort by which we change the angle of the optic axes when we look at the same object from different distances, must be admitted to be a means of obtaining a vague idea of distance, it must also be admitted that its efficiency is due, not to vision as such, but to its association with muscular efforts, differing from each other with different degrees of clearness or obscurity of vision. This variation in muscular effort, has nothing whatever to do with sight. Separate the simple action of light on the eye in which sight consists, from the conscious action of the muscles, or what some psychologists call the muscular sense, and no estimate of distance from the varying angle of the optic axes would be made. It is evident, also, that this explanation of our judgment of distance, such as it is, applies only to those persons in whom both the eyes are perfect.

In both the cases above cited, the direction of the rays of light on the one hand, and of the optic axes on the other, are in no sense objects of sight, for they in no way are appreciable by that sense, and by consequence they can furnish no basis for an inference of the mind, when its means of knowledge are through the sense of sight alone. None of those adjustments of the eye as an instrument, which are due to the play of the various muscles which surround it, whether voluntary or involuntary, can be referred to the sense of sight, properly speaking. In seeking to get at the deliverances of this sense in a pure state, we must set all such phenomena completely aside. It would be tedious to give in detail the history of the errors and half truths, which marked the opinions of inquirers into this branch of minute Psychology. The germs of Berkeley's doctrine were indistinctly hinted at by Malebranche and Locke, but their hints were not accompanied by any renunciation of the common and erroneous opinions. They are not such as in any way to interfere with our author's claim to originality. The main object of Berkeley was to analyze the complex knowledge due to the simultaneous, or intimately associated action of the different senses, which, in the con-

crete activities of practical life, we hold as uncompounded and simple ; into their ultimate and constituent elements, assigning each to the account of the sense which originally furnished it. That he sought with worthy aims to develop a sound psychology, and to reach the actual facts of one of the most obscure parts of our mental constitution, there can be no doubt. It is equally certain that he was, to a very great degree, successful, for metaphysicians of the most opposite views have united in the opinion, that the "*Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*" is one of the finest specimens of acute analysis in the whole range of speculative literature. Locke had stated that the immediate deliverances of the sense of sight were modified by his universal solvent of all difficulties, "reflection," but he does not point out that this modification is due to the presence of knowledge derived from another sense, touch. This is the very gist of Berkeley's essay. It is proper, just here, to state that it was not his design to deny that we get a knowledge of extension in two dimensions by sight. He rightly supposed all sight to be conversant with patches of various colored light, and, of course, that these were known as out of each other, separated by the lines formed by the meeting of the different colors.

Affirming that sight had to do *only* with various colored light, which was known by its touching the retina of the eye, he denied that it gave us any knowledge immediately, of distance, or of extension in three dimensions. This doctrine he founded on the simple fact that all sight must, from the nature of the case, be conversant only with light as it touches the eye, while outness, or knowledge of bodies or spaces of three dimensions, were original gifts of touch. As we perceive bodies by sight and touch at the same time, we associate the results in our thought as if they were inseparable relatives, and when sight calls up, by the law of association, the ideas due to touch, we come to suppose this relative suggestion or inference so rapidly made that it escapes attention and memory, to be the original gift of the sense which most obtrusively occupies the horizon of our consciousness. Not only does Berkeley deny that we get a knowledge of the relative distance of objects from the eye

by sight, but he affirms that with sight alone as our guide, we should suppose all objects to touch the retina just in the same manner with light itself—the only medium of communication between the eye and the outer world. We may put our author's theory in this form. With the ordinary nerves of touch situated in different parts of the body, we come into relation with all but the most attenuated forms of matter. But we need to know, for the purposes of articulate language, those delicate vibrations of the air which are set in motion by the human voice. Consequently we are provided with a special modification of the nerves, which enables us to catch and register sound waves, which, when most intense in their activity, are utterly impalpable to the most delicate touch of the most delicate hand. But there is a more delicate organ still, which is requisite in order to recognize that most attenuated ether, whose vibrations, so elastic that though an impulse given at the fixed stars is not absorbed in its enormous journey to our earth, are still unrecognizable by the acutest ear. To sieze and register these wonderful pulsations, the Creator has adjusted the human eye. Its organism is too delicate to come into contact with anything grosser than light. Light, as it comes reflected from various bodies, is variously colored. The spot of light which touches the retina reflected from a rose, though very small, represents in outline the rose itself. But the relation of knowledge takes place between the eye, and the mass of rays which touches and excites the retina. These rays are known as they touch it, where they touch it, when they touch it. They reach the retina and are known as a flat outline of color. This flat outline the eye gives us, and nothing more. Outness, distance, extension in three dimensions, it knows nothing of. The eye has its own peculiar kind of knowledge. This is its glory. It does not share it with the other senses. Nor do they share their peculiar knowledge with sight. To ask how the eye knows distance or extension, in any other mode than in two dimensions, is to ask how the eye can see the sensation of touch. It was, in Berkeley's view, as absurd, as to ask how the eye can see a concert of music or the odor of musk. Though these several gifts of the senses

are so emphatically distinct in their very nature, they are gathered up into a common mind, associated and bound together by ten thousand harmonious relations, the excitement of any one of which, calls into consciousness all those various knowledges which it has been accustomed to receive at the same time and place, or under similar conditions. In short, with Berkeley, sight is a language which calls up the gifts of touch by association, as words in our mother tongue call up each its appropriate thought or thing. We learn this language before our mother tongue, for in the order of Providence our senses from infancy are all active together, while the mind as it develops, accepts their various results, unifies them, and by its wonderful chemistry, elaborates the myriad combinations which enter into the continually accumulating sum of human knowledge. In point of fact all our knowledge of individual objects, as it practically lies in our minds, is a complex result of the various uncompounded gifts of the several senses. Complexity in our knowledge is the rule rather than the exception, and an ultimate analysis of our mental states in perception, requires a degree of acuteness and power of continuous attention, which are the rarest of intellectual endowments.

The distinct analysis of the combination of the gifts of sight and touch in the rapid and seemingly spontaneous judgments of distance of objects from the eye, and generally of extension in three dimensions, is due to Berkeley. It is a remarkable circumstance, often noted by historians of Philosophy, that these purely speculative results of Berkeley are generally admitted to have been proved correct by the testimony of persons who, born blind, have been restored to sight by surgical operations. Regarding the verification of Berkeley's views by experiment, we speak with some caution, for it must be admitted, as it was long ago suggested by Adam Smith, that the rapid estimate of distance made by the young of animals soon after their birth, would seem to favor a different view. The opinion of Platner, as cited by Hamilton in his lectures, is singularly opposite to that of our author, and of British Psychologists generally.

The old case of the boy couched by Cheselden, is familiar to all readers of psychological text books. This person is said by Cheselden to have "thought that all objects whatever touched his eyes." There has been much dispute regarding the meaning of this expression. It cannot be supposed that he used the word "touch" in the ordinary sense. We must understand that he thought the relation of knowledge was experienced at the point of contact, between the light and the eye. Until he had obtained some experience of light as a medium intervening between the eye and solid bodies, he could hardly have had any other name for his new and strange sensations. Mr. J. S. Mill, as cited by Mr. Cowell, remarks concerning this case, as follows: "That the object touched him, was obviously a mere supposition which he made, because it was with the eyes that he perceived them. From his experience of touch, perceptions of an object and contact with it were, no doubt, indissolubly associated in his mind. But he would scarcely have said that all objects seemed to touch his eyes, if some of them appeared farther off than others." Upon the case of a lady born blind, who at an advanced age was restored to sight, the following testimony is given: "She seemed to have the greatest difficulty in finding out the distance of any object, for when an object was held close to her, she would search for it by stretching her hand far beyond its position, while on other occasions she groped close to her own face for a thing far removed from her. Forty-two days after the operation by which she gained her sight, the surgeon said of her that "she had not as yet acquired any thing like accurate knowledge of distance or forms." By the word "forms" we understand him from the context to mean extension in three dimensions. Another instance of a blind boy restored to sight, cited by Mr. Cowell, is one recorded by Mr. Nunnely, who states that "of distance he had not the least conception. He said every thing touched his eyes, and walked most carefully about with his hands held up before him, to prevent things hurting his eyes by touching them."* On the whole, the evidence of ex-

* Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained, pp. 127, 135.

periment seems to support so strongly the doctrine of the *Theory of Vision*, that it may be thought to justify the emphatic expression of Sir James Mackintosh, that it "*contains a great discovery in Mental Philosophy.*"

Most of the ambiguity in the accounts of the cases of couching, has arisen from the incompetency of those who have undertaken to observe, and report, the facts which have occurred. Diderot hardly exaggerated the truth, when he said that the conduct of an experiment of this kind, "is an occupation not unworthy of the united talents of Newton, Descartes, Locke and Leibnitz." It should be borne in mind, to the immortal honor of our author, that he prepared his essay, and published his conclusions, before any experiments had been made to guide his reasonings or test his speculations.

It may be said that the psychology of vision in relation to extension in two dimensions received little attention from Berkeley, and the curious questions to which it gives rise have not been studied with sufficient diligence by later inquirers. The relation of this discussion to vision of objects as erect, which describe an inverted image on the retina, is obvious. The origin of the difficulties which have arisen on this subject, seems to lie in the idea that the image on the retina is the actual *object* of sight, rather than the light which forms the image. It is plain that the formation of the image is merely an incident or condition of vision, arising from the requisite collection of the different colored rays of light, by the refracting lenses of the eye. In the absence of all ideas of "up and down," "right and left," which have no meaning except as names, for the relations among the several parts of the bony and muscular system, and of the whole of that system to the earth and firmament, we may not unreasonably conclude that the whole notion of what we call erect or inverted vision, is due to its association with the gifts of the muscular sense or touch. This bold conclusion is Berkeley's.

Sir David Brewster has explained this phenomenon by what he calls the law of visual direction. He states, what is an undoubted fact, that in vision we refer all objects to that direction in space from which the rays reflected from them

enter the eye. Admitting this to be true as a matter of practical experience, as is shown from the phenomena of looming and mirage, the question, whether the cause of this reference is due to our actually perceiving the direction of the rays when they actually enter the eye, is still an open one. When ships on the surface of water, as seen from a fixed point inland, appear ten feet higher than their normal position, we may reasonably conclude that the change is due to a comparison of those parts of the field of vision which are severally seen through the medium of refracted and unrefracted rays of light, and are consequently drawn on the retina, and perceived by the mind, in a strange and abnormal relation to each other. From this point of view, it will be seen that the law of visual direction itself, may possibly, after all, be resolved into the intimate association of the ideas of sight and touch. We ought to say, that Immanuel Fichte has explained the phenomenon in the same way with Brewster, and gives no hint that he considers the law of visual direction aught but an original gift of the organ of vision, acting under the conditions of its own natural constitution. With two such eminent authorities against the view presented, we leave the matter to the judgment of the reader, with the hope that competent Psychologists and Natural Philosophers will continue their joint labors until the limit of the knowable, in the psychology of vision, shall have been definitely reached.

The fundamental principle of Berkeley, that sight is, by way of eminence, language, may be applied to the explanation of the curious phenomena of binocular vision, which have been developed by the stereoscope. By means of the photographic art, the two varying pictures, actually seen by the human eyes, when the optic axes make an appreciable angle, are reproduced with so much exactness, that the light and shade imitation, is vastly more correct than is possible with any single picture. The perfection of the language thus secured, recalls so completely the joint knowledges of sight and touch, that the deception is nearly complete.

We shall omit any detailed notice of the "*Minute Philosopher*." It is understood to have been written as a reply to the

once celebrated, but now forgotten, "*Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices Public Benefits*." This work is mainly made up of two volumes of commentary affixed to a doggerel poem of between three and four hundred lines, originally published under the title of the "*Grumbling Hive*." Mandeville is confessedly a follower of Hobbes, and his evident object the overthrow of all religion and morality. The Thomas Paine of his day, he was justly characterized by Mackintosh as "the buffoon and sophister of the alehouse." If the common opinion be true that he called out the *Minute Philosopher*, it is one of the illustrations of the great truth, that bad men often subserve the designs of Providence. This work of Berkeley's, meditated and written, as we have already seen, while he resided in Rhode Island, is marked by affluence of learning, breadth of view, and acuteness of argumentation. The application which he makes of the doctrines of the "*Theory of Vision*" on the language of sight, and on signs in general, to illustrate the being and attributes of God, is especially original, effective, and beautiful. Any one who reads the work will be surprised to see how little that is new has been brought forward by the opponents of Christianity since Berkeley's day, and impressed with the marvellous force and point of the older apologetic literature of our language. The "*Minute Philosopher*" would well justify reprinting. With a few illustrative notes, it would be a most effective treatise at the present day. The Materialists of the modern school in England are the legitimate descendants of the Philosopher of Malmesbury. Beyond a modicum of superficial physiology, they have added almost nothing to the results of their great master.

That which has given to Berkeley the most wide-spread, but somewhat equivocal reputation, is the "*Principles of Human Knowledge*," and the dialogues subsequently published, in which he defended and explained the doctrines which the treatise contained. Laying aside all historical notices of the doctrine of perception, as impertinent to our present purpose, it is sufficient to say that the metaphysicians of Berkeley's time, almost without exception, believed that between the ex-

ternal world and the soul of man there is no immediate relation. All real knowledge was held to be of ideas or forms, which, in some way, represented, typified, or suggested the external world. That all knowledge in perception must result from an actual relation existing, or that has existed in the past, between the mind on the one hand and the object of knowledge on the other, was admitted by all. So far as the outward world was concerned, all agreed that it could be known, only so far as it was reached by the mind. By a consent nearly as uniform, they affirmed, that in perception we do *not reach* the actually existing world of matter at all, but only a world of images, ideas, forms, or impressions which interposed their mediation between external nature and the mind. As man was held unable to reach the world, or come into relation with it, he could not *know* it. Hence it was inferred to exist as the generating force or proximate cause of the vicarious ideas or images, which were the actual objects of the mind's knowledge. It is true that these ideas were held to be copies of the world of actually existing things. But the vexing question still obtruded itself, How can we know that these ideas correctly represent a world of things which, by hypothesis, nobody has ever seen or touched? It was like asking a person his opinion of the correctness of the drawing, in the picture of an animal, which he had never seen. If we cannot know anything whatever regarding the correctness, or even existence, of these alleged copies of the world of matter, this world of matter exists for us only as a series of assumed causes, of certain subjective states of mind. But inquisitive minds further asked, How do I become certified that this postulated, external world exists, as a cause of my changing states of mind? Cannot the existing conditions be fulfilled without it? Cannot the Almighty bring these impressions or images into orderly relation with my mind, without this cumbrous machinery of an external world? The scholastics continually debated the question of the possibility of the creation of sensible species, in the absence of a world of material substances. A similar question was the constant opprobrium of the Cartesian school. To doubt in

some form the reality of matter, became a "test of capacity for speculative pursuits." The acuteness of Descartes himself was unequal to the task which his own conclusions set before him. He evades the difficulty by shifts and dodges, unworthy of his great powers. The senses were given to us by God, he said, and therefore, we should trust them. Let it be so, the objector might have replied. On your theory the senses reveal to us nothing but images or impressions, and, of course, they testify to the existence of nothing else. We have a strong native propensity to believe in the reality of matter, said the master, and this indicates the will of God that we should so believe. But this very propensity, it might have been replied, leads us to believe that we know real things, and contradicts the sages from Democritus down. Malebranche, Descartes's most brilliant disciple, stated and developed what was logically a system of Idealism; and Hamilton's hint is probably correct, that he shrunk from drawing the final conclusion, by reason of its conflict with the Roman doctrine of the Eucharist. He rested the reality of matter on religious faith, not choosing to recollect that, to the Cartesian Psychologist, prophets and apostles, miracles and testimony, were mere forms of thought or ideas, and that by this process he begged the whole question. His notion of seeing all things in God, was, in fact, nothing more than a gigantic effort to settle a basis for reality and objective evidence, while denying to the intellect the actual perception of an external, material world.

Voltaire wittily said of Malebranche, that "he saw all things in God, except that he himself was a fool." Though Voltaire held all the faulty psychological premises of the good father, his mind was not logical enough to feel the difficulties of the problem involved, nor profound enough to understand the solution proposed.

Locke was, in a limited sense, a disciple of the Cartesian school. With the exception of the doctrine of innate ideas, he adopted the theory of knowledge taught by the great Frenchman, and he was not unaware of the difficulties which it involved. After groping around the subject awhile in con-

stantly increasing darkness, he cuts the matter short, in his bluff English way, by saying that we have proof enough of the existence of matter to direct us in the pursuit of the good, and avoiding the bad, which we may receive from external things, and that beyond this we have no concern. Singularly enough, the representative theory of knowledge seems at this age to have been taken for granted, and held as necessarily true. Founded in an attempt to explain how the mind knows matter, which, as an ultimate fact, can have no explanation, and needs none, the wide adoption of the representative hypothesis is an emphatic illustration of the unwillingness of philosophers to become "the ministers and interpreters of nature," and confine themselves within the limits normal to the human mind. The theory had been denied by Durandus, Gabriel Biel, and John Sargent, in distinct and emphatic terms, but their arguments had reached a sphere too restricted, to affect to any extent the current of opinion.

Berkeley assumed the Cartesian doctrine, as reinforced by the authority of Locke, so far as to affirm that the mind, in perception, comes into relation with nothing but ideas. These ideas, though he gave them no sharp definition, he assumed to be objective to the mind, and somehow distinguishable and separate from it. He also assumed, with other philosophers of his time, that ideas were immediately and intuitively cognized. With them, also, he assumed that the mind, in the act of perception, knew nothing else but ideas. At this point, he diverged from his contemporaries. He refused to postulate, without proof, a solid, extended, external world, which was to serve no other purpose than to furnish a cause for the presence of the world of ideas, which alone was actually perceived to exist. He asked the question which had again and again been put by the scholastic commentators on the "*Book of the Sentences*," Cannot God create and present to the thought of men, images, or species, or ideas, in orderly succession, just as easily without an external world as with one? If He can, and this no one will deny, why need we invent this clumsy machinery of an external world, to account for the existence of these ideas or species? He applied Occam's razor with a

vengeance. He saw no reasons for multiplying causes of phenomena beyond what were needed to account for them. And besides, if we admit the *necessity* of this external world to meet the requirements of metaphysical theorists, who can vouch for its existence as a matter of fact? By the admission of all his opponents, it had never been seen, or heard, or touched, or smelt, or tasted. Its existence is possible, it may be said, but the question to be answered regards its actual existence *in fact*. God has no use for it, so far as the genesis of ideas is concerned, God makes nothing in vain. The external world is useless, therefore it is not only not proved to exist, but the conception of its existence is absurd, Q. E. D. Berkeley's conclusion I will state in his own beautiful language: "All the choir of heaven and furniture of earth—in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind; that their being is to be perceived or known; that so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind, or in that of some other created spirit, they must in the mind of the Eternal Spirit."

Berkeley was a natural realist, so far as regarded the object, of knowledge which he believed to exist. In his defences of his Theory, he is very careful to say that he believes most implicitly in the deliverances of the perceptive faculties. He denies only the unknown and unknowable material substance, which the philosophers have invented to puzzle and disturb plain men. The psychologists of Berkeley's day assumed the existence of two worlds—that of ideas and that of material things. He rejected the world of material things, because on the prevailing hypothesis there was no proof of it, and no need of it as an hypothesis, to explain facts otherwise unaccountable. He admitted the existence of the world of images or ideas, and supposed the human mind to be in immediate relation to it, in the act of perception. The error of the time, and with the majority, possibly, of metaphysicians, the error of to-day, lies in assuming that false analysis which separates in time and space, mode and substance, phenomenon and nonmenon, reality and image. These may be separated in thought, when considered as beings of the intellect, but never

in the actual process of perception through the senses. Denying this false analysis, the Berkleian idea or image, which he supposed the senses to know intuitively, becomes a mere mode of matter known, at once and in itself. Denying this absurd separation of a thing from itself, representative perception and its problems pass away, and we find ourselves in the presence of the simple deliverances of consciousness, affirming that the material object, which comes in relation to it, is, and exists, in a mode absolutely unlike that of the mind which knows it.

Berkeley was nearer the truths of consciousness than Descartes or Locke or Kant. Paradoxical as the statement may seem, his theory was a tentative towards the vindication of the trustworthiness of consciousness. It was a *reductio ad absurdum* of the reigning Psychology. Hume followed in the same track, and with trenchant logic showed that the denial of the testimony of consciousness in perception, involved the falsity of its deliverances on all points, and renders a philosophy impossible. With glee worthy of Mephistophiles, he cut the moorings of certainty, and set mankind afloat on a sea of doubt, without a bottom or a shore. Kant sought to escape from the Nihilism of Hume, but haunted by the ghost of the old theory of representative perception, he established a subjective certainty only. Fichte then arose, to do for him what Berkeley had done for Descartes and Locke. As intrepid and as earnest as Berkeley, the German idealist pushed his logic a step further, and the cycle was complete. I exist, says the follower of Fichte. I find ideas in my consciousness. These ideas are purely subjective — mere modalities of my own mind. They come and go within me. Some of them I am conscious of generating by my own will, others present themselves without my volition, but all are alike in me, and of me. I am sufficient to myself. Protagoras was right; "man is the measure of all things." What need to postulate a god, to keep this phantasmagoria of ideas passing before my mind's eye? Let us stick to facts. It is true that some of my ideas seem to obtrude themselves, without my calling for them; but why need I suppose they come from without? I analyze my

consciousness into two parts: one is spontaneous, the other non-spontaneous. This obstruction to my freedom, is the mind limiting itself. I have it. "I-hood" is the last word of Philosophy. My master stood on the topmost pinnacle of modern thought, when he announced to his wondering class, "To-morrow, gentlemen, I shall create God!"

Idealism, which over the practical English mind had little positive influence, became a creed among the Germans. In its various phases, it determined the thinking of the Teutonic mind for a quarter of a century. It affected all the productions of the national intellect. Physical Science and Literature, Philosophy and Theology, became thin and gaseous. Naturalists were able to develop a cameleopard from their own consciousness. Schelling (in whose steps some English-speaking followers have trod, with "legs painfully short"), worked out the whole circle of the physical sciences *a priori*. Hegel constructed the history of the human race, past, present and future, from its necessary and immutable idea. Strauss applied subjective idealism to the gospel histories, and showed how

"Apostles and martyrs died
For an idea personified."

But even in Germany this nonsense is coming to an end. The drift of the German mind seems now to be in the direction of an intense and tangible realism. We have glanced at this development of idealism, in order to show that all the fundamental notions which, with much sound and boasting, have been imported to this country from the continent, have been set forth and applied in English, before the Germans had fairly learned how to write their mother tongue, and were exhausting their power of literary production in filling enormous folios with the dismalest possible Latin. Our English deists gave them their first lessons in rationalistic theology, and Glanville, Berkeley and Hume, and the English Platonists, antedated them in idealism and sceptical metaphysics. What was a mere episode in the movement of the English mind, the Germans took up, made articles of their faith, and worked to their most absurd results, with a patience marvellous to contemplate.

In our own country there has been a passing phase of idealism in and around Boston. The transcendental movement, as it was called, had subjective idealism as its philosophical basis, but it was manifested less in its fundamental statements and principles, than in its results. For a time idealism became a contagious disease. Young gentlemen in college, when injudiciously exposed to infection, took it as children take chicken pox and measles. They read Emerson's essays as they were printed, and hailed each as the advent of a new gospel. They had spasms of introspection; they transcended the vulgar inductive science of their text-books, by the "insight of pure reason." They wore long hair; they followed the "method of nature"; they wandered off to Brook Farm, and blistered their hands with transcendental hoes, in raising transcendental beans and potatoes. Even young ladies became infected by idealistic metaphysics. They studied Fichte, Jacob Behmen and Spinoza, with a diligence which was amazing. They wrote for the *Dial*. They uttered oracles, with Boston rocking-chairs for tripods. They gave their beautiful faces all "the contortions of the sybil," if they failed to compass "her inspiration." Gradually these young prophets of idealism yielded to the necessity of getting a living by vulgar and material pursuits. The prophetesses, at least all who were not old and ugly, lost their ethereal attributes. The "absolute ego" reduplicated itself in matrimony, and boys and girls of appreciable solidity and extension, slowly gathered around them. Their idealism, like the carbonic acid gas of the chemist, became solidified by the pressure of common impulses and common necessities.

Mr. Emerson, by his genius, culture, and persistent adherence to idealistic modes of thought, has won the position of the patriarch of this movement. With a skill which cannot be too much admired, he has contrived to exempt from the "universe-ego" the finite relations of dollars and cents, and to coin the thinnest and vaguest abstractions of pantheistic idealism into solid property, clearly cognizable by the senses, and owing its value to certain quantifications and qualifications of earth, air and water. Mr. Emerson is a man of genius

and a poet. He is not, in any possible sense of the term, a philosopher. His brilliant jets of thought, though rarely sound or coherent, are often incarnated in sentences and illustrations, of surpassing point and beauty. Apparently attracted to idealistic pantheism by a mental sympathy with its processes, and a moral sympathy with its results, he finds it pertinent to the uses of the poet and the essayist. To those not familiar with his range of reading, it gives an air of originality to his productions, to which they owe as much of their popularity, as to the undoubted genius and culture of the writer. The finest phrase-maker in America, his sentences touch each other without any appreciable relation. He throws around a somewhat narrow range of ideas, such a glow of many-hued coloring from his pregnant fancy, that we almost fail to recognize in each new work, old thoughts which have done service, under various disguises and aliases, in every volume he has written. Phrase-making is not a profession conducive to the development of truth; and Mr. Emerson seems often to write as if utterly indifferent to the radical truth or falsehood of what he says, provided it admits of being moulded into forms which will

"haunt, startle and waylay"

his reader or hearer.

Asking pardon of our readers for this digression from one school of idealism to another, we will specify a few of the distinctive peculiarities of "*The Principles of Human Knowledge*."

In stating Berkeley's argument for his system, we have had reference, mainly, to those general considerations which he held in common with other writers adopting similar views. Arthur Collier, an Arian clergymen of the English Church, author of the "*Clavis Universalis*" (a system of idealism), together with Norris, the author of the "*Ideal World*," was a contemporary of our author. Collier's tract is a piece of dialectic, cold, hard and dry, imbued with an utter contempt of the common beliefs of mankind. In closeness of reasoning, he is fully equal to Berkeley; but in learning and philosoph-

ical genius, he cannot be compared with him. The conclusions of Berkeley and Collier seem to have been arrived at, in entire independence of each other. Norris was a Platonist, so far as a Christian writer can well be one. His point of view was quite distinct from that of Berkeley or Collier. We know of no more satisfactory exhibition of what may be called Christian Platonism, than is furnished by the "*Ideal World*." The almost forgotten work of Culverwell, has lately been republished in England. A new issue of "*The Ideal World*," adequately annotated, would be hailed with interest by metaphysical scholars, as the old editions are both scarce and dear. With these passing remarks on the two men most commonly mentioned in connection with our author, we will, as we have proposed, glance by way of summary, at a few of the points which are peculiar to Berkeley's advocacy of idealism.

1. While he represents his ideas as in a sense objective to the human mind, he is very careful to deny the possibility of the existence of an idea, apart from some intelligence which thinks it. When arguing this point, he would seem almost as thorough a subjectivist as Fichte. But his intense convictions as a Christian Theist, preserved him from the absurdities of egoistical idealism. His ideas were the thoughts of God immediately impressed on the mind of man, and all intermediate agency or existence was emphatically denied. The objectivity of his ideas to the percipient mind, depended upon the objective existence of the Almighty, relatively to the human minds which he had created. This statement is necessary in order to understand and account for, the energy with which he addresses himself to the overthrow of the remnant of middle age realism, which, originated by Plato, had even retained a partial empire over the hard and clear-sighted mind of Locke. If genera and species, and abstract ideas generally, had an existence apart from the sign or word, which connotes and represents their appropriate particulars in the thought consciously present in the mind, a world of ideal forms must be admitted to exist, apart from the thoughts of God on the one hand, or of man on the other. It is true that late critics have denied to Locke all sympathy with realistic notions, but it is

certain that Berkeley did not so understand him. Let this be as it may, while a fragment of the old realism was admitted, it was clear that a logical universality could not be vindicated to the system which Berkeley so ardently adopted. It is difficult to conceive a more exhaustive discussion than is contained in the section of "*The Principles of Human Knowledge*," devoted to the overthrow of realism.

If any man can retain a remnant of the old notion, that apart from the mind of God, there is in time or space any thing which stands behind the words *man* or *tree*, beyond the individual attributes which are collected in the terms, by the act of the mind in thinking; after reading Berkeley's polemic, he should be purged with hellebore, and turned over to the tender mercies of Abelard and Occam. That this discussion was necessary, is proved by the confusion which to this day is spread over almost every modern work on Psychology; by the use of such terms as essence, substance, quality, phenomenon, etc., without discriminating their singular from their general significations. Even Sir William Hamilton's acuteness and learning, have hardly saved him from falling into this vulgar error.

2. The second noteworthy point of Berkeley's treatise, is the sharpness with which he points out the fact, that every intuition of sense in perception, is *singular* in the logical sense of the term — the "*singulare quid*," of the schoolmen. He defended this view as the basis of his belief, that the mind at once, and with no intervention of a vicarious intermediate *tertium quid*, comes immediately into relation with all the outward world which really exists. Not Hamilton nor McCosh, is more completely a natural realist, in the sense explained, than Berkeley. The reigning Psychology proposed to belief two distinct external worlds — one of images, qualities or species, the other of "matter in itself," or *substance*, whose existence was inferred or postulated, merely to save the fugitive qualities or ideas from intellectual orphanage. Berkeley chose to accept that world which came into relation to his mind, which he was permitted to see, hear, and handle. If he had recognized that deliverance of consciousness, which affirms the non-ego given in perception to be a real thing, objectively existing,

and not a mere deceptive modification of the mind, he would have been at one with the school of Hamilton, and a natural realist in the full sense of the term.

3. From what had been said, it will be seen in the third place, that he denied the legitimacy of the analysis which separates the world of qualities, from the world of actual existence. Though he failed in seizing the exact import of the facts of consciousness, he made by this denial, an important movement in the direction of truth. Had he seen the fact too simple and obvious perhaps to be easily grasped, that objective qualities or phenomena, in perception, are nothing but real material substances in present relation to the knowing mind, he would have proved a reformer in philosophy, whose services would have been scarcely inferior to those rendered by Newton in the domain of physics.

4. In the fourth place he stated and illustrated the great truth too much overlooked or denied by all the Scottish and German schools, that our knowledge of *self*, or that in us which knows, and wills, and thinks, is immediate and intuitive. Although we know ourselves always, as in this or that state, or exerting this or that faculty, and in relation to this or that object of thought, it by no means follows that our knowledge of self is mediate and indirect. It is the self or mind, in such or such a state or condition or relation, which we actually know. In perception of external objects, we are conscious of the self and the not-self in the same indivisible activity of the soul. All knowledge is of a relation between these two opposite modes of being. As the knowledge of relatives is always one, this intuitive consciousness of the self, and not-self, is the necessary root of all knowledge. Had Berkeley recognized the fact that the not-self in perception is not, as he supposed, an affirmation of the presence of an entity either the *same* as itself—a mental mode only—or one *similar* to itself, a spiritual modality of the divine mind; anticipating Reid and Hamilton, he would have struck upon the great fundamental formula of knowledge in consciousness, which, like the law of gravitation, so long eluded the grasp of the most comprehensive minds.

Too long for the patience of our readers, we have kept them breathing this "difficult air" of speculation, and we hasten to conclude by a few words upon another branch of scientific inquiry, in which Berkeley made his mark. We refer to his "*Analyst*," and his "*Defence of Free Thinking in Mathematics*." The occasion of these works was, briefly, this: Sir Samuel Garth, a celebrated physician (better known, however, as a translator of Ovid), while ill of a mortal disease, was visited by Addison. He urged upon Garth the importance of attending to the subject of personal religion. Garth evaded the subject with the following remark: "Surely, Addison, I have good reason for not believing in these trifles, since my friend Dr. Halley, who has dealt so much in demonstration, has assured me that the doctrines of Christianity are incomprehensible, and the religion itself an imposture." Addison related the conversation to Berkeley, who at once resolved to turn the tables upon Halley, by assailing him on his own ground. The result was the "*Analyst*." It was an attack on the doctrine of Fluxions, as set forth by Newton, and of the similar method of investigation which, invented by Leibnitz, was in use on the Continent under the name of Differential and Integral Calculus. His main illustrations, however, are drawn from the Geometrical or Newtonian method, which, under the appellation of Fluxions, was then most used by the English Mathematicians. It is, in reality, a piece of exceedingly grim humor. For Berkeley, himself a profound mathematician, did not intend to weaken our faith in the practical results, which had been reached by analytical methods, but simply to point out, and turn upon a knot of sceptical mathematicians, the metaphysical, mathematical and logical absurdities, which lie at the basis of the method of infinitesimal analysis. He very soon and very easily proved, that not Paul's Epistles, nor Calvin's Institute, had put forth more problems hard to be understood, or difficult to believe, than were contained in the creed of every mathematician. Berkeley's *jeu d'esprit*, was a triumph. The solemn earnestness (worthy of Swift) with which he sought for the "ghosts of departed quantities," and vexed the mathematicians with his

puzzling questions, regarding the exact process in which, by constant division, they passed from finite to the infinitely small, and by constant reduplication of finite quantities, they reached the infinitely great, furnishes to the intelligent reader amusement such as mathematics has seldom evolved. Although all the principal laws of astronomy and general physics owe their verification and application to the Calculus, yet the method itself cannot be subjected to a rigid demonstration. The proof of the correctness of this powerful instrument is inductive only. Notwithstanding all that has been written to furnish demonstrations of the fundamental principles of the Calculus, the total result has been failure. Assumptions lie at the foundation of the method, which recognize that a part is equal to the whole — that an infinitely small quantity emerges when we divide into two parts, the finite quantity which has the smallest assignable value — that when a finite quantity has been raised to the highest assignable value, a finite quantity being added thereto makes it infinitely large. Take, for illustration, the method of obtaining the square contents of a portion of the surface included in a parabolic curve. The assumption is, that the contents are made up of an infinite series of parallelograms, each of which has one side a finite quantity, and the other side " dx ," or an infinitely small quantity. Let this finite side be multiplied by the infinitely small side, and we have the square contents of one of these parallelograms. This is called the differential element of the contents of the curve to be measured. This when summed up or or integrated gives the contents required. Now this " dx ," the infinitely small side of the parallelogram, is either zero, it is not. If it is zero, then the integration or summing up of the contents of the curve is zero also. If it is not zero, then it follows that our result is incorrect. But even if we admit the correctness of the result thus obtained, there is another difficulty still. One end of this differential parallelogram which has been assumed, is bounded by a line which is never at right angles with the base; and is, moreover, an arc of a constantly varying curve. In thus assuming this elementary figure to be rectangular, at the end which touches the curve,

we have theoretically *thrown out* from our estimate of the square contents of the portion of the parabola taken for measure, what by our first assumption, is an infinite number of very small plane triangular surfaces, two sides of which are right lines, and one side a portion of the curved side of the original figure — or we have *increased* the actual surface included, by an equal number of triangular surfaces lying on the outside of the curve. One or the other of these two suggested results must be admitted, as we suppose ourselves to have assumed in our differential expression, the longer or the shorter side of the elementary parallelogram. These theoretical absurdities might be accumulated to any extent. They do not essentially differ from the difficulties which puzzle the school boy who goes through the method to which geometers are compelled to resort in reaching the approximate square of the circle.

In general, we may say that all the absurd results which emerge in quantitative calculations, arise from the impotency of the finite mind when it attempts to bring the infinitely small, or the infinitely complex, or the infinitely great, sharply within the compass of definitions, and subject them to finite relations. In all questions of quantity and degree, it would seem that the limits of the thinkable, in the logical sense of the terms, lie, not so really between the so-called absolute and infinite, as between the infinitely great and the infinitely small. This principle is beautifully illustrated in the Differential and Integral Calculus. The elements which furnish these illustrations, lie on every page of the "*Analyst*." Berkeley did not for an instant undervalue that marvellous analysis which is, by way of eminence, the key to the higher physical sciences. Let a man once have an experience, however limited, of its wonderful power as an instrument of investigation, and he will pardon metaphysical absurdities, and become anew impressed with the strength, as well as the weakness, of the human mind. Berkeley gained his point, which was to illustrate the truth that Mathematics as well as Theology, has insoluble problems. He might have gone further, and showed how every branch of human knowledge,

when profoundly studied, will evolve questions which, from the multitude of elements entering into their solution, become so complex as to mock the powers of the human understanding. The whole discussion is a commentary on the remark of Hamilton, that no problem arises in Theology which has not previously emerged in Philosophy. Ninety-nine out of a hundred of the difficulties in Theology, which affect sceptically inclined persons, have their origin in illegitimate speculation, and are directly or indirectly the result of abortive attempts to transcend the boundaries of the knowable. The moral of these almost forgotten tracts of Berkeley will never cease to be applicable, and instructive. Many a young sceptic (provided he could understand it) might read the *Analyst*, and find in its mingled metaphysical and mathematical humor, "the mirror held up" to his own "nature."

We omit, though not willingly, any extended allusion to the other and less distinguished works of the good Bishop. His "*Queries for the good of Ireland*," so full of pithy good sense, sound economical principles and comprehensive thinking, containing perhaps "more hints than original, and still unapplied, in legislation and political economy, than are to be found in any other equal space" * — his "*Discourse on Passive Obedience*" — his sermon before the "Society for Propagating the Gospel" — the Utopian romance (generally attributed to his pen), containing the *Adventures of Signor Gaudenzio di Lucca* — his tract on Motion — each would justify notice from a reviewer, and the attention of the thoughtful reader. But we have exceeded our limits and must close.

Mackintosh's Miscellaneous Works, p. 63.

ARTICLE VIII.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGY AND RELIGION.

THE CHRISTIAN ELEMENT IN PLATO.*—A work that for twenty-five years has kept its place in Germany as the best on the subject of which it treats, must have substantial merits. It is not because zeal in the study of Plato is abating among German scholars, that this supremacy has been held. Only within the past year, while this translation of Ackermann was passing through the press, there was published in Berlin a new and able work on Plato's System of Education as connected with his conception of the Personality of Spirit. Though fruitfully suggestive of many points of dissimilarity and agreement between Platonic and Christian Ethics, and actually discussing a few questions identical with those of Ackermann, its scope differs widely from his.

It must not, however, be supposed that Ackermann's aim is to exhibit the *theological* affinities of Platonism and Christianity. This is specially disavowed by him. He dwells rather on Plato's consciousness of *salvation* needed, believed in, hoped for, and striven after, and shows how this is akin to the inward striving and longing of the Christian. "*The Christian element in Plato presents itself, in the conception of a saving purpose.*" "The essence of Christianity consists in *saving power*, that of Platonism, in *saving purpose.*" "The most Christian element, not in his philosophy, but in himself, in his heart, is *faith in the coming of salvation*, for which he wished to prepare the way by his philosophy." "He felt in his soul the presence of Christ in history." His moral aspirations and ethical spirit, infused an element into his philosophy that may be called Christian. It is this element that has made the study of his philosophy to so many minds, a preparation for the reception of Christianity.

* *The Christian Element in Plato and the Platonic Philosophy, unfolded and set forth.* By Dr. B. C. ACKERMANN, Archdeacon at Jena. Translated from the German, by SAMUEL RALPH ASHBURY, B. A. With an introductory note by WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D. D., Brown professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1861.

Ackermann divides his work into two parts. The first deals with the subject empirically, shewing by passages quoted from Plato and the Scriptures, a similarity of sentiment. The second deals with it genetically, tracing the causal connection of these sentiments in Platonism, with the consciousness and convictions of Plato, out of which they sprung. The whole treatise is strongly marked with the peculiarities of thought prevalent in Germany when it was written. It conceives of Christianity as a power of life separable from its doctrines, and affirms that the writings of the heathen ancients "contain not only almost all the moral doctrines and sublime sayings which the Gospel has given us, but many of those are even more sharply conceived and beautifully presented in the former than in the latter." But the grand difference between Christianity and the best ancient philosophy, is in the divine life which Christianity originated and perpetuates. "Plato could indeed *aim* at the salvation of life, but he could not *effect* it."

It is no part of our present purpose to enter on a criticism of the scope or special statements of this volume. It would be instructive to inquire how far and by what means the old established office of Plato as a guide of noble minds to a hearty reception of Christianity, has been transformed into that of a subtle decoy to a scepticism that blights all it touches. It would be profitable also, to determine the relation to this change, of such works as Ackermann's, and the one above referred to, published last year at Berlin. We hope to present our readers, before many months, with an article devoted to the inquiries now suggested.

DR. BUSHNELL'S CHRISTIAN NURTURE.*—It is now thirteen years since the two famous discourses on "Christian Nurture" were first published. The theory they embodied has not lain idle meanwhile in the author's mind. It has so strengthened itself in his convictions, and absorbed the results of his reading and reflection, that instead of two discourses, we now have a generous duodecimo volume of four hundred pages. The first half of the discourse treats of the Doctrine of Christian Nurture; the second, of the Mode in which it is to be put in practice.

It is the theory of Dr. Bushnell, "*that the child is to grow up a Christian, and never know himself as being otherwise.*" The theory rests on what the author calls "something like a law of organic con-

* *Christian Nurture.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York. Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1861.

nection, as regards character, subsisting between parent and child. Such a connection as makes it easy to believe, and natural to expect, that the faith of the one will be propagated in the other." This supposed "law of organic connection," is fundamental to the discussion. The whole treatise rests on it. The present volume differs from the two discourses first published, as respects the treatment of the doctrine, only by an elaboration of the defence and illustration of this law. Animal physiology, rational life, the family, the church, original sin, are all made to contribute to its support. Animals are tamed into the propagation of a predisposition to be domesticated, national traits are organically perpetuated, family endowments and qualities are transmitted, denominational or church types of piety are inbred, human depravity is hereditary, and in like manner piety may be so *bred in* that "the inhabiting grace of a supernatural salvation" may "become, in some sense, an inbred quality." What he calls "the populating force of faith and piety," may, by a proper attention to this *law of organic connection*, become so effectual that "those sporadic cases of sanctification from the womb, of which the Scripture speaks, such as that of Samuel, Jeremiah, and John, are to finally become the ordinary and common fact of family development."

It would be injustice to the author not to say, that he endeavors to defend himself against the charge of ignoring the work of the Spirit in regeneration. It would be equally unjust to him not to say, that his account of the matter seems to us inadequate, unphilosophical, unscriptural, and unintelligible. His explanation is as follows : "Nor let any one be diverted from the truth I am asserting, by imagining that a propagated piety is, of course, a piety without regeneration, dispensing with what Christ himself declared to be the indispensable need of every human creature. For aught that appears, regeneration may, in some initial and profoundly real sense, be the twin element of propagation itself. The parentage may, in other words, be so thoroughly wrought in by the spirit of God, as to communicate the seeds or incipiences of of a godly, just as it communicates the seeds of a depraved and disordered character. In one view, the child will be regenerated when he is born ; in another view, he will not be till the godly life is developed in his own personal choice and liberty."

He makes an amusing disposal of the objection. that the children of Christian parents are often very far from becoming the saints that on his theory they always ought to be. The failure is attributed to a want of loveable piety in the parents, and to their defective views of the

early training of children. That is, the "law of organic connection" depends for its operation, not on the genuineness of the parents' piety, but on the type of their piety, and their tact in family government. The law of grace is overruled by the law of nature.

The real aim of this treatise is to furnish a more substantial basis for infant baptism, than the one on which that rite is now commonly made to rest. Dr. Bushnell believes that the "sense of the rite is wholly gone" from it, as it is ordinarily understood and defended. The theory of individual regeneration through personal faith, he evidently regards as fatal to its continuance. He even looks upon "baptismal regeneration" as "only a less hurtful error than some hold in denying it." The true view, he insists, is that "the regeneration by baptism is not actual, but only presumptive, and everything depends upon the organic law of character pertaining between the parent and the child, and the church and the child." That is, the baptism *may* regenerate the child, if the parent and the church, shall take care that the "organic law" be not inoperative through their neglect.

The author loses no opportunity, throughout the volume, to express his disgust with the "over intense individualism," which expects every Christian to be made such through his personal faith. He cites in support of his theory, and with evident approbation, the "European Churches," where "Christian piety is regarded more as a habit of life, formed under the training of childhood, and less as a marked spiritual change in experience," than is common in this country. It is not quite apparent how the author, with his theory logically carried out, could stop short of the "multitudinist" principle of a national church.

We need not say that Dr. Bushnell always writes with a certain freshness and vigor, that make him one of the most agreeable of authors. He has strong convictions, and knows how to express them forcibly and winningly. He is also, generally, one of the fairest of controversialists, though we regret to be obliged to instance an apparent want of candor. Thus he tells us, "The Baptist premises that the child will not grow up a believer, and, therefore, declares infant baptism to be inappropriate. God presumes that he will, and therefore, appoints it." The substitution of God for Pedobaptist in this last sentence, is not only a gross begging of the question, but is a clap-trap way of taking unthinking readers, into which so high minded a writer as Dr. Bushnell should not have fallen. So also, when he says that his "Baptist brethren never rebaptize" those who suppose themselves to have become true believers subsequently to their baptism, "notwithstanding all they say of faith as

the necessary condition of baptism ;" he should know that Baptists administer baptism to those only who are supposed to make an honest profession of faith ; and should any one suppose his faith not to have been genuine till after his baptism, they would not readminister the rite, because its validity depended simply on the design and understanding with which it was received. But Baptists would readminister the rite to every one who had received it on false pretences, or to whom it had been *involuntarily* administered.

We hope that Baptists will read Dr. Bushnell on Christian Nurture. It will prompt them to a more faithful discharge of parental duties, and ground them more firmly on the doctrine of believer's baptism.

— DR. ADAMS'S EVENINGS WITH THE DOCTRINES.*—When Dr. Holmes was taken to task for certain flippant criticisms in Theology, and it was suggested that possibly his previous studies had not fitted him in the most eminent degree for the task he had assumed, his witty reply was, that a man who had listened for twenty years to an average of fifty lectures a year on topics of theology, ought to be able to think and speak understandingly of the subjects discussed. But the answer was not in point; it involved a false assumption. It took for granted that he had listened, on Sunday, to doctrinal discussions instead of ethical essays. The truth doubtless was, that the listening to a just and intelligent treatment of the doctrines assailed by him had been one of the rarest events in his later life.

Dr. Adams has done a much needed work, in this popular re-statement of the doctrines of Evangelical Christianity. It was needed both by his Unitarian neighbors and by many of his Trinitarian associates. The delivering of the discourses on week-day evenings gave an opportunity, which we hope was well improved, for others than members of his own congregation to hear them. Would that thousands more might now read them.

The discourses are written in the very best spirit, but with a clearness and emphasis that leave no one in doubt of the author's meaning. He has not controverted the errors of his neighbors and brethren, but simply stated what he conceives to be the truth. The orthodoxy of his statements will hardly be questioned, if judged by the old standards, though the truth of his positions will doubtless be warmly disputed by the advocates of orthodoxy improved.

* *Evenings with the Doctrines.* By NEHEMIAH ADAMS, D. D., author of "Friends of Christ," "Christ a Friend," "Communion Sabbath," etc., etc. Boston. Gould & Lincoln. 1861.

Dr. Adams believes and teaches that, "as a consequence of Adam's sin, the nature of every man is in a fallen condition, averse to the moral character of God; and its first moral acts will inevitably be wrong. Every infant, therefore, has a nature as really apostate from God, as the nature of Adam was upon his fall." "Every human being is by nature averse to the moral character of God." "There is entire depravation in man, as to his natural feelings toward God."

Of the atonement, Dr. Adams says emphatically, "its object is *to satisfy Divine justice*. Let no human philosophy make us lose sight of this essential object of the Saviour's death." "We cannot view the Scriptural representations of the sufferings and death of Christ too literally; indeed, Jesus Christ is more literally and more fully a substitution for the sinner than a victim could ever be; so that, instead of feeling jealous of ourselves lest we strain the emblem and push the type too far, we ought rather to fear lest we withhold somewhat from a perfect acceptance of Christ as, in all respects, dying for us, redeeming us by his blood."

So, also, the doctrines of election, of sovereign grace in regeneration, and of eternal retribution, are stated explicitly and defended with judgment. We know of no recent volume treating of the doctrines, which we can more heartily commend than this of Dr. Adams. We hope for it a *wide* circulation in the region for which it has manifestly been written.

MÜLLER'S LIFE OF TRUST.*—An isolated truth clearly apprehended and firmly carried into practice, often works most surprising results. If carried into practice by a single, well-balanced mind, and amid just sufficient resistance to keep from fanaticism, the results will, ordinarily, be healthful as well as surprising. The results of Mr. Müller's attempt to shew to this generation the power of prayer, or to prove what could be done by simple "*trust in the living God*," are marvellous, whether we regard the amount of funds brought into his hands for benevolent purposes, or the means by which we are told the funds were obtained.

Mr. Müller, a German by birth and education, became the pastor of an English Church at Teignmouth, England. Soon after his settlement, he scrupled to receive a stated salary, and was supported by vol-

* *The Life of Trust: being a narrative of the Lord's Dealings with George Muller, written by himself. Edited and condensed by Rev. H. LINCOLN WAYLAND, Pastor of Third Baptist Church, Worcester, Mass. With an introduction by FRANCIS WAYLAND. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1861.*

untary contributions. His plan was to "tell the Lord *only* about his wants." Removed, after two years, to Bristol, he continued the same life of trust in God for daily bread; in 1834, he originated a new Missionary Society, called the Scriptural Knowledge Institution; and in 1835, undertook the work by which he is chiefly known, the founding of the Orphan Houses.

Mr. Müller's prime motive in providing for the orphans, was to furnish "a visible proof that our God and Father is the same faithful God that he ever was — as willing as ever to PROVE himself the LIVING God, in our day as formerly, *to all who put their trust in him.*" He believed that Christians "needed something which could be seen, even by the natural eye." The sight of Franke's Orphan House had strengthened his own soul; he wished to do for others what Franke had done for him. To accomplish his purpose, he conceived it necessary that the orphans should be provided for solely by faith and prayer; *no individual must ever be asked*, by himself or his assistants, to contribute to the object. The result is, that two large stone buildings have been erected by prayer; seven hundred orphans, now occupying these buildings, are supported solely by prayer; a third building, that will accommodate four hundred and fifty more, is also now going up by prayer. Within twenty-five years past *nearly one million of dollars*, for orphans and other benevolent objects, have been brought into his hands solely by prayer. Several times he sums up the receipts to a given date, stating that so much had been given "*entirely as the result of prayer to God, without any one having been asked for anything by us.*"

All this seems very marvellous — approaches, in fact to the miraculous. But it is only too apparent, that very many of Mr. Müller's supposed special answers to prayer, are the natural result of second causes, which he had himself set in operation. It is solemn trifling to talk of waking up at a given hour of the morning in answer to prayer, and of praying one's baggage rapidly through the custom house. And it seems like self-delusion to find Mr. Müller recording that "just as he was going to pray," or "the instant he got up from his knees," or "one hour," or "just fifteen minutes after" he had prayed, he received in answer to prayer, moneys which had been despatched to him days and weeks, perhaps months, before the prayer, from persons who had been prompted to help him by reading some one of the "Narratives" out of which this volume has been compiled. The truth is, Mr. Müller's orphan houses have been built, and the orphans provided for, by a subtle, persistent, painstaking and religious use of second causes. His error is in

attributing *exclusively* to Divine interposition what, to no small extent, is attributable to a legitimate use of means.

The relation of human agency to Divine sovereignty, of reason to faith, of Science to Revelation, is the old and ever recurring question. No one will ever be able to trace the shadowy line of separation and contact. But every one should beware not to forget its existence. The tendency of this generation, doubtless, is to over-estimate the human side of that line, and rely by far too much on science and second causes; but that Mr. Müller, to an extent that is both unscriptural and dangerous, over-estimates the Divine side, can hardly be doubted. If it is the duty of one Christian minister to live *such* a life of trust as Mr. Müller does, receiving no stated salary, and refusing all provision for his household, then why not the duty of all ministers? And if of all ministers, then why not of all laymen? Why not conduct all religious enterprises as Mr. Müller does his? And if all religious enterprises should be so conducted, how long would it be before the Church would reach the suicide of fanaticism? Rationalism kills like a polar wind, but fanaticism destroys like the simoon of the desert. Heaven defend us alike from the one and the other.

The task of the editor has been a difficult one, and has been performed with judgment and good taste. We could wish the venerable writer of the Introduction to the volume, had stated the cautions and "limitations" required alike by Scripture and reason, in the application of Mr. Müller's theory. They were omitted, perhaps, as superfluous in this unbelieving age. We advise everybody to read the volume. It will quicken the spiritual life, and if read in the light of all Scripture, lead to a more constant and a devouter daily trust in the living God.

ALEXANDER'S THOUGHTS ON PREACHING.*—It would be unjust to Dr. J. W. Alexander to name him as one of the ablest of American divines; and equally unjust not to name him as one of the most scholarly and devout of American pastors. He had too good a memory to become a great theologian, and was too long a teacher to become a great preacher. His native endowments were sufficient to to have made him eminent in theology or in eloquence; his great attainments and untiring industry, pervaded as they were by a

* *Thoughts on Preaching; being Contributions to Homiletics.* By J. W. ALEXANDER, D. D. New York. Charles Scribner. 1861.

fervent piety, gave him a rare eminence and influence. More than almost any man of his generation, he approached the standard of a *model pastor*. Many of his contemporaries have excelled him in eloquence, or outshone him in rhetorical brilliancy and power; others have equalled him in piety; there have not been wholly wanting those who have been his compeers in breadth and accuracy of learning, but rare indeed have been those who, combining his gifts and acquirements, have been able to consecrate them to the work of a Christian pastor with the same degree of fidelity and efficiency.

It was the cherished purpose of Dr. Alexander to write, at some time, a volume on Homiletics, and to this end, it was his habit to insert in his journal any pertinent thoughts that might occur to him. He had, also, at various times, written articles for the Princeton Review, on the Pulpit and Preaching, and for the Presbyterian, a series of Letters to Young Ministers. A surviving brother has collected the scattered thoughts from the Journal, and, with the Articles and Letters, has compiled an instructive volume. We have rarely ever looked into a book, in which there were so many suggestions about preaching that accorded with the teachings of our own experience. We ought also to add, that we have rarely ever looked into a book in which there were other suggestions more opposed to our convictions.

Dr. Alexander was, to a remarkable degree, a double man. What he was by nature and what by education, were singularly distinguishable. The J. W. Alexander of the schools, never became wholly identified with the J. W. Alexander, son of Archibald Alexander. The schools had made him methodical, artificial and cold; his inherited nature sought free utterance of its convictions and emotions, and perpetually struggled against the trammels of education. It was a consciousness of this dual existence which made him express himself so frequently and earnestly in these Thoughts, against a practice he had followed of forming a plan of his sermon before sitting down to write it. With the emphasis of italics he exclaims, "*In writing or speaking, throw off all restraint.*" And again he says, "I sometimes think I never acted out my inner man in a sermon. The nearest approach has been extempore."

Every page of these "Thoughts" reveals the sincerity and fervor of Dr. Alexander's piety, and the growing earnestness of his life. The volume is full of useful hints to Christian pastors and students of theology.

HUDSON ON HUMAN DESTINY.*—The elaborate and learned work of Mr. Hudson, entitled "*Debt and Grace*," and supporting the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked, will have prepared the public for a careful reading of his arguments against Universalism. He supposes his position to be a more favorable one than that of the orthodox for assailing the Universalist error; though attended with the "disadvantage" of being a "half way house," in which neither party will expect him to "abide."

What is here given us is only a part (the "affirmative argument," as it is called) of a newspaper controversy with the Rev. Sylvanus Cobb. The "argument," however, is so managed as to be directed quite as much to the support of the author's theory of Annihilation as against Universalism. So much of his strength is expended on his premises, that he becomes feeble before reaching his conclusions. Some of the chapters read more like an apology for Annihilation than a critique on Universalism. It seems to us an unaccountable and inexcusable omission, in enumerating the occasions or causes of Universalism, to make no mention of moral causes, which are incomparably the most common and most efficient of all.

DR. MURRAY'S DYING LEGACY.†—Few pastors in this country have been more widely or more favorably known than Dr. Murray. Brought prominently into notice by his racy letters to Archbishop Hughes, whatever has since come from his pen has been attentively read. To an unusual degree, his genial and catholic spirit, his sound sense and healthful, earnest piety, had won for him the regard of all denominations. All mourned at the recent announcement of his sudden death.

Dr. Murray was always industrious. Never profound nor subtle, rarely if ever rising into what could be called true eloquence, he was yet always clear, simple and natural in his thoughts. These four sermons, in themselves considered, have but very little to entitle them to publication, but having been recently written and not delivered, he referred to them in his last moments, and "committed the delivery to other hands, as *his dying legacy to his people*." It is a singular fact that the last

* *Human Destiny. A Critique on Universalism.* By C. F. HUDSON, author of "*Debt and Grace, as related to the Doctrine of a Future Life*." Boston and Cambridge: James Munroe & Co. 1861.

† *Dying Legacy to the People of his Beloved Charge*, by NICHOLAS MURRAY, D. D., February 4th. 1861. *Things Unseen and Eternal.* New York: Harper & Brother, Franklin Square. 1861.

sermon was written on The Intermediate State, and the next that was to have been written, the text only of which had been inscribed, was on the Resurrection.

DR. BUSHNELL ON THE CHARACTER OF JESUS,* is a republication of the tenth chapter of "*Nature and the Supernatural*." It was perhaps the most effective chapter in the discussion of which it was originally a part. Complete in itself, it will not be less serviceable in its detached form. It is allied, by its scope and method, to Young's "Christ of History," rather than to Ullmann's "Sinlessness of Christ." A good book for the sceptically inclined.

BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION.

EBRARD'S COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLES OF JOHN.†—Dr. Ebrard is already well known in this country, as the continuator of the Biblical Commentary of Olshausen. He adds the present volume to that work. More direct and spirited as a commentator than Olshausen, he is yet less exact and concise than Meyer. He almost never wavers, is sometimes a little too positive, but always in earnest. Connected with the Reformed Church, his doctrinal sympathies are Calvinistic rather than Lutheran.

The volume is prefaced with an essay on the Apostle John and his writings, the purpose of which is to show that the life of the Apostle and the Gospel and First Epistle ascribed to him, form an organic and harmonious unity. The second and third Epistles are attributed to John the Presbyter, though held to be canonical; the second, being addressed to a Christian woman named Kyria. A translation of each epistle is given at the end of the exposition. The work concludes with an appendix, inquiring into the use of the word "catholic," which is prefixed to several epistles in the New Testament, maintaining that it means "encyclical," and does not denote either canonicity or plurality of authorship.

The present volume makes the eighth in the third series of Clarke's

* *The Character of Jesus : forbidding his possible classification with men.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York : Charles Scribner. 1861.

† *Biblical Commentary on the Epistles of John in continuation of the work of Olshausen. With an Appendix on the Catholic Epistles, and an Introductory Essay on the Life and Writings of John.* By Dr. JOHN H. A. EBRARD. Translated by Rev. W. B. POPE, Manchester. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark.

Evangelical Library. It is for sale by Smith, English & Co., of Philadelphia.

DR. ALEXANDER'S NOTES ON NEW TESTAMENT LITERATURE, ETC.*—It is understood that the Lectures of Dr. J. A. Alexander were always listened to with profound interest by his pupils. His reputation for learning was extraordinary. His enthusiasm and industry in investigation continued unabated to the end. From Biblical Literature and textual Interpretation, to which he had given his best days, he could turn with zest to the investigations of Ecclesiastical History. It was his cherished purpose to write out for publication his lectures in both these departments. Delayed by accumulating materials, and occupied with his New Testament Commentaries, death surprised him amid his labors. The hand of a surviving brother, gathering up the fragmentary notes from which he had lectured, has comprised them in a single volume, being all that the lamented author left in a condition fit for publication.

Most readers will be surprised at the meagre traces of learning in these Notes, and, while gratefully recognizing the genial spirit and freedom from common place with they are written, will marvel that they contain so little that is really new or valuable. There is also abundant reason for questioning the method and classification of topics in the Lectures on Ecclesiastical History. It would be difficult to state the principle that determines their arrangement. We, nevertheless, are glad to see the Notes in print, and are confident they will prove not only acceptable to those who listened to the author's lectures, but profitable to those now engaged upon the questions discussed in them.

DR. CONANT'S REVISION OF MATTHEW.†—We have already expressed so clearly in formal articles, our high appreciation of Dr. Conant's labors on Matthew, and have indicated so fully the points of our dissent from his version, that nothing more is here needed than to refer to those articles, with the expression of a hope that the eminent services of the reviser will not be unappreciated by the public.

* *Notes on New Testament Literature and Ecclesiastical History.* By JOSEPH ADDISON ALEXANDER, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner. 1861.

† *The Gospel of Matthew. The Common English Version and the received Greek text, with a Revised Version, and Critical and Philological Notes, prepared for the American Bible Union.* By T. J. CONANT, D. D. New York: American Bible Union, 350 Broome street.

ALEXANDER'S MATTHEW.*—We receive this volume with mingled pleasure and regret. The hand by which it was executed will move no more. We read with solemn interest these words from the preface, by the editor: "This volume presents the last work on which the pen of Dr. Alexander was engaged." The work is unfinished. The analysis of all the chapters is complete, but the full commentary extends only to the close of chapter XVI.

Dr. Alexander brought to his explanation of Matthew the same fulness of information, the same scholarly culture, the same unhesitating orthodoxy, the same pure and wholesome style that marked his previous Commentaries. And the volume resulting from these combined qualities, will not be an unwelcome or useless addition to libraries, even the most richly furnished in Biblical Literature.

A distinguishing feature of this work is *the full and careful analysis* of the chapters of Matthew. This part of the volume evidently cost the author considerable labor, and it will amply reward special attention, particularly by ministers, who may wish to *expound* this gospel from the pulpit. We prize whatever may prompt and help such preaching, and therefore we commend Alexander on Matthew to the attention of ministers.

Another feature of this commentary strikes us very favorably. The Sacred records are accepted, generally, *as they read*, and are expounded accordingly. There is very rarely any appearance of an attempt at violent exegesis; an endeavor to find something in the language of Matthew other than what is naturally conveyed. There is, for the greater part, a striking, refreshing honesty in the explanations given. For example, on iv: 2, we read, "*And having fasted*, not in the attenuated sense of eating little, or abstaining from all ordinary food; but in the strict and proper sense of eating nothing." In this, and a hundred other examples, we are glad to see expositions that do not wrench Scripture from its plain reading.

Having said thus much, we must also say, that, in a few instances, Dr. A. seems to have departed, consciously or unconsciously, from the prevailing frankness and simplicity of his commentary. For example, on chap. iii: 6, we read, "Even admitting that the word *baptize* originally meant to dip or plunge, and that the first converts were in fact immersed—both of which are doubtful and disputed points—it no

* *The Gospel according to Matthew. Explained by* JOSEPH ADDISON ALEXANDER. New York. Charles Scribner. 1861.

more follows that this mode of washing was essential to the rite, than that every *elder* must be an old man, or that the Lord's *Supper* can be lawfully administered only in the evening." One can hardly suppress an expression of amazement, that writers of intelligence should so preposterously confound essentials with circumstantials. Perhaps it will not be deemed uncharitable for us to ask, Why it is that distinguished Pedobaptist authors in America do not write as frankly as do Pedobaptist authors of note in Britain and on the continent of Europe, in recognition of the ancient external baptism?

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

CORNELIUS'S HISTORY OF THE MÜNSTER INSURRECTION.*—It is remarkable that the most thorough and impartial history of the Anabaptists and the Münster Insurrection, should have been written by a Roman Catholic. But such is the fact. Protestants have been unable to escape from their mutual prejudices; the Catholic has succeeded in discovering and revealing the truth, if not always in kindling into sympathy as he has depicted it.

The first work published by the author, relating to the subject of this history, appeared in 1850, and was entitled "Concerning the sources which learned men have used in their Histories of the Münster Sedition" (*de fontibus quibus in Hist. seditionis Mon. viri docti usi sunt*). In 1855 appeared the first volume of the History to which we wish now especially to call attention. It begins with the manifestations of fanaticism in 1525, and ends with its triumph in the institution of a Theocratic government at Münster, in 1533. The intermediate chapters are occupied in tracing the causes and progress of fanatical views of civil and religious liberty, in different parts of Germany.

The second volume, which appeared last year, is devoted exclusively to Anabaptism, beginning with the "origin of Anabaptism," tracing it in various cities, and among the adherents of party leaders, and ending with the persecution of the "Melchiorites," on the first outbreak of which Jan Mathys directed his steps toward Münster, proclaiming to the Melchiorite Churches, that the Lord had selected Münster to be his chosen city, the New Jerusalem. Mathys began his journey towards Münster on the very month in which that city had been brought

* *Geschichte des Munsterischen Aufruhrs. In drei Buchen, von C. A. CORNELIUS. Erstes Buch. Die Reformation. Leipzig. 1855. Zweites Buch, Die Wiedertaufe. Leipzig, 1860.*

under the Theocratic rule; the two volumes thus ending with the same date, and with actors and events that converge to a common centre and result.

Each volume is accompanied with a very full Appendix, containing documents in verification of the truth of the narrative. The writer avows his wish to have it understood, that he has in no way aimed in the History to conceal the relation of his stand-point (Catholic) to the events narrated, and that whatever good may be done by his work, should be accounted the effect of all true history, and not set down to the merit of the historian. The volumes are worthy to be translated into English. We hope to give our readers an account of their contents at some future time.

PROF. SMITH'S EDITION OF HAGENBACH'S HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.*—A good text-book of the History of Doctrines is indispensable to the theological student, and invaluable to any one engaged in theological or historical inquiries. Theology must be studied historically, if studied intelligently, and Church History, to be intelligible or profitable, must take careful account of the doctrinal conceptions and controversies of successive periods. A growing attention to the History of Doctrines, is one of the most hopeful signs in our American theological training.

It is, therefore, a real and valuable service that has been performed by Dr. Smith, in the preparation of this new and greatly improved edition of Hagenbach. His large learning and sound judgment eminently fitted him for his task. He has not only corrected the translation in innumerable instances, but has introduced the changes and additions of the several German editions issued since the translation was first made. Numerous citations are also made from other Histories of Doctrines, as Gieseler's, Neander's, and specially Baur's, and references are given to later German, English and American works. "The additions made to the Edinburgh edition, and to the text of Hagenbach, increase the matter of the volume about one-third," and we may add greatly enhance its value.

Gieseler, Neander and Baur were undoubtedly superior to Hagen-

* *A Text-Book of the History of Doctrines.* By Dr. K. R. HAGENBACH, Professor of Theology in the University of Basle. The Edinburgh Translation of C. W. Buch, revised, with large additions from the fourth German edition, and other sources By HENRY B. SMITH, D. D., Professor in the Union Theological Seminary of the City of New York. Vol. I. New York: Sheldon & Co., 115 Nassau st, Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1861.

bach in original investigation ; but his work, as a text-book, surpasses theirs, whether regarded in its method, its minuteness of details, its fulness of citation, or, with the exception of Neander, its doctrinal bias. As now amended and enlarged by Dr. Smith, it is the best existing text-book in its department.

GANGOOLY'S LIFE AND RELIGION OF THE HINDOOS.*—Mr. Gangooly, a converted Brahmin, was born at Balie, on the Ganges, about seven miles from Calcutta. Hearing, when quite young, that many Hindoo boys were becoming Christians, through the labors of Dr. Duff of Calcutta, he was led to examine the doctrines of Christianity. A tract containing the Sermon on the Mount moved his whole nature at the first reading. He very soon became acquainted with Rev. Mr. Dall, a Unitarian missionary from Boston, "who kindly gave him Unitarian tracts." A Common-Prayer Book disturbed him about the divinity of Christ. He applied for a solution of his difficulties to an Episcopal clergyman, who gave him the Catechism. Dissatisfied, he sought Mr. Dall, who gave him Unitarian books. He became a Unitarian, because he could not believe in the Trinity, in Total Depravity, or in Eternal Punishment. Hindooism has a Trinity which, he thinks, is "far more rational, more logically and philosophically consistent, than the Christian Trinity."

Mr. Gangooly came to this country, we are told, "expressly to prepare himself as a Christian missionary." He remained two years, and to judge from the account he gives of himself, a remarkable preparation was made. He read the Gospels systematically, dabbled in the Evidences, practised English composition, and seems to have devoured promiscuously whatever books fell in his way.

Mr. Gangooly is, unquestionably, a young man of rare endowments. He will make himself felt in Calcutta. Would we could hope for a healthful influence! But when a young man reproaches Evangelical missionaries with "injudicious preaching," and with "errors and follies" in their teaching, from which "the cause of Christ suffers" in India, and declares that "he knows the best way for him will be to take a Hindoo saying and present its truth in a practical way," and that one "can preach years from texts taken from Hindoo proverbs," we must confess that we have not the most brilliant expectations of his success as

* *Life and Religion of the Hindoos. With a sketch of my Life and Experience.* By JOGUTH CHUNDAR GANGOOLY, (baptized Phillip). Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. 1860.

a *Christian* missionary. It was of itself a queer notion, to think of preparing for missionary life a very young man, just converted from Brahminism, by throwing him into the giddy whirlpool of Unitarian beliefs and disbeliefs now prevalent in Massachusetts. Pleasant thoughts must have been in the mind of the friend who put in his hand "The Experience of Theodore Parker," with whom, we are told, "on many points he was in intellectual sympathy, but differed from him in his estimate of Christ."

We have read Mr. Gangooly's volume with special interest. The first half of it, on the Life and Religion of the Hindoos, abating a few slight flings at the missionaries, is particularly instructive on points about which Occidentalists are usually very ill informed. It lets one more into the heart of Hindoo society than all other books we ever read. We regret to find in the Preface of Dr. Ellis, the following sentence, referring to certain "religious papers" that had spoken unbecomingly of Mr. Gangooly: "The harm they can do is steadily, year by year, becoming more circumscribed, as the readers for whose poor entertainment or edification they are edited, form a proportionately smaller and smaller portion of our intelligent communities, and have an equally diminished importance or influence in giving a tone to the religion of the time." This is in wretched taste, not to say totally unsupported by facts. It betrays a temper strangely discordant with the fact alleged.

MOTLEY'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED NETHERLANDS.*—We have the promise of a review of these volumes, from an accomplished contributor, for our July number, and so will not anticipate his work by any account of their contents. It will suffice to say, that Mr. Motley not only fully sustains, but exceeds the expectations of the most admiring readers of his former work. It has even a higher and more artistic finish than "The Rise of the Dutch Republic," and dwells upon scenes and themes of equal if not of superior interest.

* *History of the United Netherlands, from the death of William the Eldest to the Synod of Dort. With a full view of the English-Dutch struggle against Spain, and of the origin and destruction of the Spanish Armada. By JOHN MOTLEY, LL. D., D. C. L., Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, author of "The Rise of the Dutch Republic." Vols. I and II. New York: Harper & Brother. 1861.*

THE BAPTISTS—A VINDICATION.*—Dr. Jones has taken in hand the popular charges against the Baptists, which are circulated in cheap controversial literature, and are so often repeated by the prejudiced or ignorant. The charges are grouped under seven headings, as the origin, the continuity, the principles, spirit, polity, position and influence of the Baptists, and each point is concisely and conclusively disposed of. There are hundreds of places in our own land where Baptists are snubbed and treated with contempt, by persons who repeat the accusations—some of them almost absurd—which are so well refuted in this book. It will be useful in all such localities.

New Editions of Standard Histories.

HALLAM'S MIDDLE AGES.†—Many a collector of books, in selecting an edition of Hallam, has hitherto hesitated between the expense to his purse of an English copy, and the draft on his patience and eyesight of an American. Occasionally one has compromised the matter by purchasing a copy of a French edition. But the perplexity is removed. The most fastidious fancier of fine books must confess himself satisfied with the edition now being issued by Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co., of Boston. Printed at the far-famed Riverside press, Cambridge, on the finest of paper, and superbly bound in half-calf, it is more than worthy a place in any library. Printed from the latest and corrected edition of the author, with the contents of the supplementary volume, that embraced the latest results of his protracted investigations, distributed along the appropriate pages, it is the completest and best edition yet issued. Uniform with this, the same publishers are soon to issue his Constitutional History of England, and his Introduction to the Literature of Europe.

MILMAN'S GIBBON'S ROME.‡—The same House have also published, from the same press, the best edition by far, of Gibbon, that has yet appeared in this country. It is of all others *the* library edition.

* *The Baptists: their Origin, Continuity, Principles, Spirit, Polity, Position and Influence. A Vindication.* By T. G. JONES, D. D. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 530 Arch street.

† *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages.* By HENRY HALLAM, LL. D., F. R. A. S., Foreign Associate of the Institute of France. In three volumes. Boston. Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. 1861.

‡ *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.* By EDWARD GIBBON, Esq. With Notes by Rev. H. H. MILMAN. A new edition, to which is added a Complete Index of the whole work. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. 1861.

HUME'S ENGLAND.*—The never-failing Hume, with all his faults, can be omitted from no collection of books professing to be a library. This edition is as nearly as possible the counterpart of Gibbon. The two should always accompany each other on the shelves.

DEAN MILMAN'S HISTORY OF LATIN CHRISTIANITY.†—Messrs. Sheldon & Co.'s edition of this work, noticed in our last number, is still passing through the press, one volume a month, six in all having now been issued. Dean Milman, with all the pains-taking and patient research of a mere investigator, has succeeded in arranging his ample materials with masterly skill, and in adorning them with all the grace and beauty of a poet. The Romish Church passes before the reader, in its gigantic progress, with all the rounded fulness and vivid naturalness of passing reality.

We hope at some time not far distant, to present our readers with a review of the work as a whole, and so need not now specify its contents.

GREENE'S BIOGRAPHICAL STUDIES.‡—The accomplished author of these papers has published less, as yet, than might legitimately be expected from one of his resources and skill. We thank him, nevertheless, for the "Studies." They add to our appreciation of Fennimore Cooper and his works; they draw us more closely towards the artists Cole and Crawford; and they help us to find a new grace even in the familiar pages of Washington Irving.

SCIENTIFIC.

ANNUAL OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY.§—Nothing so forcibly reminds us of the actual progress of mankind, as the regular appearance of this Annual. Two centuries ago this year-book would have been impossible; a semi-centennial volume, of equal bulk, would have been amply suffi-

* *The History of England, from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Abdication of James the Second, 1688.* By DAVID HUME, Esq. A new edition, with the author's last corrections and improvements. To which is prefixed a short account of his Life, written by himself. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. 1861.

† *History of Latin Christianity, including that of the Popes to the Pontificate of Nicholas V.* By HENRY HART MILMAN, D. D., Dean of St. Pauls. In eight volumes. Vol. Sixth. New York: Sheldon and Company. MDCCCLXI.

‡ *Biographical Studies.* By GEORGE WASHINGTON GREENE. New York: G. P. Putnam.

§ *Annual of Scientific Discovery, or Year-Book of facts in Science and Art, for 1861. Exhibiting the most important discoveries and improvements in Mechanics,*

cient. But now, a compact, duodecimo volume of four hundred and twenty-four pages, only suffices to give a mere epitome of what has actually been done during a single year, in the various departments of science. No accessible field in the physical universe is now unworked. A countless host of inquirers and experimenters are everywhere on the alert, and the amount of exact or scientific information amassed by them in a twelve month is almost incredible. And the progress thus made in our knowledge of Mechanics and the Useful Arts, of Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Geology, Botany, Zoölogy, Astronomy, and Meteorology, is not only alleviating the physical condition of our race, by multiplying employments and wealth; but by facilitating the diffusion of Christianity and civilization throughout the world.

The Annual of Scientific Discovery is, accordingly, a book in which readers of every class will find interest and profit. Master mechanics and tradesmen will find in it much to stimulate and guide in their pursuits; all who aspire to the cultivation of a taste for scientific inquiry will discover in it hints for their encouragement and guidance; and preachers, who should make themselves familiar with its facts and principles, would enrich their stores of illustration and argument. Christianity and science must henceforth traverse the world in company, and no teacher of the religion of Christ can prove himself faithful to his trust, who ignores either the offices or the aim of modern science.

COINS, MEDALS AND SEALS, ANCIENT AND MODERN, BY W. C. PRIME.*—The science of Numismatics is of the highest importance in certain historical investigations. Like every other science, it attracts to its service many useful collectors of materials, who know nothing of the use the science is to make of them. The mania for coin collecting just now prevalent in this country, though affecting a multitude of minds who are ignorant of the science from which it springs, bids fair to lead in the end to very useful results. This volume of Mr. Prime's is both opportune and valuable. Modest in its pretensions, professing to give instruction only to young collectors, the old

Useful Arts, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geology, Zoology, Botany, Mineralogy, Meteorology, Geography, Antiquities, etc. Together with notes on the progress of Science during the year 1860; a List of Recent Scientific Publications, Obituaries of Eminent Scientific Men, etc. Edited by DAVID A. WELLS, A. M., author of Principles of Natural Philosophy, Principles of Chemistry, Science of Common Things, etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1861.

* *Coins, Medals, and Seals, Ancient and Modern. Illustrated and described. With a sketch of the history of Coins and Coinage.*

and instructed need not be deterred from looking into its pages. Its illustrations and descriptions of ancient coins are full, for the size of the volume, while that portion which relates to American coins has been prepared with special care. The mechanical execution of the volume, with its broad page, tinted paper, and fair type, make it specially inviting. No one affecting to be a collector of coins, especially of American coins, should fail to consult this, the best popular guide in his search.

TRUE'S ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.*—All men think and reason, and all men, specially all educated men, ought to reason correctly. Whatever will help to keep any one from erroneous conclusions, or protect him against sophistry, should be brought within his reach. If logic can be so simplified as to be made much more commonly than it now is a branch of study in our common schools, by all means let it be done. He is a benefactor who contributes to its being done.

This is a "revised edition" of what was published twenty years ago. Whately was the author's guide and authority. He has accordingly applied logic rather to the form of our thoughts than to the laws that regulate our thinking. Dr. True would perform a much needed work if, reconstructing his "Elements" on the basis of Hamilton, he would give us an introductory treatise on Logic, in a later and juster sense of that term.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

NATIONAL EDITION OF IRVING'S WORKS.—No family that reads, no household with children that are being educated, should be without the works of Irving. To all Americans, familiarity with his writings is the first of literary duties. And no one who is at all particular about the editions that adorn the shelves of his library, should lose the opportunity of securing the latest, the best, the fitly named "National" edition, now coming in monthly volumes from the press. Its delicately tinted paper, its clear type, the convenient size of its volumes, its numerous and costly illustrations—all combine to give it the preëminence over all the editions that have preceded it. Twelve volumes have already been issued; twenty-one, including the Life of Washington, and sixteen omitting it, complete the sets. The name of Putnam, the tasteful and liberal publisher, will hereafter stand indissolubly associated with that of Irving, the graceful and accomplished author.

* *The Elements of Logic; adapted to the capacity of younger students, and designed for academies and the higher classes of common schools.* By CHARLES K. TRUE, D. D. Revised edition. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1861.

BACON'S ESSAYS, WITH ANNOTATIONS BY WHATELY.*—The Archbishop of Dublin has been a laborious student and a prolific author. The intimate friend of Arnold of Rugby, to whom he was inferior in scholarly accuracy and enthusiasm, he has long survived him, and must now have gone far into the autumn of life. Like other English prelates, he has succeeded in proving himself to be neither a theologian nor a philosopher. Not an original investigator, and sometimes carried away by eccentricities of opinion, he bids fair to leave behind him no enduring monument worthy his industry and his powers. He began many years ago to write down the thoughts that occurred to him in reading the essays of Bacon, and these became the nuclei around which gathered much of his learning and his reflection. Some of these Annotations are on questions pertaining to the common affairs of life, some are on questions of literature, others are on obscure allusions, and others still on rare quotations. The whole, however, forming an accumulation of practical suggestion and literary disquisition that is at once curious and instructive. Written, as the Essays were, at the time when our English version of the Scriptures was made, and accompanied as they are with abundant foot-notes, explanatory of obsolete words, the volume has a special value for all students of our good old English Bible. The whole is a large octavo volume, whose mechanical execution leaves nothing to be desired. We are inclined to believe that these Annotations will be longest known of any of Whately's productions.

RECREATIONS OF A COUNTRY PASTOR.†—Such a work as this could proceed only from the heart of an English home. It breathes the very spirit of happy repose. The parson is a well-to-do parson, in a comfortable living, and can look with compassion and sympathy on a brother, who, "like poor Sidney Smith, adds his accounts, calculates his little means, and wonders where he can pinch or pare any closer." Our parson can afford, in an unostentatious way, to keep his horses, dogs, man-servant and maid-servants, as a country gentleman ought; and, withal, he can take his family in the summer, on a few weeks' excursion to the sea-shore, or elsewhere. Yet he is not too affluent, since the zest with which he unties a package of new books is not impaired by

* *Bacon's Essays, with Annotations.* By RICHARD WHATELY, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. Fifth edition. Revised and Enlarged. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. 1861.

† *The Recreations of a Country Pastor.* Ticknor & Fields. 1861.

the thought that he can buy just as many more as he likes. He loves good English books better, even, than good English beef, but he cannot, like Coleridge, dive at one with a dinner knife. He placidly cuts the leaves with a reflective, prolonged, anticipatory enjoyment. He has plenty of time to make the acquaintance of his horses, and stranger still, of his children. He has time to look at the shadows passing over his little lawn, at his flowers, his hedges, his orchard, at the country all up and down the roads which he jogs over in his parish visits. He looks and *thinks*, though never hard, and in a straight line to an end, but all about a thing; and then, in an unaffected, unpretending way, with quiet humor, genial temper, pleasant simplicity, he writes down his reflections and sends them to a favorite magazine. So his book is made; a summer book for an American to cool off with after a hurried day in the city, or to grow confidential with under an old whispering elm in the country.

GRIMM'S POPULAR TALES.* — Every language has its household stories; the older and more advanced in culture the nation, the more numerous and suggestive its stories. The propriety of storing youthful minds with these, is a grave question, about which judicious parents are not agreed. On the one hand, it is maintained that the stories stimulate the imagination, and help to people the hard dry world of fact with creations that call out the subtler powers of our nature, and so elevate and refine us; while, on the other hand, it is affirmed that they stimulate to diseased activity those delicate susceptibilities on whose gentle and healthful exercise so much depend our happiness in childhood, and the harmonious development of our character in manhood. We are disposed to believe that the true course must be determined by the constitution and temperament of the child; what would be serviceable and healthful to one, would be poisonous and fatal to another.

The German popular tales of the Brothers Grimm, are known the world over. They have been newly and admirably translated, and, profusely illustrated by Wehnert, are printed in two beautiful volumes.

* *German Popular Tales and Household Stories.* Collected by the BROTHERS GRIMM. Newly translated, by EDWARD H. WEHNERT. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. 1861.

THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

Among the recent deaths in Germany, is that of Ferdinand Christian Baur, Prof. of Theology in the University of Tübingen, for many years known as one of the most learned and able of the German Rationalists, and the leader and head of the so-called Tübingen School. He was born 1792, and died in December last. He was a disciple, first of Schleiermacher, and subsequently of Hegel, and his numerous writings have aimed at the subversion of all true faith in a personal God, and an atoning Saviour. His last prayer, "Lord, grant me a peaceful end," was in harmony with the negative character of his system, and contrasts strikingly with the closing scenes and utterances of Bunsen, who, although he adopted many fanciful and extravagant views, and often seemed to be losing all hold of the concrete truths of the Gospel, yet seems after all to have retained in his heart the germs of a genuine Christian faith. The writings of Baur were extensive in the department of historical Theology. Among his distinguished disciples were Schweigler and Zeller, both among the ablest historians of ancient philosophy. Among other recent deaths, we must record that of Prof. J. G. Kosegarten of Griefswald, a distinguished Oriental philologist, in August last; of Dr. J. A. Theiner, Theol. Prof. at Breslau, in September; and of John George Krabinger, Librarian in Munich, and author of several editions of Writings of the Fathers, distinguished for the reliableness of their critical apparatus.

Reuter's Repertorium für die theologische Literatur, Heft IX, 1860, contains a notice of J. L. Studeck's work on The Primitive Religion (*die Urreligion*) or the Original Alphabet discovered, 2 vols., 1856, 1859, in which the author, a profound Runic scholar, aims to show that the religious doctrines of all heathen nations of the ancient world, however apparently different their alphabetical and mythological dress, have yet all sprung from the same cradle; that the Gods of all the nations were essentially the same. He maintains that there is one original alphabet lying at the basis of all the pre-Christian alphabets, and finds in it not only the basis of every organized language, but a religious symbolism, or the common articles of faith of all the early nations. This original alphabet consists of precisely twelve letters, nine consonants and three vowels, and each number of this *dodecad* has a fourfold significance; an arithmetical (number), a phonetic (sound), a geometric (writing), and a symbolical (form). The forms are expressed in the twelve signs of the Zodiac, which take rank according to their alphabetical signs to which they respectively cor-

respond. It reviews favorably Dr. H. Schmid's Manual of the History of Doctrines (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch.*). It notices a new work by Dr. Philip Frederick Keerl, entitled "Man, the Image of God (*der Mensch, das Ebenbild Gottes*), his relation to Christ and to the world. The first volume only has as yet appeared, under the title, The History of Creation and the Doctrine of Paradise, which treats in an extended and thorough manner of the heavenly bodies, the solar system, the peculiar structure and condition of the earth, and the harmony of science in all these respect with the biblical account of creation, discussing multitudes of related topics as the relation of Satan to the Earth, and to the Planets, the Angels and the Fixed Stars, the Deluge, etc., and finally examines at length the doctrine of Paradise, its position, history and nature. The work is commended as thorough, and holding fast to the authority of Scripture.

Heft X, 1860, reviews Dr. A. Köhler's Haggai, the commencement of a work on the Prophets after the Exile (*die Nacherilischen Propheten*), ascribing to him sagacity, learning and exegetical tact. It notices Stier's Words of the Angels somewhat unfavorably, both as to its title and its accuracy—the first we think hypercritically—while professing profound regard for the rich Christian feeling of the author. It comments in the main favorably on a small work by Hebart, on the Natural Theology of the Apostle Paul, which seeks to expound Paul's doctrine regarding the *natural revelation of God*; and commends in strong terms the new edition of Meyer's Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians (8th part of the Works), as deserving not merely the praise of philological exactness and acumen, but of penetrating sharply into the innermost depths of the word of God. It approves decidedly of Meyer's reference of the well known passage, iv: 9, "He descended first into the lower parts of the earth"—to the traditionary doctrine of Christ's descent into hell, to preach to the spirits in prison. Dr. Düsterdieck, author of a well known and able Commentary on the Epistles of John, and the Commentator on the Apocalypse for Meyer's Commentary, reviews in Heft XI of the *Repertorium*, Ebrard's Commentary on the Epistles of John, with general approval, though differing from him in some important points of explanation.

The *Zeitschrift für die gesammte lutherische Theologie und Kirche*, Heft I, 1861, contains A. G. Rudelbach's Confessions; C. F. Keil on Shilo, Gen. xlix: 10; J. M. Hurban, The Church Parties and the Church; C. F. Göschel, Political Law in connexion with Ecclesiastical and International Law, according to the Old and New Testament Scriptures; with a Bibliography of recent Theological Literature.

Allihnu & Ziller's *Zeitschrift für exacte Philosophie*, 2 Heft, 1860, contains articles by Ch. A. Thilo on the Fundamental Errors of Idealism, in its development from Kant to Hegel, concluded; on the Science of Theoretical Philosophy, and a preliminary article by Allihnu, on the Reform of Metaphysics, by Hebart.

The *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 38 vol. I. Heft, embraces articles by Dr. Swegler on the Idea and Object of the Doctrine of Knowledge; by Ulrici on the Nature of the Soul, philosophically

considered; by Dr. Harless on the Apparatus of the Will, and by Cullmann, a second article on the Principles of the Philosophy of Fr.v. Baaden and G. A. v. Schaden.

Welcker & Ritschl's *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, Heft IV, 1860, contains discussions of the Sophist Hippias, of Elis by Mähly, an article by Halm on the Criticism of the Text of the Rhetoricad Herennium, and articles by Mommsen and by Enger, critical and exegetical, on the Agamemnon of Æschylus.

WORKS IN THEOLOGY, EXEGESIS, ETC.—Prof. Fred. Bleek's Introduction to the Scriptures (*Einleitung in die heilige Schrift*), ed. by J. F. Bleek and Ad. Kamphausen, vol. I, containing the Introduction to the Old Testament, 854 pp.—Bunsen's "Biblework" for the Church embraces in the second half of the fourth half volume, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and the twelve minor prophets. A neat Atlas to the "Biblework," consisting of ten maps, has been prepared by H. Lange.—J. P. Lange's "Biblework," theological and homiletical, designed to meet the wants of Pastors, has reached in the New Testament (Part XI), the Pastoral Epistles and the Epistle to Philemon, by Dr. J. J. Van Oosterzee.—Dr. U. Hepp, the Doctrines of the Reformed Church (*Die Dogmatik der Evangelisch-reformirten Kirche*), from the Sources, 526 pp.—Gumpach, the Prophet Habakkuk, translated and explained after the revised Hebrew Text.—Dr. G. K. Mayer, the Messianic Prophecies of Isaiah; Vienna, 511 pp.—"Life and Select Writings of John Calvin" (*Leben und Ausgewählte Schriften, etc.*), by E. Stähelin, constitutes the 4th part, 1st half of Hagenbach's series of Lives and Select Writings of the Fathers of the Reformed Church.

In Patristics, V. von Strauss has published a work on Polycarp, Heidelberg, 347 pp.—The Apologies of Justin Martyr, ed. by Braun, 2d ed., published at Bonn.

PHILOSOPHY.—The Speculative System of John Scotus Erigena, by Dr. W. Kaulich, Prague, 84 pp., 4.—A tract on the Progress of Metaphysics among the oldest Ionic Philosophers. A historico-philosophical study, by Dr. R. Leydell, Leip., 74 pp.—Philosophical Propædeutics (*Phil. Propædeutik*), an Introduction to Philosophy, embracing Prolegomena, Logic, Empirical Psychology, by Prof. Dr. R. Zimmermann, 2d enlarged ed., Vienna, 432 pp.—On Philosophical Method, by Dr. J. H. Leuzen, Cologne, 454 pp.—Jacob Böhme, the German Philosopher, the harbinger of Christian Science, by Dr. A. Peip, Leipz., 264 pp.—Chalybäus Hist. of Speculative Philosophy from Kant to Hegel, 5th ed., revised.—Francis Sanchez, a contribution to the history of Philosophic Movements at the beginning of Modern Times, by Dr. Gerkrath, Vienna, 149 pp.

CLASSICAL LITERATURE AND PHILOLOGY.—A pamphlet of 50 pp., published by Buxtorf-Falkeisen, contains the correspondence of the Hebraist, John Buxtorf, the elder, with distinguished scholars and men of his time.—The Life of the Greeks and Romans, from ancient Sculptures; 1st half, the Greeks, with 317 wood cuts printed in the text.—The Life and Political Acts and Influence of Demosthenes, from the

Sources, by Dr. O. Haupt.—Horace's Satyres, in Latin and German with explanations, by Dr. L. Döderlein, 318 pp.—The Works of Porphyry, the Neo-Platonist, ed. by A. Nauck, are published by Teubner, Leipz., 1 vol., 223 pp.—The third vol., fasc. 2, of Hesychius' Lexicon, edited by Schmidt, Jena.—F. G. Welcker's Doctrine of the Gods among the Greeks, 2 vols.—Etymological Inquiries, by Dr. H. Weber, Halle.

FRANCE.

L. Bautain has published a work on Conscience, or the Rule of Human Actions, 452 pp.—P. Cruice has translated into Latin, and published with his own and selected notes, Hippolytus' Philosophoumena, ascribed to Origen, 548 pp.—A volume of 618 pp., contains a new edition of part of the Works of Descartes, with an Introduction by Jules Simon.—Robinet, Notice on the Works and Life of Auguste Comte.—Jules Jolly, History of the Intellectual Movement in the sixteenth and the first half the seventeenth century.

The Jews in France, Italy, and Spain; researches on their condition from their dispersion to the present time, in respect to legislation, literature, and commerce, by J. Bédarride, 2d ed., 616 pp.

M. Bouillet is translating into French, for the first time, the *Enneads* of Plotinus, the Coryphæus of Neo-Platonism, preceded by his life, with fragments of Porphyry, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, etc., accompanied by notes and explanations. The third vol. has 700 pp.

Didot has published in 2 vols., the *Fragmenta Philosophorum Græcorum*, ed. by Mullachiús, author of some excellent editions of early Greek philosophers.—A History of Religious Persecutions in Spain, alike of Moors, Jews, and Protestants, by E. de la Rigaudière.—Puaux, Hist. of the French Reformation, vol. IV.

M. Blanchet has published an able and thorough work on Goethe's *Faust*, interpreting it after the principal German commentators.

The New Annals (*Nouvelles Annales*) of Travels, of Geography, of History, and of Archæology, by V. A. Maltebrun, is now in its sixth series, and is executed with the industry and care demanded of so important a work. It aims, in a great measure, to carry out the plan of the great work of the late Carl Ritter, of Berlin.

The Reflections on the Compassion of God (*Réflexions sur la Miséricorde de Dieu*), attributed with probability to the Duchess de la Vallière, has been published in two elegant volumes, by Pierre Clément, of the Institute, with annotations and a biographical essay, including selections from her letters, etc.

M. Noël des Vergers, who has long resided and studied in Italy, has published an Essay on Marcus Aurelius, which is one of the most remarkable of recent works on Roman History, sketching not only the personal character of the Emperor, but the state of society in its relations both to Philosophy and Christianity.

M. Jules Rennay, a Naturalist, on returning from a journey of ten years, made purely in the interests of Science, has published in Paris a work on the History of the Mormons, in 2 vols., with maps and plates. A work of great interest and excellence.